Doing a good job in regulating grain reserves plays an important role in stabilizing the market, preparing for famine and helping farmers. China's grain purchasing and storage policy has reached the window of reform. After China's grain market was fully liberalized at the beginning of the 20th century, a policy grain reserve system with strategic reserve and market support was formed. The two types of reserves have their own functions, which effectively play the role of crisis response and market regulation. However, it can be clearly seen that the policy grain reserve system has long deviated from the position of timely regulation in the market in the past. The market purchase price has become the "wind vane" of the market price, and the government's monopoly on purchasing and storing has squeezed private reserves, seriously distorting the market mechanism. More seriously, the market distortion caused by policy purchasing and storage is inconsistent with China's high-quality development trend, which constantly increases the pressure on natural resources and environment and even becomes the focus of multilateral trade disputes. In the new stage of development, it is necessary to re-sort out the objectives and functions of policy grain reserve and reconstruct the policy grain reserve system.

First of all, China's policy grain reserve system faces severe challenges.

In the past, the problems of the grain reserve system mainly focused on distorting the market mechanism and frequent regulatory loopholes. However, "stubborn diseases" have not been solved, and "new troubles" have emerged one after another. Under the background of deepening trade globalization, tightening resource and environment constraints and accelerating domestic consumption upgrading, China's policy grain reserve system is facing more and more severe challenges.

1. There are many contradictions in the grain market.

Stimulated by a series of supporting policies, such as agricultural subsidies and stock market acquisition, China's grain output has increased rapidly. But at the same time, the prices of means of production are rising, and maintaining farmers' enthusiasm for growing grain has become highly dependent on market acquisition. The scope of the purchase of the market is expanding, the inventory scale continues to be high, and the grain market presents an obvious "policy city" orientation. International food prices have experienced two peaks around 2008 and around 20 10. Since 20 13, staple food prices at home and abroad have been completely upside down, which has aggravated the downward pressure on domestic food prices. Grain and oil processing enterprises are facing fierce external competition pressure. The high cost of domestic raw materials leads to "strong rice and weak wheat", which squeezes the profit space of enterprises and weakens the competitiveness of products. Continuing to maintain a high level of support will further aggravate the market block, increase financial costs, and face greater market risks and policy risks in the future. If it is liberalized, it is very likely to dampen the enthusiasm for growing grain, leading to a sharp drop in output and threatening national food security. If we take the initiative to go out of stock, the market price will drop too fast, which will hit the processing willingness of processing enterprises and the regulation of domestic grain market will fall into a big dilemma.

2. FAO yellow box restrictions

The policy of supporting the market for purchasing and storage belongs to the support policy of WTO yellow box restriction. According to the requirements of China's entry into WTO, the total amount of subsidies should not exceed 8.5% of the total output value of such agricultural products. With the continuous expansion of stock market support, stock market support policies have become the focus of international multilateral trade disputes. As early as 2065438+September 2006, the United States believed that China's total subsidies for rice, wheat and corn exceeded the yellow box quota and filed a lawsuit with the WTO. The biggest controversy between China and the United States lies in the definition of "output eligible for subsidies". The United States insists that the minimum purchase price implementation plan does not explicitly limit the number of acquisitions, and the output of all supporting provinces is within the scope of subsidies. However, the Chinese side said that the scope of the acquisition is greatly limited by the acquisition time, start-up conditions, acquisition quality standards and farmers' selling habits. 2065438+On February 28th, 2009, the WTO issued a report on the domestic support case of the United States v. China in the WTO dispute over wheat, rice and corn. The expert group rejected the US request for corn litigation, but concluded that China's minimum purchase price policy for wheat and rice violated its commitment to enter the market. Out of respect for the WTO, China accepted the ruling on June 12, 1965, and promised to complete the policy reform of minimum purchase price of wheat and rice before March 3 1 2020. Multilateral trade disputes have shaken the foundation of the policy of supporting the market for purchasing and storing, and the space for supporting the market for regulation has been further narrowed, which is not conducive to maintaining the stability of China's grain market and protecting farmers' enthusiasm for growing grain.

3. Natural resources and environmental constraints

Behind the grain reserve system is a higher demand for food self-sufficiency, which intensifies the damage to natural resources and the environment. China's per capita land and water resources are very scarce, and the development of industry and urbanization constantly squeezes the cultivated land space, which intensifies the predatory development of agricultural resources. The per capita arable land area of more than 600 counties in China is lower than the warning line of 0.8 mu per capita stipulated by FAO. High yield is based on high input. From 1980 to 20 15, China's grain output increased by 82.8%, while the amount of chemical fertilizer application increased by 4.5 times, and the growth rate of chemical fertilizer application far exceeded the growth rate of grain output. The consumption of agricultural plastic film in 199 1 10,000 tons per year increased to 2,603,600 tons in 20 15 years, more than four times that of 199 1 year. Large-scale non-point source pollution caused by agriculture has become one of the main sources of environmental pollution in China. For a long time, the high-pressure utilization of agricultural resources has made agricultural production highly dependent on chemical inputs. Without "one-off" fertilizer input, there will be no output. The destruction of agricultural resources is not optimistic. If we further emphasize the increase of grain output without protecting and restoring the future agricultural ecological resources, it will directly destroy the foundation of ensuring food security.

4. High quality requirements of consumers

China's economic and social development has entered a new stage, and the transformation and upgrading of people's consumption has put forward more requirements for food quality. Consumers are not satisfied with eating enough, and eating well, diversifying and nourishing has become the main direction of food consumption. In recent years, there has been a situation that domestic grain production can't keep up with consumer demand, which directly leads to a substantial increase in imports of foreign high-quality agricultural products. China's economy has shifted from a high-speed growth stage to a high-quality development stage, and the grain industry is also facing the requirements of high-quality development. At present, the problem of insufficient development imbalance in the grain field is more prominent: the imbalance is manifested in rapid quantity growth, slow quality improvement, rapid production development and slow ecological improvement; The low ability to ensure food and food safety highlights this deficiency. New requirements such as the transformation and upgrading of consumption structure, the improvement of the competitiveness of the grain industry, and national food security urgently require the high-quality development of the grain industry. The long-term leading role of policy grain purchasing and storage in the grain market has led to the emphasis on grain quantity and the neglect of grain quality. A small amount of high-quality grain has flowed into the market, and most of the inferior grain has entered the state treasury. This not only leads to the long-term dislocation of grain supply and demand, but also affects the quality of grain in the national treasury and wastes the country's high-quality reserve resources.

Two, China policy grain reserve system target imbalance and system out of control.

The problems existing in China's policy purchasing and storage are closely related to its system design. The policy grain purchasing and storage system undertakes the functions of ensuring national food security, ensuring farmers' income from growing grain and stabilizing the grain market. The realization of these goals depends on two major reserve systems: the central strategic reserve and the stock market. The former is mainly a conventional reserve held to cope with natural disasters, wars and other emergencies, while the latter is mainly a temporary buffer reserve to cope with market fluctuations and sharp market declines. The strategic reserve was formed in the grain market reform from 65438 to 0999, which was marked by the establishment of the Central Grain Reserve Company. The system of supporting the market originated from the promulgation of the implementation plan of the minimum purchase price of rice in 2004. In the early stage of grain market reform, policy reserve effectively played the role of policy orientation and market stability, but in the long-term practice, policy orientation began to deviate, and a series of problems followed.

1. Multi-objective superposition and deviation of policy purchasing and storage

In different countries and regions, the objectives of grain reserves can be roughly summarized as three: food security, income and price stability, and economic benefits. The first two goals are easy to understand, while the economic benefits focus on the balance between the overall income of producers and consumers and the national financial burden. The objectives of China's policy grain reserves are also very similar, and in terms of the functions of the two types of reserve systems, the two types of reserves correspond to different reserve objectives: strategic reserves mainly play the role of the last line of defense for food security, and the policy of supporting the market to purchase and store is mainly used to deal with the initial sharp market fluctuations. In 2004, the implementation plan of the minimum purchase price of rice marked the introduction of the policy of supporting the market. The plan clearly stated: "The minimum purchase price policy is different from the previous protective price acquisition. In order to prevent excessive policy intervention in the market, it is only started under certain circumstances. " That is, only when there is a major change in grain supply and demand, only the key grain varieties that are in short supply and only the main grain producing areas will be implemented. At this time, the division of policy grain purchasing and storage is clear, and the rights and responsibilities are clear. Practice has also proved that the two types of policy purchasing and storage have indeed played a role in stabilizing the market and promoting stable grain production.

However, under the pressure of increasing farmers' income and ensuring food security, market support has gradually expanded from a single goal of ensuring market stability under special circumstances in the past to multiple goals of ensuring farmers' income, food security and stabilizing the market. The superposition of multiple objectives has disrupted the design of the purchasing and storage system with division of labor in the past, and handed over the functional part of food security to the purchasing and storage policy of the market. In order to achieve this goal, we must ensure the steady growth of grain output and further distort the stable income function of the policy of supporting the market to increase farmers' income. Therefore, the stock market actually undertakes the triple goals of ensuring farmers' income, food security and stabilizing the market. It is easy for a single policy to undertake triple objectives, which will lead to confusion of policy objectives. Once it is difficult to balance the relationship between goals, it will inevitably lead to policy distortion. In the specific implementation process, the priority of market stability goal is replaced by food security, and the concern for food security goal further strengthens the function of supporting the market to increase farmers' income. At this point, it is obvious that the stock market has gradually deviated from the previous positioning of starting under specific circumstances, and the actual policy objectives have far exceeded the function of ensuring market stability.

2. Viscosity dependence of bearing and storage system and generalization of supporting market.

The deviation from the goal of ensuring stability to ensuring income has led to the continuous expansion of market support. Initially, the government was very cautious in expanding the scope of market support. Only the minimum purchase price policy for rice was introduced in 2004, and the minimum purchase price policy for wheat was further introduced in 2006. Since then, in order to stabilize the production of other important agricultural products, the government has further introduced the "compatriots" policy of supporting the market-the temporary purchasing and storage policy. Unlike the stock market, which announces the stock price when sowing, the temporary purchasing and storage policy only announces the purchase price when harvesting, which has a relatively weak guiding effect on the market. It can be seen that the government is still cautious about supporting the market at this time. However, after the positioning of supporting the market for purchasing and storage is biased towards increasing farmers' income, the scale of supporting the market for purchasing and storage will inevitably be further expanded. From 2007 to 2009, the state successively implemented the temporary purchasing and storage policy for corn, soybean and rapeseed in the main producing areas in Northeast China. Since 20 1 1, China's main cotton producing areas have implemented the policy of temporary purchasing and storage of cotton, and China's main sugar producing areas have implemented the policy of temporary purchasing and storage of sugar.

The deviation of policy orientation and the incomplete marketization of purchasing and storage organization and management system further aggravate the generalization of market support. In the late 1990s, after the establishment of the vertical management system of central grain reserves, the local state-owned grain system that once "ate policy meals" immediately faced the challenge of transformation. Without central financial allocation, local state-owned grain enterprises will either purchase and store local grain reserves or enter the market for market-oriented purchase and storage. Local reserves are restricted by the weak local financial strength, and the market risk faced by market-oriented purchasing and storage is too large. After the introduction of the stock market acquisition policy, the storage enterprises can get the full subsidy from the central government, which gives many local state-owned grain enterprises an opportunity. Local state-owned grain enterprises compete for the task of supporting the market and purchasing, and the phenomenon of "running relations to storing grain" frequently appears. China's grain storage adopts the principal-agent method to support the market, and the information asymmetry under the principal-agent structure intensifies the management difficulty. In order to obtain as many storage fees as possible, the entrusted storage enterprises have as many storage impulses as possible during the grain harvest, further expanding the scope of market support. The reform of grain system needs to reorganize and arrange the existing interest structure. In the past grain market reform, the institutional defects and departmental interests of state-owned grain enterprises have more or less formed some resistance. After the reform, the stickiness of the departmental management system still exists, which makes the market-oriented control means return to the essence of policy intervention to some extent.

3. The formation of state monopoly pattern in the market system

Under the combined effect of the deviation of purchasing and storage target and the sticky dependence of the system, the purchasing and storage policy of supporting the market began to expand. The scope of market acquisition has expanded from two major rations to important food crops such as corn and soybeans, and further expanded to important agricultural products such as cotton, oil and sugar. In order to ensure the basic income of farmers, the minimum purchase price and temporary storage price are continuously raised. From 2008 to 20 18, the minimum purchase price of early indica rice increased by 93%, middle and late indica rice increased by 92%, and japonica rice increased by 107%. From 2009 to 20 14, the minimum purchase price of white wheat increased by 64%, and the minimum purchase price of red wheat and mixed wheat reached 7 1%. From 20 10 to 20 13, the temporary storage price of corn increased by 49%; From 2009 to 2065438+02, the price of temporary storage and storage of soybeans increased by 24%; From 20 10 to 20 13, the temporary storage price of rapeseed increased by 38%.

The signal of supporting the market is transmitted and fed back in the market. Under the long-term dynamic effect, the state monopoly pattern in the grain market system has formed. The market support effectively stabilized farmers' expectations and increased grain output, but it also caused more grain to be listed in the next harvest period, which led to a cliff-like decline in food prices and forced the market support to restart. With the increase of means of production, the decline of grain price further squeezes grain income, and the stock market price rises correspondingly, which leads to the further solidification of the signal transmission channel of the stock market, the accelerated decline rate and the further increase of the stock market acquisition pressure. After such a long-term evolution, the market price basically conforms to the market price, and the market supply and demand situation is vague. Farmers basically rely on subsidies and market prices to grow grain. In the year of rising market prices, a large number of industrial and commercial capitals were stimulated to rent land and grow grain in rural areas. After delivery, most of the grain enters the national grain depot through layers of middlemen. From 2006 to 20 10, the government bought 34. 1% wheat in the market with the lowest purchase price policy, and after 2008, Linchu bought more than 80% corn. On the one hand, private grain enterprises purchase storage to meet their own processing needs, on the other hand, they use market fluctuations to earn the difference. In the government-led grain market, the purchase price of private enterprises is difficult to compete with the market price, the state monopoly leads to extremely stable market, and the external environment for private enterprises to purchase and store is basically lost. As a result, the acquisition of food resources by processing enterprises is reduced, the enthusiasm for purchasing and storing is obviously reduced, and more raw materials are purchased from policy stocks. The grain market eventually evolved into a "policy city" mainly supporting the market. In order to ensure farmers' income, the government has also paid a lot of financial costs in maintaining the operation of the stock market acquisition system.

Under the state monopoly pattern, the disadvantages of the acquisition management system are further highlighted. China's grain purchasing and storage has the power to decide local grain depots, which leads to rent-seeking behavior of local grain departments and grain enterprises. Because purchasing and storage enterprises can get a considerable amount of subsidies from the state after obtaining purchasing and storage qualifications, purchasing and storage qualifications have become scarce resources for grain purchasing and storage enterprises. In order to obtain purchasing and storage opportunities, local grain departments lead to rent-seeking behavior, and "circle grain" and corruption cases are frequently exposed.

These are just internal problems in the grain market. From a broader perspective, the distortion brought by policy purchasing and storage has pushed agricultural policy to a dead end. The policy of ensuring national food security by maintaining farmers' enthusiasm for production has led to a continuous increase in output, but the quality has been low for a long time, and the structural contradiction between supply and demand has become more intense in the new development stage. Under the background of globalization, policy purchasing and storage has become the focus of trade disputes, and under the increasingly severe multilateral trade environment, it has become the soft spot for other countries to sue China for distorting the international market. Long-term high-intensity agricultural operations have intensified the destruction of agricultural resources and environment, and the resources and environmental conditions on which people's lives and social development depend have been pushed to the limit.

Third, the goal decomposition and functional regression of China's policy grain reserve system.

It can be seen that after the policy orientation of supporting the market has changed from stabilizing the market to ensuring basic income, there are more and more interventions and distortions brought by policy purchasing and storage. This distortion has obvious "bullwhip effect", which is further extended to all aspects of economic and social development after being transmitted and amplified by market signals. The main idea to solve the dilemma is to adjust the target range of policy purchasing and storage, decompose overlapping targets, and reconfigure functional authority.

1. stable income: divest the function of purchasing, storing and increasing income by supporting the market, and return from "supporting the market" to "supporting the bottom"

In order to avoid the interference and transmission of the market support signal, it is necessary to divest the income-increasing function of the market support storage as soon as possible. The direct link between purchasing and storage and price will distort the market signal, and the government's public acquisition will distort the real relationship between supply and demand in the market. When the market supply and demand is extremely unbalanced or fluctuates greatly, this kind of effective government intervention measures can really play a greater role, but it is not suitable for conventional market regulation. To cut off the dynamic transmission of government intervention signals in the grain market, we need to filter out the function of increasing income. There are two ways to filter: one is to cancel the stock market directly, and the other is to limit the stock market acquisition to a certain range. The direct cancellation of stock market support fundamentally cuts off the influence of government intervention on the formation of market prices, but the result may be a sharp drop in prices in the short term and a dynamic adjustment of supply and demand in the long term. Judging from the reform experience of temporary purchasing and storage of corn, the market price of corn dropped sharply after the temporary purchasing and storage was cancelled, and the price in some areas even "halved". Although the state has introduced a producer subsidy policy at the same time, the enthusiasm of growers for growing grain has been severely hit, and many areas have returned to rent and run away. If the market acquisition is completely cancelled in the field of rations, it may seriously threaten the national food security.

Therefore, to some extent, restricting stock market purchases is more in line with the actual situation in China. We can consider returning to the original intention of the purchase policy of supporting the market, narrowing the scope of implementation of supporting the market, and making it truly a "supporting the bottom" policy launched in a specific period. In fact, although developed countries such as Europe and America have not implemented intervention in purchasing and storage at present, they have not completely abolished the system design. The institutional framework of American marketing aid loan project and EU public intervention acquisition still exists, but the starting conditions have been improved through various restrictions. To change "supporting the market" into "supporting the bottom", the primary consideration is the price level of supporting the market. In the past, when setting the purchase price, both the production cost and the appropriate income should be taken into account. Even in the later target price reform of cotton and soybean, the target price was set according to the same pricing method, which determined that government intervention would inevitably distort the market pricing mechanism. We can limit the scope of the stock market from three starting situations at the beginning of stock market buying in the past: "Only when there is a major change in grain supply and demand", the stock market price will be reduced to the level of cost or slightly lower than the cost, and it will be restarted when the market fails and it is difficult to adjust spontaneously; "Only the key grain varieties that are in short supply will be implemented", and the varieties entrusted to the market will be strictly limited to the two major rations of rice and wheat, so as to further improve the quality standards for entering the market; "Only the main grain producing areas" will be implemented, and the scope of market support will be further narrowed on the basis of the existing market support areas, and some areas that have achieved high quality and good price will be purchased by the market, and the varieties of poor quality areas will be improved or reduced, and the weak areas in central China will be supported.

2. Market stability: encourage people to buffer and store more, and ensure the spontaneous buffering capacity of the market.

The policy of supporting the market for purchasing and storing has caused false stability in the grain market. On the surface, it is a stable scene of small price fluctuations. In fact, the grain market has stagnated and lost its vitality. Such stability does not mean that the grain market is running healthily. On the contrary, all kinds of business entities in the market have lost their basic risk buffering ability. Once the real risk comes, all kinds of market players have little resistance. A healthy and stable state of the grain market should be the spontaneous operation of all kinds of private reserve subjects, giving full play to their own functions to buffer market fluctuations. Private reserves play a major role in fluctuations, and government reserves interact with them and play a complementary role.

The contraction of the scope of market purchasing and storage has left room for the spontaneous acquisition of the market. Encourage grain enterprises and farmers to enter the market for purchasing and storage, and cultivate the spontaneous adjustment ability of private purchasing and storage entities. In the past, the monopoly of government purchasing and storage squeezed the market operation space, which greatly inhibited the enthusiasm of grain purchasing and storage enterprises and farmers. Encouraging and supporting farmers' reserves can not only improve the market's ability to stabilize its own supply and ensure food security, but also help to reduce the burden on the government. The grain storage of farmers' specialized households is decreasing, so we can consider developing farmers' reserves with the support of new agricultural management entities. Large grain growers have a large planting scale, and the demand for storage facilities is more urgent. Taking this as an opportunity, we can provide discount loans or in-kind support to large households, which can not only meet their own storage needs, but also drive neighboring farmers to sell grain and prevent the problem of difficulty in selling grain. In the United States, the government has a facility credit project specifically for farm reserve facilities, which effectively increases the scale of farm reserves and improves the ability of producers to cope with market risks. At the enterprise level, after the market is liberalized, there will be certain market fluctuations, which can restore the purchasing and storage of enterprises of a certain scale. However, it should be noted that the government needs to guide and standardize the purchasing and storage behavior of enterprises to prevent excessive speculation, because enterprises themselves have profit-seeking motives. Judging from the supervision experience of other countries, there are two kinds of supervision measures: one is to encourage enterprises to purchase and store by means of purchasing and storage subsidies. When the price of grain is too low, France provides subsidies to grain enterprises, encourages them to buy in the market, and raises the price. The other is a joint venture between government and enterprises. India adopts PPP mode of cooperation between government and enterprises, and supports private enterprises to build warehouses 10. After the warehouse is completed, the government has priority to use it. All these can ensure that the government's ability to regulate private reserves will not be weakened.

3. Food security: adhere to the strategic purchasing and storage of food security, and separate the safeguard function of safeguarding the market.

Ensuring food security is the fundamental requirement of policy reserve. In the face of natural disasters, wars and other emergencies, policy grain reserves are necessary strategic materials to quickly respond to the crisis. In the past policy grain reserve system, both the central strategic reserve and the entrusted market reserve played an important role in ensuring food security, but their performances were quite different. The organizational management system of strategic grain reserves has always been the vertical management of the central government, with a strict rotation management system, and there have been almost no major regulatory loopholes. However, management loopholes and corruption cases are frequently exposed in the purchasing and storage market policy, and problems such as irregular acquisition and auction stages and aging of grain are also common and criticized. Although the two types of policy purchasing and storage have purchased a large amount of grain, and even made China the largest grain reserve country in the world, the safety of the quantity does not mean that it is really safe to look back.

On the basis of adhering to the strategic reserve, we should separate the function of supporting the market to ensure food security and concentrate the function of ensuring food security on the national strategic grain reserve. At present, the central grain reserve management system is relatively mature, the reserve technology and ability are at the international advanced level, and it has the ability to support strategic materials. However, in the part of supporting the market, regulatory loopholes cover up the real number of policy reserves, and the auction is not timely, leading to food aging and other problems. Therefore, from the book point of view, the market has stored a considerable amount of grain, but a considerable part of it may be "invalid inventory". In case of emergency, it may be impossible to dispatch food, or the dispatched food cannot meet the quality requirements of rations. Judging from the cost-benefit of ensuring food security, the efficiency of supporting the market to store and store grain is far lower than that of strategic reserve. We can consider removing the inefficient part of supporting the market and focusing the food security function on the strategic reserve.

Fourthly, the institutional reconstruction of China's policy grain reserve system.

Policy purchasing and storage involves not only the grain circulation field, but also the whole economic system and social system, which is closely related to the level of agricultural development and farmers' lives. In the new stage of development, the policy grain reserve system needs to be reconstructed as soon as possible, and relevant supporting policies should be issued in time. After the target decomposition and functional regression of the reserve policy, it is necessary to have corresponding support measures to supplement the "vacancy" of the policy, thus forming an all-round and multi-angle grain production support system.

Reconstructing China Grain Reserve System

1. After government procurement is stored, it will "support the bottom" to avoid yellow box restrictions and strengthen supervision and accountability.

Policy-based purchasing and storage should not assume the function of ensuring planting income, but should play the role of the last line of defense in maintaining food security, market stability and income stability. Policy purchasing and storage has obvious effect but deep intervention, which is not suitable for daily regulation, but suitable for market-oriented policy. The strategic reserve will continue to assume the responsibility of ensuring food security and responding to emergencies. The storage and rotation of strategic reserves are still fully supervised by China Grain Reserve to ensure that they are "well managed, well adjusted and used". The policy of supporting the market for purchasing and storage should be contracted according to the market affordability and WTO yellow box restrictions, so as to ensure that it is only implemented in a specific period, a specific crop and a specific region when the market fluctuates violently. It is necessary to further explore the market-oriented operation mechanism of strategic reserve rotation, entrusted grain purchase and auction, open up the rotation sequence during the year, avoid the impact of centralized purchase and rotation on the market, and reduce the impact of intervention prices on the formation of market prices. Streamline entrusted grain storage institutions, establish a credit blacklist of entrusted grain storage institutions, and implement a one-vote veto system for storage enterprises that expose regulatory loopholes.

2. Leading private purchasing and storage in advance, cultivating market mechanism, and timely regulation by the government.

Encourage farmers and grain enterprises to store grain, fully tap the spontaneous adjustment ability of the market, and buffer market fluctuations. Grain growers, family farms and cooperatives have a strong demand for storage and drying facilities. Subsidies such as reserve facilities subsidies and low-interest loans can be implemented for large households. On the basis of strict examination and approval and ensuring the same use, the restrictions on the land used by large households to build storage and drying facilities can be relaxed. Encourage large grain growers to purchase and store grain, help cushion the risk of market fluctuation, and ensure the stable sales of agricultural products throughout the year. Encourage large households with storage facilities to carry out socialized drying and storage services, and radiation will drive small farmers to cope with market fluctuation risks. When the policy purchasing and storage is withdrawn, the market price may drop sharply. Purchase subsidies should be introduced to encourage grain enterprises to buy in the market, avoid the difficulty of selling grain, and accelerate the recovery of market regulation mechanism. After the market mechanism is on the right track, the government should withdraw in time to avoid interfering in the market again.

The government has retired from the background of market regulation, but it must ensure that it has the ability to regulate the market. China's economic and social development has entered the stage of deepening reform, transformation and upgrading, the international environment has become increasingly complex, and the uncertain factors affecting grain production at home and abroad have increased. Ensuring food security is very important for stabilizing the development situation, and it is necessary to ensure that the government's regulatory capacity is not weakened. When the market fails, we will encourage private reserves in the form of interest subsidies and storage fee subsidies. In addition, the government can support the construction of private reserve facilities in the form of cooperative purchasing and storage and equity investment. And get the priority to use the facilities to ensure that the government has sufficient control tools. The government should establish a dynamic monitoring and publishing mechanism of agricultural product market information, monitor the market trend, play the role of information guidance, and provide a basis for government regulation.

3. Multi-dimensional support policies are supplemented to ensure reasonable income and stabilize grain production.

Develop multi-dimensional support policies such as subsidies and insurance to fill the "vacancy" where policy-based purchasing and storage has withdrawn from farmers' income security function. To ensure the "rice bowl in China" is to ensure farmers' reasonable income from growing grain. The contraction and post-purchase of the stock market will inevitably impact the planting income in a short time, and the market fluctuation will also disturb the farmers' income after the market mechanism is restored. Therefore, after the purchasing and storage policy is put in place, it is necessary to support the planting income policy in time and stabilize farmers' grain production expectations. Under the constraint of WTO yellow box, we should further explore the agricultural support model decoupled from production. In terms of subsidies, we will implement subsidies that are decoupled from the planting area and output of the year, carry out subsidies such as green prevention and control technologies and socialized services, and carry out special subsidies for large grain growers. In terms of insurance, it is necessary to improve the level of premium and compensation, and actively explore on the basis of the current cost insurance and income insurance. At the same time, pay close attention to the changes of WTO trade rules, evaluate the support space of decoupling subsidies and insurance policies, make possible evasive responses, and adopt diversified income support means.