The independence of the central bank means that the central bank has the legal power and responsibility to independently formulate and implement monetary policies without being dependent on the government. From the birth of the central bank to the present day, the debate on the necessity of its independent legal status has never stopped. In this case, a theoretical in-depth exploration of the origins of the legal status of the central bank's independence is essential for correctly handling the relationship between the People's Bank of my country and the government, giving full play to the macro-control role of the People's Bank in formulating and implementing monetary policies, and promoting the coordination of the national economy. , stable and sustained development, is of great significance.

1. The economic roots of the legal status of central bank independence

The coordination, stability and development of the market economy require an independent and authoritative regulator of money supply. This is the legal status and economic origin that gives the central bank the independent formulation and implementation of monetary policy.

Marxism starts from the historical materialist methodology that social existence determines social consciousness and the economic base determines the superstructure. It believes that the principle of law is not in itself, but outside the law. The roots and causes of law are hidden in social practice and within social relations. Marx said: "The relationships of law, just like the forms of states, can neither be understood from themselves nor from the so-called general development of the human spirit. On the contrary, they are rooted in material life relationships." [1] Contemporary New Research on institutional economics also shows that on the one hand, institutions including legal systems are "endogenous variables" of economic development. Institutions are the decisive factors for the production factors of land, labor and capital to function. The optimal allocation of production factors must There is institutional support; on the other hand, how can the system play a restraining role and what kind of laws can promote economic development? The answer to this question can only be found in economic life. These provide methodological guidance for our analysis of central bank independence issues.

The modern market economy is a monetary economy. In practice, economic operation is manifested as an operation process with currency revenue and expenditure as the core. The balance between the money supply and the necessary amount of money is the key to the normal operation and healthy development of the market economy. Prerequisites. However, as the 19th-century British economist and financial writer Walter. Bagehot said: "Money will not adjust itself." [2] The "invisible hand" of the market mechanism is not omnipotent. The reason is that individual rational behavior cannot lead to rational social results. For example, when there are bad signs about the economic outlook, it is a reasonable individual behavior for investors to sell securities and reduce investment; it is also a reasonable response for consumers to reduce consumption and save money. But the result of everyone doing this will really be an economic recession that hurts everyone. Similarly, when inflation occurs, rational individuals will not cut back on spending to reduce the inflation rate. They often request more loans on the grounds of rising investment prices, depreciation of the local currency, and rising costs, and at the same time oppose increases in interest rates to compensate for the inflation. Inflating losses and risks, this "rational ignorance" can only lead to more serious inflation. In response to this "fallacy of composition," Manser. Olson's Second Law of Economics correctly states that effective collective results can only be achieved with the help of a "guiding hand" or appropriate institutional arrangements. Then, an independent central bank is an institutional arrangement that achieves the rational result of a dynamic balance between the money supply and the necessary amount of money. Only this kind of institutional arrangement can effectively eliminate the interference of "rational ignorance" that often occurs in enterprises, local governments and even some departments of the central government, adjust the money supply according to the inherent laws of the operation of the monetary economy to adapt to the necessary amount of money, and correct the total social demand. imbalance with the total supply, achieving a stable currency and ensuring the normal operation and healthy development of the currency economy as a socially rational result.

2. The political origin of the legal status of the central bank’s independence

Due to various reasons, the government’s economic behavior goals have been misaligned with the goals of monetary policy, and the resulting constraints on the government’s improper economic decisions have Need is the political root of giving the central bank the legal status to independently formulate and implement monetary policy.

The goal of monetary policy is the goal that the central bank should achieve by taking adjustment and control measures. It has ultimate goals and intermediary goals. Judging from the legislative provisions and practices of various countries, there are two main statutory models for the ultimate goal of monetary policy: one is a single statutory goal model. For example, the "Deutsche Bundesbank Act" stipulates that the task of the Deutsche Bundesbank is to stabilize the currency. The second is the multiple legal goal model. For example, the Bank of England Act of 1946 and 1979 set price stability, full employment, reasonable growth rate of real income and international balance of payments as four monetary policy goals. According to Article 3 of the "People's Bank of China Law", the goal of my country's monetary policy is to stabilize currency value and economic growth. But no matter which model, all countries regard "stabilizing currency values" as the only or primary goal of monetary policy.

The consistency of government economic behavioral goals and monetary policy is based on the basic assumption that the government elected by the public, as a representative of social public interests, has behavioral goals consistent with The interests of the public are consistent, and therefore they are naturally consistent with the monetary policy objectives that represent the interests of the public. In theory, this assumption does not violate logic, but reality is not that simple.

The government is not the hand of an all-powerful god that is detached from real social and economic interests. It is composed of various institutions, and each institution is composed of officials at all levels. Both government institutions and government officials have their own behavioral goals, and These goals are not naturally equated with social public interests, and certainly cannot be naturally equated with monetary policy goals. The government regulatory economics and public choice theory developed by Stigler, Buchanan and others in the 1960s regard the government as "economic man" and believe that the government is nothing more than a human organization. There is no difference between people who work in government agencies and other people. Their direct motivation is to maximize personal utility. If there is any difference, it is just the maximization of personal utility of government officials (such as less participation costs, higher positions, greater power and the resulting material benefits, higher prestige and professional fulfillment, etc. ) is realized in the "political market", while the maximization of personal utility of economic parties is realized in the transaction market. [3] As an "economic man", one of the behavioral goals of the government is to maximize the budget: because an increase in the budget can have more control power, it can control more areas, and thus bring government status. The consolidation and strengthening of government officials’ income and status. There are obvious contradictions and conflicts between this behavioral goal and the goal of monetary policy. As an "economic man" government, another behavioral goal is to win votes and obtain re-election, that is, to maintain its ruling status. To achieve this goal, governments often adopt strategies that satisfy the short-term interests of their constituents at the expense of monetary policy. As Mueller, one of the representatives of the American public choice school, pointed out: The government "has an objective function, including the probability of winning re-election..., in order to achieve these goals, the ruling party uses it as some urgently needed status as a monopoly supplier of public goods (e.g., state, police, fire protection, highways)”. “This myopia, combined with the government’s campaign goal of winning the next election, leads to an optimal government strategy of raising unemployment and thereby lowering inflation for a politically safe period after an electoral victory, and then lowering it again Unemployment to face the new election, and the latter lurks new inflation. "[4] In this case, if the central bank is not independent and must obey the government's instructions, the monetary policy goal of stabilizing the currency value will be defeated. .