When considering whether the Singapore International Financial Exchange is competent, it must be clear that the Singapore International Financial Exchange has no responsibility to manage the affairs of the Bahrain Futures Company of Singapore or any clearing member. Singapore International Financial Exchange is only a trading place for clearing members to conduct transactions. However, even so, the Singapore International Financial Exchange still has the opportunity to identify and reflect the signs of misconduct of its members.

This opportunity appears at the end of 1994 and at the beginning of 1995. At that time, the Singapore International Financial Exchange found that there were some anomalies in the trading of Bahrain Futures Company in Singapore, and made some inquiries about Bahrain Futures Company in Singapore to Bahrain Group. These may be helpful for early detection of Allison's activities. According to the official liquidator, if the management of Bahrain Group correctly examines and understands the concerns expressed by the Singapore International Financial Exchange in its letter to the group, bankruptcy may be redeemed. The official liquidator thinks that the attitude of Bahrain Asset and Liability Management Committee in replying to the second letter of Singapore International Financial Exchange should be severely criticized, and it has made many unfounded false guarantees to Singapore International Financial Exchange. Similarly, Jones's attitude towards the two letters of the Singapore International Financial Exchange also reflects that he has taken the problem lightly to an unacceptable level. We can't understand why Qiong Qi, as the chief financial officer of Bahrain Futures Company in Singapore, signed the reply drafted by Li Sen in response to the inquiry of Singapore International Financial Exchange about Li Sen trading activities without having an independent and detailed understanding of the whole incident.

(2) Loose internal control

From the whole process of bankruptcy in Bahrain, it is generally believed that the internal management of financial institutions is the core issue of risk control, but the internal control in Bahrain is very loose. According to the newspaper, before the tragedy on February 26th, the securities investment of Bahrain Bank had exposed great risks, but it did not arouse the vigilance of the bank's top management. In the first week of June 65438+ 10, Lisen held 3024 lots, and after 20 days, he held 16852 lots. In just 20 days, the contract holdings have increased fourfold. By mid-February, Allison had more than 20,000 contracts, eight times more than the position held by the second largest trader in the same market. For reasons we don't know, the senior management of Bahrain Bank didn't notice this signal, so we responded accordingly.

In a word, the internal control system and early warning system of Bahrain Bank failed, which eventually led to the tragedy. Shortly after the bankruptcy of Bahrain Bank, its executives said that they knew nothing about Allison's behavior in Singapore. Until the day Allison resigned, that is, February 23rd, the company's risk report was still balanced. However, according to the relevant authorities in Singapore, Bahrain remitted US$ 65.438+28 billion to Singapore International Monetary Exchange in the first 654.38+08 days of February 1995 to advance the maintenance fund. According to the Financial Times, Eddie George, Governor of the Bank of England, delivered a speech to the British Treasury and the House of Representatives Committee on April 5.