Since 2003, there has been a vigorous "audit storm" in the field of public policy in China, and the effective supervision of public policy has been pushed to the forefront of reform, which has aroused unprecedented public concern. Audit department is a very important subsystem in China's policy monitoring system. Therefore, from the perspective of its real case analysis, we can clearly understand the development process and development dilemma faced by China's policy monitoring system to a great extent, so as to find a more effective way out of the real dilemma. After more than 20 years of growth and the baptism of audit storm in recent years, the development of China's policy supervision mechanism has indeed achieved remarkable results. Openness, institutionalization and standardization have also become the next development direction of China's audit work and even the policy monitoring mechanism, but the problems and difficulties exposed in the reform process can not be ignored, which also means that China's audit work and policy monitoring system reform are still facing development difficulties that cannot be shaken off and ignored in the short term.

Poor coordination within the monitoring system

There are many policy supervision mechanisms in China, including inner-party supervision, supervision by the National People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, and special supervision by auditing departments and discipline inspection and supervision institutions. However, it is the fundamental premise to ensure the maximum benefit of policy monitoring to really straighten out the coordination rhythm between these subsystems and realize integrated supervision.

In fact, an important reason why some departments and units with problems have repeatedly investigated and committed crimes is that after the audit department found the problem, the government's measures to trace the responsibility were not followed up. The root of this phenomenon lies in the lack of effective coordination among various systems in China's policy monitoring system, and each link is easily dislocated or even broken.

(B) poor information communication between the monitoring subject and the monitoring object

In the process of exercising the right of supervision, the Audit Commission also faces the dilemma of poor communication with the information of the supervised object. Some audited units are unwilling to provide all the information to the audit department, and even feel that it is unnecessary to do so, thinking that the audit institution is completely putting on a show and making achievements. For example, the State Sports General Administration, State Taxation Administration of The People's Republic of China and the National Development and Reform Commission did not make any rectification response at the initial stage. To a great extent, this reflects the weakness of the supervision power of the audit department in China, because there is still a lack of mandatory binding power, which makes it an obligation and responsibility for the audited unit to provide relevant information to the audit institution.

(C) to solve the existing problems in the mechanism

The fundamental reasons for the above two dilemmas lie in the diversification of power and the imperfection of supervision mechanism.

Undoubtedly, the way to solve the above two dilemmas is to make policy supervision open and institutionalized, so that the policy supervision system will develop in an increasingly standardized and coordinated direction.