The discipline inspection and supervision organs implement the vertical management leadership system, which has its profound historical origin in China. China is one of the first countries in the world to establish a regulatory system. The ancient supervisory institutions were independent and self-sufficient and managed vertically from top to bottom. Central supervisory officials are appointed by the central government and report directly to the emperor. Local inspectors are appointed by the emperor or by the central supervisory head, and they can report to the supervisory head or directly to the emperor, which is basically divorced from administrative institutions at all levels. For example, the imperial history of the Tang Dynasty was directly appointed and dismissed by the imperial history or the emperor, and was not managed by the official department. Tongguan in Song Dynasty was well known and had the right to report to the emperor at any time. [3] During the period of Nanjing National Government, the Supervisory Yuan had an independent status, which was the same as that of the Legislative Yuan, the Judicial Court, the Executive Yuan and the Examination Yuan, and restricted each other. In view of the bureaucratic tendency after the October Revolution, Lenin established the Central Supervisory Committee in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the People's Supervisory Committee in state organs and the workers' supervisory organizations at the grassroots level to prevent corruption. It also emphasizes that the status of supervisory organs should be relatively independent and highly authoritative [④]. In the early days of the establishment of China * * * Production Party, the Central Supervision Committee was established, which was set in parallel with the Party Committee.

Under the current system, the discipline inspection and supervision organs are co-located (except Shenzhen). Both the party constitution and the Supervision Law stipulate that local discipline inspection and supervision organs at all levels should not only accept and obey the leadership of party committees and governments at the same level, but also accept and obey the leadership of the discipline inspection and supervision departments at the next higher level. Discipline inspection organs, as the supervisory organs of the Party committees and governments at the same level, should carry out all work under the leadership of the supervised Party committees and governments at the same level and be responsible to them. At the same time, the self-interests of discipline inspection and supervision cadres, such as equipment, assessment, appointment and removal, transfer and expenditure, are also in the hands of the party committees and governments at the same level, which obviously leads to the contradiction between the relative independence of the supervision and restriction mechanism and the non-independence of the actual affiliation, leading to the lack of autonomy and independence of discipline inspection and supervision organs, which is vulnerable to power interference and network blockade. In reality, the supervision of the discipline inspection and supervision organs over the top leaders of the party and government and the party committees at the same level is often in a situation of "virtual supervision", "weak supervision" or even "prohibition of supervision". Especially in some places where the party style is not correct, the discipline inspection work is often not supported by party committees, and a few leading cadres deliberately make things difficult for discipline inspection cadres who adhere to principles, set obstacles or directly intervene, which seriously affects the normal development of discipline inspection and supervision work. In recent years, a large number of major corruption cases of party and government leaders at all levels have proved that the discipline inspection and supervision organs "value power over power" will inevitably lead to weak links in supervision and even leave a "vacuum" in supervision.

Judging from the experience of countries all over the world, a perfect and mature supervision system should have the following three basic objective conditions: first, it is necessary to comprehensively supervise its supervision objects; Second, the intensity of supervision and restriction must be compatible with the status and power of the supervised object; Third, the process of supervision and restriction must be independent and authoritative. [5] Local discipline inspection and supervision organs at all levels are led by and responsible for the discipline inspection and supervision organs at higher levels. The office funds are fully allocated by the higher authorities, and the leading bodies are selected by the higher discipline inspection and supervision organs, and the wages and benefits are decoupled from the local authorities. The personnel establishment and assessment management of cadres are all the responsibility of the discipline inspection and supervision organs at higher levels, and the discipline inspection and supervision organs will no longer undertake other work that has nothing to do with combating corruption and promoting honesty. At the same time, the unified management reform of discipline inspection and supervision institutions was implemented, and the staffing, cadre management and funding guarantee of discipline inspection and supervision institutions at all levels were managed by the original discipline inspection and supervision organs. As the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the Ministry of Supervision are still under the leadership of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council, and are accountable to the CPC Central Committee and the State Council, they are also subject to the supervision and restriction of the Party Congress and the National People's Congress, as well as the democratic supervision, social supervision and internal supervision of the CPPCC, thus avoiding the corruption of the anti-corruption institutions themselves and the problem of "who will supervise and restrict the Commission for Discipline Inspection". While actively and steadily promoting the reform of vertical management system, we can further improve the existing dual leadership system, such as delegating the main powers of discipline inspection and supervision organs, such as institutional setup, cadre management and fund management, to higher-level discipline inspection and supervision organs; Increase the authority of discipline inspection and supervision organs to deal with cadres managed by party committees at the same level, give discipline inspection and supervision organs the right to file cases and dispose of cadres at the same level, and implement a new dual management model of "the management of discipline inspection and supervision organs at higher levels is the main one, supplemented by the management of party committees and governments at the same level" to enhance the independence and authority of discipline inspection and supervision organs. Such as the special prosecutor system in the United States, the Corruption and Bribery Investigation Bureau in Singapore and the Independent Commission Against Corruption in the China Special Administrative Region. Therefore, breaking the framework of the dual leadership system, breaking the institutional drawbacks that restrict the in-depth anti-corruption and implementing vertical leadership in an all-round way to a certain extent are the inevitable path choices for the reform of the discipline inspection and supervision system. Implement a vertical management model for local discipline inspection and supervision organs,

Second, regarding the establishment of a special anti-corruption agency.

At present, there are many anti-corruption institutions in China. In punishing corruption, it is mainly a trinity anti-corruption model formed by discipline inspection and supervision organs, procuratorial organs and public security organs. Among them, the discipline inspection and supervision organs mainly perform the pre-investigation functions of cadres and government officials in party member, the anti-corruption bureau of the procuratorial organs specializes in cracking down on duty crimes such as corruption and bribery of state staff, and the economic investigation department of the public security department is responsible for the jurisdiction of economic crimes. In terms of corruption prevention, it is mainly undertaken by the Bureau of Corruption Prevention established in 2007 and the Department of Duty Crime Prevention of the Procuratorate. In addition, auditing, customs and other units and departments also have certain anti-corruption functions. There are many anti-corruption institutions, scattered functions and insufficient coordination among anti-corruption organizations, which is one of the important reasons why corruption can not be effectively cracked down. It should be said that the current anti-corruption coordination group has played a certain role in coordinating the investigation and handling of cases. However, from a practical point of view, due to the different status and nature, the objects and means of handling cases are also very different, and the due role of the anti-corruption coordination group has not been well played, making it difficult to form a joint force for investigating cases. Moreover, the anti-corruption coordination group is mainly a loose coordination and deliberation body, which has no final decision, its resolution is not mandatory, its legal status is not clear and its role is limited.

John heil Bruen, an American scholar, believes that anti-corruption agencies in the world today can be divided into four modes: the first is the all-round mode, and anti-corruption agencies have both investigation, prevention and education functions, such as the Independent Commission Against Corruption of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region; The second is the investigation mode, where the anti-corruption agencies are small in scale but highly concentrated in investigation power, such as the Singapore Corruption Investigation Bureau; The third is the parliamentary model. The Anti-Corruption Bureau is independent of the executive and judicial organs and only reports to Parliament, such as the Independent Commission Against Corruption in New South Wales, Australia; The fourth is the multi-sector model, in which some departments are independent of each other and share the responsibility of anti-corruption. For example, the corruption prevention function of the US Federal Government Ethics Bureau and the investigation and prosecution function of the Ministry of Justice are complementary, and * * * is the same as reducing corruption [6]. Judging from the countries and regions with high global corruption index published by Transparency International, most of them adopt the first or second mode, that is, to establish a highly independent, comprehensive and fully authorized specialized anti-corruption agency, such as the Independent Commission Against Corruption established in Hong Kong 1973. It took only four years to eliminate the vast majority of corruption accumulated in Hong Kong's history, and it was successful in fighting corruption in less than ten years. Singapore set up a corruption investigation bureau to specialize in anti-corruption work, and it took only five or six years to achieve a fundamental improvement in social corruption.

In view of the present situation of numerous anti-corruption institutions in China, with scattered legal provisions and overlapping or even conflicting functions, it is suggested that all anti-corruption institutions should be re-integrated, with the ultimate goal of integrating them into only one anti-corruption institution, that is, the discipline inspection and supervision organs, the corruption prevention bureau, the anti-corruption bureau of the procuratorate and the duty crime prevention institutions currently distributed in the party and government judicial system, all of which are gradually brought into the scope of integration reform, with discipline inspection and supervision organs as the main body and integrated on this basis, with high independence and centralized authority. The Bureau for the Prevention and Punishment of Corruption has internal organs according to the functions of preventive education, investigation and punishment. And enact an anti-corruption law, referring to the establishment of the Singapore Anti-Corruption Investigation Bureau, giving special anti-corruption agencies the right to arrest suspects without an arrest warrant; Confiscate all bribes of corrupt criminals; Check and freeze the bank account of the suspect, and even check the account of his family; Enter the house to search, inspect and detain anything that can be used as evidence; Enter various departments and institutions and ask their officials to provide any articles, documents and internal information that investigators think necessary. Even have the right to track the behavior of all public officials and other special investigation activities. Specialized anti-corruption agencies have both the power to investigate party and government discipline and the power to investigate corruption crimes, and the two are completely integrated without distinction. Specialized anti-corruption agencies can investigate corruption crimes and disciplinary actions in party member, without distinguishing between agencies and law enforcement departments. [7] Specialized anti-corruption agencies implement vertical management, independent of institutions, members and the economy, and are not subject to the leadership and constraints of local government agencies at all levels, and are directly responsible to the CPC Central Committee, the State Council and the National People's Congress to ensure their due independence. First, the discipline inspection and supervision organs and anti-corruption investigation departments are limited by their respective means of handling cases, scope of investigation and objects, and their independence and authority are not strong, so it is difficult to form a joint force against corruption, which is not conducive to fundamentally eradicating corruption. The establishment of specialized agencies is conducive to improving the authority of anti-corruption work, effectively integrating existing resources, not only continuing to give full play to the advantages of discipline inspection and supervision organs, but also helping to combine crackdown with prevention and education to combat corruption from the source. Second, because the discipline inspection department is not the subject of law enforcement, there is no investigation power and judicial coercive power given by law, and the means of handling cases are limited. The establishment of special anti-corruption institutions and legislation can better solve the defects of the lack of legal basis in the current handling methods of discipline inspection and supervision organs, and realize the legalization of anti-corruption subjects and working procedures. Third, the investigation power of duty crime is more reasonable. According to the principle that the investigation power, public prosecution power and judicial power of criminal cases are independent and mutually restricted, it is inappropriate for the investigation power of duty crimes to belong to the procuratorial organs. As the subject of investigation and a special legal supervision organ, it will inevitably form a situation of self-supervision, which is contrary to the spirit and principles of modern rule of law. Fourthly, judging from the world anti-corruption trend, the establishment of a highly independent specialized anti-corruption agency has become one of the most effective means to control corruption in all countries, and the establishment of a specialized anti-corruption agency is an important measure to adapt to this development trend.

Three. On the promotion of the status of discipline inspection and supervision organs

Supervision is the behavior of people who master and use power. Therefore, for supervisors, they need higher authority than the supervised ones in order to effectively supervise and even deprive them of power. At present, the authority of discipline inspection and supervision organs is not strong enough, especially in supervising party committees at the same level. First, judging from the rank status of discipline inspection and supervision organs, the position of discipline inspection and supervision organs in the political life of the country is relatively low, and the rank status of discipline inspection and supervision organs is lower than that of party committees and governments at the same level, and it is not as good as NPC organs and CPPCC organs. It is precisely because of the unequal status of the discipline inspection and supervision organs and the supervised objects that the supervision functions of the discipline inspection and supervision organs are restricted and their functions are not fully exerted. Secondly, judging from the position of the secretary of the Disciplinary Committee, at present, the secretary of the Disciplinary Committee is only a member of the Standing Committee of the local party Committee at the same level, and his position is limited. In the change of local party committees at the beginning of 2006, the level of deputy secretary of the party Committee was greatly reduced, and the newly appointed secretary of the discipline inspection commission no longer served as deputy secretary of the party Committee, but only served as the standing Committee member of the party Committee at the same level. Although CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the Central Organization Department jointly issued a document in 2009, it was clearly stipulated that the position of the standing committee secretary of the county-level discipline inspection commission should be ranked ahead of the standing committee members with the same qualifications according to the time of holding leadership positions at the same level. However, this provision only applies to the county level, and other levels are not clear. As a result, the position of the secretaries of local disciplinary committees at all levels has been weakened in the Party committees at the same level. Under the current situation, it is neither convenient nor harmonious to assist the Party committees at the same level to strengthen party style construction and organize and coordinate anti-corruption work as entrusted by party constitution.

The essence of supervision is that one power supervises, urges and disposes of another power. If the power of the supervisor is too small to effectively restrict and restrain the supervised party from exercising its power, this kind of supervision will inevitably be inadequate and the effect will be greatly reduced. Therefore, it is necessary to further improve the political status of the discipline inspection and supervision organs, enhance the rank status of the secretary of the discipline inspection commission and the director of supervision, and give the discipline inspection and supervision organs the right to speak in the leading bodies, so as to realize the balance of power game. First, the Commission for Discipline Inspection was upgraded. Upgrading the local discipline inspection commission to the same status as the party committees, people's congresses, governments and CPPCC committees at the same level will give the supervised party higher authority and stronger supervision deterrence, thus forming effective supervision and restriction on the supervised party. Theoretically, it is not without legal basis that the discipline inspection and supervision organs have the same status as the party committees and governments at the same level. Article 25 of party constitution stipulates that local party congresses at various levels elect party committees and party discipline inspection committees at the same level. Therefore, the discipline inspection and supervision organs and party committees at the same level are elected by the party congress at the same level and report their work to the party congress. In a sense, the Commission for Discipline Inspection is no longer the working department of the Party Committee, but a parallel institution. [8] Therefore, there is no legal obstacle to improve the political status and institutional level of the Commission for Discipline Inspection. The second is to enhance the rank status and discourse power of the Secretary of the Disciplinary Committee and the Director of Supervision. It is suggested that the secretary of the local discipline inspection commission should be the deputy secretary of the party Committee at the same level according to the pattern before the change in 2006. At the same time, the inspector general is given a higher rank, and the secretary of the Disciplinary Committee and the inspector general are given more voice in leadership, such as the right to supervise the "three majors and one big" arrangement and the veto power over illegal decisions or decisions that violate legal procedures.

Four, on the construction of discipline inspection and supervision cadres.

Discipline inspection and supervision organs specialize in performing the functions of inner-party supervision and internal supervision of administrative organs, and their nature and tasks determine that this is a "offensive" job. Discipline inspection and supervision organs are led by party committees and governments at the same level, and the cadre assessment management mechanism and promotion incentive mechanism are no different from other civil servants. Due to the particularity of work tasks, discipline inspection and supervision cadres are often isolated, excluded or even retaliated. In the selection and recommendation voting of cadres, it is often difficult for discipline inspection and supervision cadres to be promoted and exchanged because of the low number of votes, which affects the enthusiasm of discipline inspection and supervision cadres to some extent. Therefore, it is necessary to further improve the selection and appointment mechanism of discipline inspection and supervision cadres. Hong Kong's Independent Commission Against Corruption Ordinance stipulates that "the Commissioner of the Independent Commission Against Corruption and his staff under his jurisdiction are not under the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission, so they are not civil servants". The membership system of ICAC and the civil service system of the government are separated from each other and form their own system. To a certain extent, ICAC will follow the laws of the Hong Kong Government and the appointment system of civil servants, but it is different from the management of other government departments. Drawing lessons from the management system of the Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption, it is suggested that the selection and appointment of discipline inspection and supervision cadres should be separated from that of other party and government cadres, and separate regulations on the selection and appointment of discipline inspection and supervision cadres should be issued, clearly stipulating the standards, conditions and procedures for the promotion and appointment of discipline inspection and supervision cadres, so as to further smooth the promotion channels of discipline inspection and supervision cadres.

Discipline inspection and supervision is a highly disciplined and professional work with its own laws and characteristics. Especially with the development of society and the progress of science and technology, the phenomenon of corruption crimes tends to be "high intelligence", and high-tech and high-IQ corruption methods emerge one after another. The discipline inspection and supervision work is becoming more and more professional and technical, which poses an unprecedented challenge to the handling ability of discipline inspection and supervision cadres. The establishment of professional discipline inspection and supervision cadres is an urgent need to adapt to the current anti-corruption situation and tasks and improve the effectiveness of the anti-corruption struggle. At present, there are some problems in the professional construction of cadres, such as insufficient full-time specialization, imperfect access mechanism and low level of specialization. To strengthen the professional construction of discipline inspection and supervision cadres, we should focus on perfecting four mechanisms. The first is the responsibility definition mechanism. To further clarify the position of responsibilities, we should not only do our own work well, but also get rid of the work that does not conform to the nature and authority, and don't take over and do everything. The second is the cadre access mechanism. According to the management mode of judges and prosecutors, the qualification access system is implemented for discipline inspection and supervision cadres. The third is the cadre professionalization mechanism. Efforts should be made to establish a contingent of cadres with discipline inspection and supervision as a special occupation and lifelong occupation, and with unique professional awareness, professional skills, professional ethics, professional status and professional security. The fourth is the education and training mechanism.