The so-called accounting information distortion refers to a phenomenon that accounting information fails to truly reflect the objective economic activities, which has an adverse impact on the relevant decisions of decision makers. The information quality distortion of listed companies is mainly manifested in: first, the information disclosure is not true; second, the information disclosure is not sufficient; third, the information disclosure is not timely.
Second, the overall situation of accounting information quality of listed companies in China at present
Since 1720, the first accounting fraud case of listed companies in the world-"Nanhai Company" incident occurred in Britain, the authenticity of accounting information has become one of the core issues concerned by investors and creditors. Although in the past two hundred years, the modern auditing technology has been greatly developed, and at the same time, financial accounting standards have been generally established and improved in all countries in the world, which has greatly guaranteed the authenticity of accounting information. However, the problem of accounting information distortion has not been fundamentally curbed as investors and creditors hope. On the contrary, cases of serious distortion of accounting information of listed companies still occur from time to time. In China, this phenomenon also exists: according to relevant information disclosure, when the Ministry of Finance199 spot-checked the accounting statements of 100 state-owned enterprises, 8 1 household falsely listed assets of 3.761100 million yuan, and 89 companies falsely listed profits of 2.747 billion yuan; In the spot check of accounting information quality in 2000, among the 159 enterprises sampled, there were 147 enterprises with false assets. This 147 households * * * inflated assets1848 million yuan, and depreciated assets by 2.475 billion yuan; Inflated profit1472 million yuan, and inflated profit1943 million yuan. In terms of listed companies: in 200 1 year, more than 1000 companies listed in Shenzhen and Shanghai were audited, and the inflated profits should be reduced by 189 billion yuan, squeezing out the profits by15.9%. Among them, the audit reduced the profit by 31700 million yuan, the audit increased the profit by 128 million yuan, and the total profit was increased and reduced by 44.5 billion yuan; The audit reduced assets by 90.3 billion yuan, increased assets by 84.2 billion yuan, reduced assets by 6 1 billion yuan in general, and increased and decreased total assets by174.5 billion yuan. In particular, there are six listed companies whose assets have been reduced by more than 50%. At the same time, there have also been a series of accounting fraud cases in listed companies, such as Hongguang, Qiongminyuan, Yinguangsha, Maikete, ST Liming, Monkey King, Dongfang Electronics, Lantian and so on. The frequent occurrence of these fraud cases not only seriously challenges the integrity foundation of accounting, but also seriously damages investors' investment confidence.
Third, the reasons for the distortion of accounting information of listed companies
There are many reasons for the distortion of accounting information, including profit-driven factors, institutional defects and moral problems. China is in the process of market economy transition, and there are some problems in the perfection of capital market, corporate governance structure and external supervision mechanism, which make the accounting information distortion of listed companies in China have certain particularity and complexity. A comprehensive survey of the phenomenon of accounting information distortion of listed companies in China, I believe that the main reasons for accounting information distortion are as follows:
(A) China's capital market problems and accounting information distortion of listed companies
China's capital market was established and developed under the background that the market economy system is not perfect and the corporate governance structure is flawed, and there are some problems such as lack of market mechanism, single market structure and market administration. Due to the low marketization of the capital market and the lack of financing channels for enterprises, the listing qualification with the attribute of "shell resources" has high economic value. According to the existing system, the listing, allotment and delisting of companies are all based on accounting profitability. In order to meet the conditions of listing or allotment or avoid delisting, a considerable number of listed companies have engaged in legal but unreasonable earnings management or accounting fraud activities. At the same time, the listed companies, mainly state-owned enterprises, have artificially divided the ownership structure and blocked the circulation, "the same shares have different prices, and the same shares have different rights"; In addition, the state-owned shares are dominant, the minority shareholders hold less shares, pay less attention to the actual operation of enterprises, and the speculative atmosphere is serious, which can easily lead to the behavior of large shareholders encroaching on the assets of listed companies and harming the interests of minority shareholders through related transactions. For example, "Zheng Baiwen" fabricated financial surplus to obtain listing qualification for the purpose of raising funds for listing in the case of serious losses; In order to maintain and regain the rights issue qualification, "Yinguangxia" fabricated transactions and exaggerated profits to drive up the company's share price; "Lantian shares" inflated profits and obtained bank loans by counting inventory value, fixed assets, inflated sales revenue and inflated sales cost. And after the state promulgated "Several Provisions on the Trial of Civil Compensation Cases Caused by False Statements in the Securities Market" on September 9, 2003, the friendship between Jinzhou Port and anniversary set off a climax of securities civil compensation. These events reflect that the distortion of accounting information of listed companies in China has a strong policy-driven feature.
(B) the conflict of interests of all actors in enterprise property rights leads to the distortion of enterprise accounting information.
Economics assumes that people are rational, and rational individuals pursue their own interests or utility maximization. Every individual maximizes his utility within the limited scope allowed by the system he depends on. Due to the different interests of individuals, there will be different stakeholders in the organization.
Generally speaking, there are several main bodies in enterprise property rights, such as government, creditors, owners, operators and other individuals related to enterprises. The government is most concerned about the collection of taxes; Creditors are most concerned about whether their claims can recover the principal and interest on time; The owner is concerned about whether the assets he has invested can preserve and increase in value; Operators are concerned about whether the increase in performance will bring them additional economic benefits; Investors in the securities market care about the value of stocks and the performance of companies. Because they have different behavioral goals and economic characteristics, there are different interests, and conflicts of interest inevitably occur. Compared with other stakeholders, the position of the operator is unique, that is, the operator directly manages the enterprise, and he is directly responsible for the operation and action of the enterprise, so he has a unique information advantage. However, based on their own interests, operators will only provide information to maximize their own interests. At the same time, the operator's "stealing" opportunity caused by information asymmetry brings the problem of "moral hazard", that is, the operator has the motivation to manipulate the generation of accounting information or even provide false information, which leads to the distortion of accounting information. From the perspective of information users, accounting information is distorted because of their different interests and goals. From the perspective of information users, due to their different interests and goals, they have different requirements for information. Some information users really need accounting information that truly and objectively reflects economic activities, while others do not. Sometimes, driven by the interests of individuals, departments and regions, they may not need real accounting information for some special purpose, such as whitewashing political achievements or concealing facts, if these real accounting information is unfavorable to their purposes. From the perspective of creditors, they are concerned about whether the creditor's rights can be recovered on time, and should also ask for real accounting information to make a correct judgment and take countermeasures as soon as possible. At present, the biggest creditor of an enterprise is a bank. Do all banks really need real accounting information? I'm afraid not. Here also involves the interests of banks. At present, most of the banks in China are state-owned banks, and most of the enterprises that accept loans are state-owned enterprises. If banks still require the authenticity of enterprise accounting information before the loan is issued (in fact, there is even doubt about this), then the importance of the authenticity of accounting information after the loan is issued will be greatly reduced. The reasons mainly include: first, the need of bank and credit personnel's own performance evaluation, and true accounting information is not necessarily good for them; second, even if they know the real situation of the borrowing enterprise (of course, the financial situation is not good), they can't do anything. The remaining shareholders, it should be said that investors in the securities market need real accounting information most, because they have the clearest property right relationship with the enterprise and the greatest interest correlation. However, as far as China's securities market is concerned, investment and speculation coexist, with the latter accounting for a large proportion. There are many "shareholders" who aim at earning short-term price differences, but few long-term investors are really willing to appear as "shareholders". Whether accounting information is true or not is not important to the majority of shareholders. What they care about is whether accounting information will make the stock price rise, because that is where their interests lie. Sometimes, different property owners may collude with each other to provide false accounting information in order to achieve their own but consistent interests, although this may not only harm the interests of other property owners, but also harm the long-term interests of enterprises.
(C) lack or inefficiency of internal control system
The purpose of establishing enterprise internal control system is to find, prevent and correct mistakes and fraud. A sound internal control system should at least achieve the following objectives: to ensure that business activities are carried out in accordance with appropriate authorization; Ensure that all transactions and events are recorded in the appropriate accounts at the correct amount in the appropriate accounting period, so that the preparation of accounting statements meets the relevant requirements of accounting standards; Ensure that the contact and handling of assets and records are properly authorized; Ensure that the book assets are in line with the actual assets on a regular basis. So theoretically, all mistakes and frauds can be found and corrected in time by a sound internal control system. However, if a company's internal control system is not perfect or lacking, accounting fraud will easily occur. At the same time, the quality of the control environment that has a great influence on the establishment and implementation of the internal control system of enterprises also directly affects whether the internal control system plays a role. A very important reason why all fraudulent information can finally form financial reports through the accounting system is that the internal control environment of these enterprises is extremely abnormal, which makes accounting fraud an opportunity.
(D) ineffective external supervision led to the proliferation of accounting information distortion.
In China, the competent department of accounting work is the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Finance is responsible for formulating the accounting system and supervising its implementation. According to the provisions of the Accounting Law, the departments of finance, auditing, taxation, people's bank, securities supervision and insurance supervision shall supervise and inspect the accounting data of relevant units in accordance with their duties as stipulated in relevant laws and administrative regulations. It stands to reason that our supervision should be effective, which can prevent the flooding of accounting information distortion. However, in fact, the phenomenon of weak supervision and lack of supervision means still exists. Securities supervision, finance, auditing, taxation and other departments have the right to supervise the authenticity and reliability of accounting information. However, the various regulatory authorities lack cooperation and conduct their own supervision, failing to achieve an effective and complementary regulatory mechanism. Take the listed companies with more supervision, it is obvious that the quality of accounting information of listed companies in China is not high. After listing, if the enterprise is not well managed, it will adopt various means to inflate the income and profits of the listed company, obtain the qualification of capital increase and share allotment, and further extract the funds from the investors. Some listed companies also cooperate with bookmakers to speculate on their own stocks in violation of regulations. When the loss is unsustainable, we will restructure our debts and assets and sell our shell resources. This has become a landscape of listed companies in China. Zheng Baiwen Company Limited is a typical case. At the end of 1997, Zheng Baiwen Company prepared false financial statements by means of fictitious rebate and expense inter-posting, and disclosed the profit of 85.6 million yuan to the public in the annual report, and raised funds through rights issue in 19981500 million yuan. After the disclosure of Zheng Baiwen's huge deficit and fraud in 2000, the CSRC intervened in the investigation. Due to the limited supervision power and means of the CSRC, it is difficult to detect the fraudulent behavior of listed companies in time, and other departments have not played a corresponding role.
Fourth, the harm of accounting information distortion of listed companies
The distortion of accounting information of listed companies is a serious deviation from the rules of market economy. The survival and development of enterprises can not be separated from capital and market. The accounting report information provided by listed companies to the open market is a very important reference index for the outside world to understand the operating conditions of enterprises. After a listed company publishes its accounting reports, the external users of corporate accounting reports, including shareholders, creditors, potential investors and other members of the public, will make their own decisions according to the information reflected in these reports (assets-liabilities, operating conditions, etc.). If the financial and accounting information provided by enterprises to the open market is untrue, investors will feel cheated. If investors in the capital market feel that listed companies are using these false accounting information to cheat them, they will not invest in listed companies; Similarly, if banks know that the statements provided by companies are false, they will not lend money to enterprises again. If everyone does not invest in listed companies, enterprises will be like fish without water, and sooner or later they will fall into an unsustainable dilemma. Therefore, the distortion of accounting information of listed companies is a serious deviation from the rules of market economy. It will not only seriously weaken the decision-making usefulness of accounting information, endanger the interests of investors and creditors, make the public doubt the basis of accounting integrity, but also fundamentally shake the credit basis of market economy, weaken and distort the functions of fund raising and resource allocation in securities capital market, and endanger the normal operation of macro-economy. The distortion of accounting information also encourages corruption and seriously hinders the economic development and the smooth progress of enterprise reform.
V. Suggestions on measures to control accounting information distortion of listed companies
It is a complex social system engineering to control the accounting information distortion of the boss company, which requires long-term unremitting efforts and comprehensive management. Based on the above analysis, I think that in order to improve the quality of accounting information of the boss company, the following aspects should be done well:
(A) improve the ownership structure, clear the market mechanism
The premise of controlling accounting information distortion is to find problems in time. The accounting supervision system dominated by government administrative supervision is too slow to respond, and when problems are found, the consequences are usually irreparable. Market-oriented accounting supervision mechanism mainly relies on the stakeholders of enterprises to discover and reveal problems, and the speed of discovery is often much faster. The establishment of this mechanism needs to mobilize the enthusiasm of investors to explore accounting problems of listed companies, and it needs to be based on the ownership structure of shareholder diversification, micro-decentralization and macro-centralization. Therefore, reducing the proportion of state-owned shares, constructing a diversified shareholding structure and increasing the liquidity of equity according to the market mechanism are the primary tasks to solve the problem of accounting information distortion.
(B) improve the corporate governance structure
1, clarify property rights, and play the role of property rights in standardizing and defining the process of accounting information generation.
Property right is the basic condition for an enterprise to obtain the qualification of market legal person, and only an enterprise with clear property right can truly become a market subject. An enterprise is essentially a contract, which broadly stipulates which task should be completed by which members of the enterprise. Here, the basic rights (the right to claim income, the right to use and the right to transfer) are actually divided into different interest groups. In enterprises with unclear property rights, the lack of transfer of power makes the behavior of enterprises deviate from the market to a certain extent, and fails to implement enterprise behavior according to the laws of the market, thus causing accounting information not to be provided according to the needs of the market.
Only a clear definition of property rights will enable market participants to carry out accounting management transactions according to accounting behavior norms. This is because the clarity of property rights creates two important conditions for the realization of accounting information objectives: first, the owner pursues the maximization of asset returns, and second, there is an economic contractual relationship between the owner and the operator. Under these two conditions, the allocation of resources is relatively efficient: the operator maximizes his own utility without reducing (or even increasing) the utility of the owner, and implements economic behavior according to the will of the market rather than the owner. At the same time, accounting subjects can choose the combination of accounting norms according to the level of transaction costs, and give full play to the functions of incentive, restraint, resource allocation and income distribution of accounting norms.
2. Implement the system of independent directors.
China Securities Regulatory Commission issued the draft of Guiding Opinions on Establishing Independent Director System in Listed Companies, which determined that more than one third of the board members of listed companies should be independent directors, including at least 1 accounting professionals. If the board of directors of a listed company has committees on remuneration, auditing and nomination, independent directors shall account for more than half of the total. The main duties of independent directors are to fulfill the obligations of honesty and diligence to listed companies and all shareholders, safeguard the overall interests of the company, and especially pay attention to the legitimate rights and interests of small and medium shareholders. Independent directors will reflect the value of "independence" in professional committees such as the Audit Committee under the board of directors. Independent directors have special powers, such as proposing to the board of directors to hire or dismiss accounting firms, hiring external audit institutions or consulting institutions independently, and expressing opinions on the fairness of major related party transactions of listed companies. Carrying out the independent director system and giving full play to the checks and balances of independent directors have become the focus of attention from all walks of life.
(C) improve the internal control system
Establishing, perfecting and strictly implementing the internal control system of enterprises plays an important role in standardizing accounting behavior, improving the quality of accounting information and preventing fraud.
1, formulate and issue the internal control standard system.
With the deepening of China's economic reform and the establishment of modern enterprise system, it is urgent to strengthen internal accounting supervision and establish and improve internal accounting control system. In order to promote the construction of unit internal control system as soon as possible, the Ministry of Finance should formulate and issue unified unit internal control standards for all units to implement or refer to. Generally speaking, the internal control standards of a unit should meet the following requirements: First, the standards formulated should include all aspects of the internal control system and form a complete system; The second is to formulate detailed and specific standards for the content of * * *, and formulate principled standards for complex and special content; Third, normative standards should be formulated for the internal accounting control content related to the quality of accounting information and the control content of the unit's performance of laws and regulations, and exemplary standards can be formulated for the content only involving the internal management control of the unit.
2. Organize the implementation of internal accounting control system.
First of all, we should vigorously publicize the internal accounting control system. Secondly, earnestly perform the statutory duties of the financial department, and urge all units to establish and improve an effective internal accounting control system through regular supervision and inspection. Third, through the exchange of experience and other means, guide and help all units to do a good job in the construction of internal accounting control system, and at the same time use intermediary forces such as accounting firms to provide manpower and technical support for the implementation of internal accounting control system.
(D) to strengthen the construction of enterprise external supervision mechanism.
1, improve the construction of relevant laws and regulations and strengthen the supervision and punishment of listed companies.
We should give full play to the deterrent role of the Accounting Law in promoting healthy trends and combating unhealthy practices. Further improve the accounting system and continue to improve the Accounting System for Enterprises. In view of the special business of various industries, we will promptly study and formulate professional accounting methods for different industries. Strengthen the transparency of the operation and management of listed companies, reduce the information difference between the two parties, and improve the comprehensive information disclosure supervision system including judicial investigation, securities supervision, violation warning, industry self-discipline and media supervision. In terms of legislation, we should increase the punishment for false disclosure and raise the cost of illegal information disclosure from the system.
2. Improve the independent review system.
Certified public accountant is the product of the development of market economy to a certain stage, and its prerequisite is the separation of property ownership and management right. China's CPA industry started late and the relevant policies are not matched, so there are some problems to be solved urgently in the process of progress, such as the small number of full-time CPAs, the shortage of people within the working age and the lack of necessary risk funds; Some firms simply pursue income, ignore the quality of practice and even issue false reports; Due to the departmental organization, the administrative audit business, the introduction business is divided in proportion, and the income is paid in proportion, which has become an important economic source for the competent authorities to engage in welfare and bonuses, thus seriously damaging the image of social intermediary organizations and their relations with all walks of life, affecting the independent, objective and fair status of certified public accountants and so on. The 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of China set the development goal of cultivating and perfecting the socialist market economic system in the end of 20th century and the beginning of 2nd1century, and raised the cultivation and development of market intermediary organizations to the height of political system reform and democracy and legal system construction. Therefore, with a high sense of responsibility, mission and urgency, we should promote the reform of the firm system through decoupling and restructuring, build a high-quality and high-level team of certified public accountants and a number of accounting firms as soon as possible, and strengthen the practice supervision of certified public accountants, so that the social accounting supervision institutions can truly become the "economic police" of the socialist market economy. It is necessary to further clarify the legal responsibility of social accounting supervision mechanism for the conclusion of accounting review, give full play to its role, and safeguard the authenticity, legitimacy and seriousness of information.
Graduation thesis opening report
Paper Name: Analysis on the present situation and problems of the fund management mode of enterprise groups.
College: Accounting College
Specialty: accounting (international accounting direction)
Student number:
Student name:
Instructor:
20081October
First, the motivation (background or significance) of the topic selection.
Fund management is the core of enterprise financial management. As an economic consortium composed of several enterprises, the most important link of enterprise groups is capital. In the case that the enterprise group takes the maximization of enterprise value as the financial management goal, it has sufficient theoretical and practical basis to take fund management as the center. Because the quality and effect of all aspects of production and operation activities of enterprises can be comprehensively reflected in the capital movement, effectively and reasonably organizing capital activities plays an important role in improving enterprise management and improving economic benefits. Only by strengthening capital management, reasonably organizing capital supply, reducing capital cost, speeding up capital turnover and optimizing capital control and supervision mechanism can enterprises promote the virtuous circle of cash flow and realize financial management objectives. Therefore, it has become a crucial practical problem for modern enterprise groups to choose an appropriate fund management model in fund management.
Second, the main problems to be clarified in the paper
The main purpose of this paper is to explore the problems and modes of enterprise group fund management, so as to improve the efficiency of enterprise group fund management and realize the financial goal of maximizing enterprise value. The conception of this paper is based on the understanding of modern enterprise theory and financial management theory. The basic idea of this paper is to discuss the content and function of enterprise fund management, point out the particularity and importance of enterprise group fund management, and then emphatically analyze the outstanding problems faced by enterprise group fund management and the reasons for these problems, put forward a variety of enterprise group fund management models, and analyze and compare their applicability with their advantages and disadvantages in reality, so as to try to put forward the author's own suggestions on enterprise group fund management.
This paper mainly adopts the logical method of normative research, and demonstrates it by combining case analysis, data analysis and chart analysis. The basic point of this paper is that choosing a suitable fund management model is beneficial to the efficiency of fund allocation of enterprise groups and to solving some problems encountered by enterprise groups in fund management.
Third, the outline of the paper
I. Overview of fund management of enterprise groups
1.The concept and characteristics of enterprise groups;
2. The content of enterprise group fund management;
3. Fund management objectives of enterprise groups;
4. Principles of fund management of enterprise groups.
Second, the enterprise group fund management model analysis-based on the chart
1.Common modes of fund management of enterprise groups
2. Analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of enterprise group fund management model
Third, the analysis of common problems faced by enterprise group fund management-based on case and data analysis
1.The funds are scattered and the use efficiency is low;
2. Poor supervision, lack of strict supervision beforehand and in the process;
3. The information is distorted, which makes it difficult to provide a basis for scientific decision-making;
Four, to solve the problem of enterprise group fund management countermeasures
1.Realizing centralized management of funds and improving the efficiency of using funds —— Introduction of advanced management technology of cash pool
2. Explore various supervision methods to ensure the safety and integrity of funds;
3. Using advanced computer technology as a means to improve financial rules and regulations and reduce human factors.
Element, realize efficient information management.
Fourth, the paper work schedule
Time node of content in each stage of serial number paper
1 2008.9. 10 topic selection
2 2008. 10.5 Determine the topic of the paper
3 2008. 10. 10 began to write the opening report.
4 2008.11.1Start writing the first draft of the thesis.
5. Complete the first draft of the paper on February 28th, 2009.
6 March 30, 2009, the paper was finalized.
7 May 2009.15 thesis defense
V. Main references and related materials
[1] China Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Financial Cost Management. [M], Economic Science Press, 2008.
[2] Wu Bolin. On China Enterprise Groups. [M], Fudan University Press, 1996.
[3] Yuan Lin. On enterprise collectivization and centralization of financial management. [J], Friends of Accounting, No.9, 2000.
[4] Ma Xueran. Establish three concepts of fund management. [M], Economist, 2006 1 period.
[5] Zhao Dongfang. Construction of the settlement system of the group settlement center. [J], Accounting Monthly,No. 19, 2005.
[6] Ren Yong. Financial settlement center: an effective way for group companies to centrally manage internal funds. [J], Accounting Newsletter (comprehensive edition),No. 13, 2004.
[7] Yu Zengbiao, Liang Wentao. The starting point of modern company budgeting. [J], Accounting Research, No.8, 2002.
[8] Zhang Fang. On the future financial management mode of enterprise groups. [J], "Shanghai Accounting", 200 1 year No.4. 。
[9] Lu Zhengfei. On enterprise collectivization and centralization of financial management. [J], Accounting Newsletter, No.9, 2000.
[ 10]Charles T.Horngren,Gary L.Sundem.William O.Stratton. Introduction to Management Accounting, Prentice Hall, 12th Edition
[ 1 1]Scoot Besley,Eugene F.Brigham.Essentials of Managerial Finance,Thomson Learning, 12th Edition
Sixth, the guidance of teachers' opinions
Do you agree with students to enter the thesis writing stage?
Instructor (signature):
20 years month