According to the statistics of China Banking Regulatory Commission, as of the end of June this year, according to the "five-level classification", the balance of non-performing loans of 1 12 city banks was 10389 billion yuan, and the non-performing loan ratio was 10.43%. After years of efforts, especially through comprehensive disposal and asset replacement, the non-performing loans of city commercial banks have been effectively controlled, and the non-performing loan ratio has been continuously reduced from the highest of 34.2% to 65,438+00.43%.

The above data basically reflect the current situation of non-performing assets of city commercial banks in China, but it should also be noted that there is no lack of water in the above data. In recent years, the decline of non-performing loan ratio has been realized under the condition of a large increase in total loans, which has dilution factors; From the micro level, it is possible for city commercial banks to artificially create data.

The reasons for the formation of non-performing assets of city commercial banks are similar to those of state-owned banks, but they also have their own particularity.

(A) Poor management of small and medium-sized borrowing enterprises is the objective cause of non-performing loans. The market positioning of city commercial banks is different from that of state-owned banks. Limited companies, collective enterprises and other small and medium-sized enterprises account for more than 80% of all loans. Bad loans caused by poor management of small and medium-sized enterprises have always been the main reason for the formation of bad loans in city commercial banks.

(B) The serious defect of bank governance structure is the root cause of non-performing assets of city commercial banks. At present, the ownership structure of city commercial banks in China is unreasonable, which leads to defects in the internal governance structure of the company. This is mainly manifested in the following aspects: because the local government is in a controlling position in the city commercial bank, the main management positions of the bank are recommended by the government and elected by the board of directors or shareholders' meeting; City commercial banks are actually controlled by a few government capital agents, and the board of directors (or councils), the board of supervisors and other power departments exist in name only, which can not effectively supervise bank agents; At present, the incentive mechanism design of city commercial banks does not fully reflect the principle of commercialization, and it still has a strong administrative incentive color.

(C) There are many problems in risk management, resulting in high non-performing assets.

1, the risk-taking subject is not clear. China's city commercial banks are all joint-stock companies, and the corporate governance guidelines of joint-stock commercial banks do not specify the risk-taking subjects. The result is a weak sense of financial risk management and a lack of urgency and enthusiasm for risk management.

2. The risk management system is backward. Only a few large city commercial banks have independent risk management departments, and most banks' risk management systems are constantly "copying" various risk management regulations issued by the regulatory authorities in order to cope with the supervision of the regulatory authorities, without forming independent risk management departments and perfect management systems.

3. There is a serious shortage of risk management talents. Because of the comprehensiveness and professionalism of risk management, it is required that the personnel engaged in risk management must have high quality and undergo strict professional training. At present, city commercial banks are quite short of talents in this field.

(4) Loans from affiliated enterprises caused huge losses of non-performing loans.

City commercial banks have become the most serious types of banks in China. Since the beginning of 2004, there have been serious loan-related problems in Chengdu, Zhuhai and Kunming, especially in some large enterprise groups. For example, Delong Company's circuitous infiltration of Kunming Commercial Bank is a typical case.