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Help, who can tell me what Dai is about?
According to the information currently available, Qilu Bank is suspected of forging financial bills, and the maximum amount involved is 654.38+0.5 billion. This 654.38+05 billion is the amount involved, not the amount of loss, and part of the funds can be recovered, so the loss will be less than 654.38+05 billion. Qilu Bank's total assets reached 66,543.8+0,789 billion yuan, and its core capital adequacy ratio was 8.54%. In this way, the core capital of Qilu Bank is 5.2 billion yuan. Even if there is such a loss, it will not cause disaster to such banks. The money in the bank is fine. This incident is not like the collapse of Hainan Development Bank. Shanghai Development Bank participated in the non-performing assets business of real estate, and assumed the risks of non-performing assets of many credit cooperatives, which led to a run.

With the deepening of the investigation, Qilu Bank Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Qilu Bank), which caused police intervention a few days ago, was involved in a high-value loan fraud case, and its risk traces had already appeared as early as the beginning of 20 10.

On February 28th, 65438 last year, it was widely rumored that Qilu Bank lost 6 billion yuan, and other losses totaled over 10 billion yuan, so its chairman Qiu Hexiang was "arrested". 6 billion yuan is equivalent to 12 times of Qilu Bank's net profit of 488 million yuan in 2009. In that year, the total non-performing loans of the bank was only 704 million yuan, and the non-performing loan ratio was only 1.99%. Later, it was reported that banks such as ICBC and CITIC were involved. These have not been confirmed, and there is no authoritative news from authoritative departments. For a time, the Qilu Bank incident was confusing and turbulent.

However, one fact is certain. According to Xinhua News Agency, Jinan public security organs recently announced that they had seized a case of forging financial tickets to defraud funds, involving many local financial institutions in Jinan. There are two facts that the case of forging financial tickets to defraud funds involves many financial institutions in Jinan. In my opinion, no matter what the final investigation result of the judicial department is. How much money is involved and how many banks are involved? This "long-lost" case of forging financial tickets to defraud funds has brought us some reflections and warnings.

In recent years, although there are more and more banking supervision departments, the supervision team is getting bigger and bigger, and there are a lot of supervision policies, calling for international integration every day. However, as a veteran who has been engaged in banking for decades, his "achievements" in supervision are far less optimistic and ideal than those in summary reports, reporting materials and public reports. Objectively speaking, the reform of large commercial banks has made some achievements in recent years, and the supervision of large commercial banks has become more and more standardized and strict. However, it is undeniable that the early supervision of small and medium-sized banks such as joint-stock banks, regional banks, rural credit cooperatives and city commercial banks was almost laissez-faire and full of loopholes. These banks are directly managed by local governments, and the regulatory authorities are only business supervision; Driven by the pressure from local governments and other parties, the scale and execution of supervision have been greatly reduced, and even succumbed to government pressure and administrative orders. These banks, including asset risk, operational risk, moral risk and internal control risk, are not optimistic. Laissez-faire and excessive supervision are the reasons for the poor supervision of Qilu Bank's accidents. In fact, not only Qilu Bank, but also small and medium-sized financial institutions in China, such as local financial institutions, will definitely have many problems.

At present, commercial banks simply cannot stand the test of market competition and tight monetary policy. Under the background of years of excessive currency, commercial banks are accustomed to the "loose" days and easy operation under the flood of liquidity. Once the money is tightened and the market liquidity is tight, it will immediately "show its true colors" and there is no way to know what to do. Immediately, loan-to-deposit ratio and capital adequacy ratio both exceeded the red line. In this case, there is no proper technology, and many crooked ways take vicious competition, bill mortgage and other means to absorb deposits. This means of absorbing deposits must be coordinated by customers, including financial and accounting personnel of enterprises, and it is impossible for internal personnel of banks to complete the whole operation. This gives an opportunity to those who forge financial tickets to defraud funds. Qilu bank incident seems familiar. The case of China Bank in Harbin stealing 654.38+0 billion yuan from Gaoshan, which caused a sensation in the whole country and shocked the world, was a success in taking deposits by taking advantage of this opportunity. Last year, the central bank raised the deposit reserve ratio six times, which made some banks nervous. The author once predicted that high-interest deposits would appear soon, but unfortunately he was right. It is inevitable that the central bank will tighten monetary policy, commercial banks will be short of funds, and commercial banks will absorb deposits at high interest rates to alleviate the shortage of funds, and then there will be a major case of forging financial bills to defraud funds. It shows that the current management ability of commercial banks is low and their competitiveness is extremely weak, which shows that the defense line of bank supervision is vulnerable.

Another thing to think about is that there is an extremely bad phenomenon at present, that is, the wrong approach of "covering fire in paper" is adopted for financial risks, economic cases of banks and problems existing in operation. The result is to turn small problems into big problems and small risks into big risks. For example, the Qilu Bank incident, PricewaterhouseCoopers Zhongtian Certified Public Accountants had early warning and tips, resulting in a change of personnel, which eventually led to a major case. At present, many banks, including publicly listed commercial banks, have closed their news and closed their public opinion. As long as there are negative things, they will not be reported, saying that they are worried about causing financial risks. In fact, when the risk cases show signs, making public information and consciously accepting the supervision of public opinion, on the one hand, exercise the ability of commercial banks to deal with emergencies, on the one hand, eliminate risks in the bud and early stage, on the other hand, make people know the real situation in time and avoid being confused by rumors. As the saying goes, rumors stop at the truth, which is true. This "paper wrapped fire" approach has brought considerable harm to China's financial industry. At present, once all kinds of cases in financial institutions "break out", they are often hundreds of millions, billions or even billions of cases, including cases of fraudulent loans, cases of concentrated outbreaks of non-performing loans, cases of forging financial bills, and cases of collusion between internal and external sources to steal bank funds.

Therefore, the reflection and warning brought by Qilu Bank incident is profound!