1. Anhui and other provinces rural homestead mortgage pilot.
On April 9, 2008, the news from Anhui Province said that Anhui Province will establish and implement a registration system for farmers' housing property rights. After obtaining the housing ownership certificate issued by the construction department, farmers can obtain bank loans with rural housing as collateral. /kloc-on the issue of mortgage guarantee in April, 2005, Zhejiang province indicated that according to the characteristics of farmers' housing and the conditions of bank mortgage loans, it planned to carry out rural housing mortgage loans in rural areas in the urban-rural fringe. 19 In May, the Shandong Provincial Government's Notice on Further Promoting Employment proposed that "rural financial service institutions should broaden the coverage of farmers' micro-loans and joint guarantee loans, relax loan conditions, and lower the mortgage (quality) standard of loans, so that entrepreneurs' housing property rights and land use rights can be used as collateral".
However, according to the Property Law of People's Republic of China (PRC) and related laws, rural homestead can only be circulated within the village collective, and urban residents or people from other villages are not allowed to buy it. In other words, farmers' homesteads and land cannot enter the market and are not eligible for mortgage loans. At the same time, the corresponding housing ownership registration system is also extremely backward and lacks technical support to enter the market.
2. The experiment of land capitalization in Zaozhuang City.
On September 14, 2008, the first rural land use right property right exchange in China-Shanting Xuzhuang Town Rural Land Use Right Property Right Exchange was unveiled. Chen Wei, Mayor of Zaozhuang City, personally issued land use certificates to 280 farmers in Xuzhuang Land Cooperative. Zhang Kaihua, chairman of Xuzhuang Land Cooperative, who received the land use certificate, was very excited. Soon after, Zhang Kaihua obtained two loans of 450,000 yuan from Shanting Rural Credit Union with part of the land use right certificate as collateral, which was used to buy much-needed fertilizer and engage in the construction of water conservancy facilities. This indicates that a new model has been added to the exploration cases of rural land system reform in China.
3. Jiaxing "two points and two exchanges" reform experiment
According to the plan, more than 4,800 farmers in Yaozhuang Town, Jiashan County, Jiaxing City will all move to the market town to live, which is one of the new phenomena brought by the new round of land use system reform pilot in Jiaxing.
In April, 2008, Jiaxing was listed as the experimental zone for the comprehensive reform of urban and rural areas in Zhejiang Province. Aiming at the core of optimizing the land use system, according to the general idea of separating homestead from contracted land, separating requisition from land circulation, replacing urban real estate with homestead, and replacing social security with contracted land management right (that is, "two points and two exchanges"), Jiaxing Municipal Government has formulated "Several Opinions on Accelerating the Construction of New Rural Communities by Saving Intensive Land", which is the first to carry out exploration and practice in Zhejiang Province.
After land replacement, land ownership and land use nature will not be changed. After land transfer, farmers who are employed in non-agricultural fields must achieve full coverage of old-age insurance within three years; For farmers who have entered the aging stage, the pension insurance benefits will be gradually improved. Jiaxing has identified the first batch of nine pilot towns (streets) with a total area of 265km2, nearly 40,000 farmers and a population of nearly1.5000. At present, the pilot reform in Jiaxing has entered the stage of substantive action, and the construction of new communities where farmers gather has started, with more than 2 100 households signing up for house change (or relocation); * * * The contracted management right of the transferred land is more than 30,000 mu, accounting for nearly 8% of the city's total circulation, of which more than 5,700 mu has achieved secondary circulation, and 6 agricultural investment projects have been signed, with a contracted investment of 66 million yuan.
4. Reform of rural collective construction land circulation system in Chengdu-Chongqing area.
(1) Wenjiang District, Chengdu "Double Abandonment and One Retreat"
The so-called "double abandonment and one withdrawal" means to encourage farmers whose main source of income is non-agricultural industries to voluntarily give up their homestead and contracted land management rights, quit collective economic organizations, enter cities and towns to buy houses independently or enter concentrated residential areas in accordance with government planning requirements. The recovered homestead is recovered by the government, and the vacated collective construction land is used centrally according to the plan, and reasonable compensation is given to the "double abandonment" farmers.
(2) Unified circulation in Jinjiang District of Chengdu.
The specific approach is government-led, unified planning and unified circulation. The whole region has set up a land reserve auction trading center, set up a trading platform for collective construction land, concentrated the indicators of rural collective construction land, and publicly listed and traded in the land trading center. After deducting the cost of land consolidation and supporting expenses, 50% of the rural collective construction land after land consolidation and the new circulation of agricultural land income will be reserved for the social security of the members of the new collective economic organization, the other 40% will be used for the redevelopment of the new collective economic organization, and the rest will be distributed to the members of the new collective economic organization as dividends.
(3) Chongqing Jiulongpo District "Jiulong-Yunyang" cross-regional planning.
In accordance with the unified deployment of urban and rural development, in accordance with the requirements of constant total amount and balance of occupation and compensation, the index of construction land between regions should be reasonably adjusted to ensure the needs of urban and rural development. The Kowloon-Yunyang Industrial Park will be built through co-construction of the park and fiscal and tax sharing, so as to realize the coordinated development of the main city supporting the reservoir area, the main city and the reservoir area.
(B) the reform of agricultural land system ideas and vision of the breakthrough
According to Marin Noszky, any attempt to study the land property right system only from the legal point of view will inevitably lead to unsatisfactory results. If we don't have a complete understanding of the local people's economic life, we can't define and describe the land property right system. Moreover, you must first know how the local people use his land; How to make folk customs, beliefs and mysterious values fluctuate around the land issue; How to fight for land and defend it; Only by understanding all this can we understand the system of legal rights and customary rights that regulate the relationship between man and land.
It's like someone who sees a drunk looking for something under a street lamp in the dark and asks questions. The drunk said that he had lost his key. He is looking for his key. Passers-by said: Why do you always look under the street lamp? The drunk said, because you can only see it under the street lamp. Faced with such a complicated problem of solving the reform of rural land property right system, people's way of thinking and vision can't be similar to this drunkard. They just want to find answers in their familiar areas and fields, and they are always subject to their own basic personal values, even if the answers are not in the range they can see.
At present, all parts of the country are actively exploring the reform of rural land property rights system, and have achieved many meaningful results and accumulated important experience. However, we must pay full attention to such behavioral economic phenomena as "overestimating the success rate is a common phenomenon", "people tend to believe in the law of decimals" and "preferring to suffer rather than admit mistakes". In the process of exploration and innovation, the management and transaction costs are continuously reduced, and the reform performance is comprehensively improved.
China is a country dominated by farmers. In the balance and stability of the whole country, the state and farmers are the central axis. Therefore, in the logic of China's development and construction, land policy is an important tool to balance farmers, state power and modernization, and the reform of land property right system must find an acceptable and satisfactory balance point. This reform can be studied not only from the perspective of law and economics, but also from the perspective of politics and sociology. It needs to be investigated and explored from the basic position and attributes of cultural anthropology on the basis of practical work.
(c) Supporting measures for land system reform
1. Land market system
The existing land market system has been criticized because of the fairness of the cost and income distribution of farmland conversion and the difficulty in controlling the externalities of farmland conversion. As for the distribution of economic value embodied in the market system, China is carrying out corresponding reforms. With the increase of the proportion of "bidding, auction and hanging" and the implementation of "two lines of revenue and expenditure", it will be beneficial to standardize the income distribution of farmland conversion at this stage, improve the confidence of farmland conversion system, stabilize the mood of farmers and other stakeholders, and improve the willingness to cooperate. However, due to the fragmentation of the existing land market system, the price mechanism and supply and demand mechanism of the market itself are directly intervened by the government, and the weakness of property rights itself reduces the allocation of resources by the "market mechanism", leading to the failure of the land market. Furthermore, the existing market system still cannot solve the problem of ignoring the non-market value of agricultural land resources. Therefore, on the whole, these institutional environmental problems are not conducive to reducing the transaction cost of farmland conversion in the land market, and also directly affect the choice of governance structure level.
In neoclassical economics theory, breaking the existing market segmentation situation is the direction of land market system reform. However, in order to control the externality of farmland conversion and meet the demand of current economic growth for surplus agricultural production, the existing fragmented market system is very necessary. From this point of view, to break the market fragmentation, its own transaction costs will be high. In addition, the value evaluation method of neoclassical economics can only be a tool to control the externality of farmland conversion, or how to bring the non-market value of farmland into the existing market system. The key is to achieve it through institutional arrangements such as property rights and the design of corresponding governance structure. The reform involving property rights naturally needs to face greater transaction costs. For example, in theory, if the non-market value of agricultural land is written into the system and given to relevant stakeholders, the non-market value of agricultural land will naturally be "internalized" into the decision-making system of stakeholders. At this time, there is no need for the government to intervene in the market through various administrative means to reduce transaction costs. However, the premise of this paper is that the cost of setting up and changing the property right system must be considered. Therefore, in reality, it is a more efficient improvement measure to establish an institutional environment conducive to the reform of governance structure. Some examples can be used for reference to illustrate how to realize the ecological value of natural resources by establishing an institutional environment conducive to the reform of governance structure. For example, by establishing a certification system for organic vegetables, the price of organic vegetables is higher than that of ordinary vegetables, which is an "internalization" of ecological value. Therefore, considering how to combine with the product value of other links in the industrial chain of land assets and establishing a price mechanism conducive to information circulation will help improve the ability of the existing land market system to solve externalities. For example, if the real estate development is located near the wetland reserve, the value of the real estate must be higher than other real estates with similar conditions but no wetland landscape, and if the owners of agricultural land are given the necessary information, the ecological value of the area will be "internalized" into the real estate built after non-farming.
2. Land planning system
The existing land planning system is still an index planning system, rather than the successful concept of "spatial planning" in western countries. A potential problem brought by the indicator planning system is the contradiction of information circulation in the hierarchy, which leads to the characteristics of "low exclusiveness" and "high competitiveness" in the indicators of farmland conversion. The lack of public participation and information asymmetry in land use planning can not promote the long-term cooperation willingness of stakeholders, and at the same time cause difficulties in implementation and supervision, which will lead to the over-utilization of "public pond resources" in farmland conversion, and will inevitably lead to the weakening of the function of land planning system in the external control of farmland conversion.
Changing the characteristics of the land planning system from "index planning" to "spatial planning" and optimizing the information circulation mechanism of the planning system, such as increasing the transparency of planning and public participation, is a problem of the design of the planning system itself on the one hand and closely related to the property right system on the other. If the property right of land can fully arouse the public's interest, public participation will no longer be passively promoted by the government. Generally speaking, in terms of information asymmetry and failure to promote long-term cooperation, the transaction cost of the improvement of the planning system will not be higher than that of the reform of the property rights system. Therefore, from this perspective, the improvement of land planning system can improve the institutional environment, thus serving the level of resource allocation and governance structure.
3. Land management system
From the above review of the defects of the existing farmland circulation system, we can see that the land management system needs to be improved in two aspects. On the one hand, it is macro-level land management, on the other hand, it is micro-level land management. The macro level refers to the demand of perfecting the supervision system in the administrative system of farmland conversion and the experimental mechanism of improving the governance structure from bottom to top. Micro-level refers to the improvement demand of administrative management system at the level of agricultural land transfer practitioners.
For the macro-regulatory system, firstly, due to the information asymmetry, the existing regulatory system characterized by the responsibility of the central government can not meet the regulatory needs, leading to a large number of violations by local governments; Secondly, in the process of monopolizing the land acquisition market and the primary land market through land planning, monopolistic behavior is theoretically feasible and can make up for the defects of market failure, but the monopoly behavior of the government itself needs supervision; Thirdly, no matter how perfect the supervision system is, who will supervise the "supervisor"? This is a difficult problem in theory and practice. Therefore, the improvement of these three regulatory systems is a feasible improvement direction in the future. This can be achieved by improving the land planning system, changing the performance evaluation criteria of local government officials, improving the transparency of farmland conversion information and increasing the supervision power of farmers and ordinary citizens. Of course, it should be pointed out that strengthening supervision is not a distrust of local governments, nor is it centralized. The role of local governments cannot be denied, which is particularly important under the existing economic and social system.
Perfecting the experimental mechanism of governance structure from bottom to top is an effective mechanism to realize the spontaneous evolution from system to efficiency. This "bottom-up" mechanism is conducive to designing and arranging appropriate governance structures and institutional arrangements according to the actual local natural and social environment. "Household Contract Responsibility System" and "Farmland Share Cooperative System" are both classic "bottom-up" evidences. At present, the "experimental" mode in this place still lacks the support of the standardized institutional environment, so this aspect is an important direction of institutional environment reform in the future.
With the adjustment of government institutions, the micro-administrative system is also constantly reforming. At present, the post setting and performance appraisal system has been able to motivate, supervise and punish the corresponding farmland conversion employees. But it does not rule out the opportunistic behavior of a few practitioners who ignore laws and regulations. In terms of enhancing job security, it is doing well at this stage, because it is already a post setting for "civil servants". Of course, there may still be some problems in enhancing trust, loyalty and the smooth implementation of government decrees. If the enthusiasm and loyalty of employees are improved according to different specific positions, different treatments, different performance appraisal mechanisms and different reward and punishment mechanisms, then the land administration system needs to be further strengthened. The cost of this improvement (newly increased transaction cost) seems to be smaller, while the benefit (reducing other transaction costs) seems to be great, so it is worth considering in the current system improvement.
4. Land legal protection system
At present, there has been a lack of a sound legal system and an independent judicial system to protect land property rights and resolve land disputes.
The imperfect legal system refers to the lack of land registration system at the level of natural villages and farmers, the lack of systematic punishment mechanism for illegal land use, and the lack of formal laws, regulations and provisions to solve land use contradictions. Without a sound legal system as the basis, the land legal guarantee system can not operate well.
The lack of an independent judicial system means that the existing system has been influenced by the administrative department of the government, which has had a great impact on the credibility and effect of property rights, laws, markets and planning. Although China's court system and administrative system are independent systems, the law still stipulates that land conflicts and disputes, such as agricultural land expropriation disputes, should be decided by the government that approved the project. This undoubtedly increases the complexity of the land legal protection system.
The establishment and improvement of land legal system and independent judicial system are restricted by politics, but based on the existing land management law and independent court system, the transaction cost of improving this aspect seems not very high, and its benefits are obvious, so the further improvement of land legal protection system will have a positive impact on the choice of governance structure level.