.1 The distribution of the credit term structure of my country’s commercial banks is unreasonable

The current problem with the credit term structure of my country’s commercial banks is that the proportion of long-term credit is too high and the proportion of short-term credit is too small . This has gone through a process of change. Since the reform and opening up, most banks have chosen short-term credit terms based on my country's national conditions and credit market demand. As a result, the proportion of short-term loans in my country's bank loan business has always been above 50%. However, with the development of the economy and the reform and listing of my country's state-owned banks, under the principle of pursuing maximum profits for shareholders, commercial banks are now paying more and more attention to long-term and stable earnings. Therefore, most banks continue to adjust short-term assets and increase long-term credit assets. , some banks even increased long-term loans at the expense of liquidity.

From Figure 1 we can see that the proportion of short-term loans in 2008 decreased by 2.4% compared with the proportion of short-term loans in 2006. The proportion of medium and long-term loans increased from 47.3% to 51.1% in 2008, a year-on-year increase of 3.8%. Among them, the growth rate of medium and long-term loans is 7.9% higher than the growth rate of short-term loans. This set of data not only fully reflects the changes in my country's credit market demand, but also is a true portrayal of banks increasing credit risk management and increasing the returns on credit assets. It is worth noting that this behavior of banks at the expense of liquidity will increase the bank's credit risk. In particular, the financial crisis will lead to tight liquidity of banks. If the proportion of medium- and long-term loans of banks is too high, the consequences will be very serious.

1.2 The credit ownership structure of my country’s commercial banks is imbalanced

Currently, the problems existing in the credit ownership structure of my country’s commercial banks are: credit rationing is heavily tilted towards state-owned enterprises and not towards my country’s non-profit enterprises. The credit rationing of enterprises in the public ownership economy is relatively small, resulting in the phenomenon of credit rationing being out of proportion in terms of ownership.

Our country is a socialist market economy with public ownership as the main body and multiple ownership systems developing simultaneously. With the deepening of the construction of market economy, the non-public economy has achieved rapid development. Among them, the private economy has increasingly become an active point of economic development. However, the private economy and other non-public economies still encounter certain obstacles in their development. Among them, the credit allocation of commercial banks is an issue that we urgently need to solve. For a long time, my country's banking industry has grown under the monopoly environment of state-owned banks. Naturally, the allocation of bank credit has been tilted towards state-owned enterprises, while less credit support has been given to private enterprises. This has institutional problems and is also the result of information asymmetry. , because it is difficult for banks to distinguish complete credit information of enterprises, and the cost of obtaining this information is high, so banks are more willing to choose state-owned enterprises that they know better, have better credit and are supported by the state.

1.3 The credit industry distribution of my country’s commercial banks is unreasonable

Since the reform and opening up, there has been a relatively large imbalance in the distribution of my country’s credit industry. The main manifestations are: there is a large supply of industrial credit, but there is less agricultural credit support; the follow-up of productive credit is faster, and the follow-up speed of consumer credit lags behind; the credit support for traditional industries is large, and the credit support for sunrise industries is less; among them, it is particularly noteworthy. The problem is that the risk of credit funds for real estate is too high, which will be detrimental to the healthy development of credit funds for commercial banks in my country.

In the more than thirty years of reform and opening up, with the strong support of the country’s credit, my country’s productivity, especially the industries and fields that are conducive to faster economic development, has developed rapidly. Among them, the traditional manufacturing, processing, steel and cement industries have achieved considerable development, while some capital-intensive industries such as real estate, IT, and finance have also developed rapidly. The reason why such great results have been achieved is related to the credit preference given by Chinese banks to these industries. But while seeing these results, we should also see that under the protection of bank credit policies, some projects with high energy consumption, high pollution, high duplication of construction, and high risks have existed for a long time. The characteristics of these projects are: higher risks and greater impact from policies. The existence of this phenomenon is not only related to the country's long-term bank credit industry rationing policy, but also involves the interests of various localities and departments. At the same time, we should also see that banks provide less credit support to agriculture, resulting in agriculture being left behind for a long time. Credit funds are mainly concentrated in natural monopoly industries such as electricity, petrochemicals, oil, telecommunications, transportation, and railways.

Problems in the credit structure

Due to the traditional inertia of state-owned commercial banks’ own operations and the reform costs they bear for the transition of the national economic system, there are obvious problems in the credit structure of state-owned commercial banks. defect.

Defects and imbalances in the credit structure have led to an excessive proportion of non-performing loans, a negative correlation between the total amount of loans and loan quality and benefits. Loan quality and benefits have declined year by year, and the overall loans are characterized by high risks. The serious flaws in the current credit structure of state-owned commercial banks are highlighted as follows (taking a certain garbage branch in Liaoning as an example):

First, the distribution of economic components of existing credit assets: Taiwan management. Loans to state-owned and collectively owned customers account for more than 90% of all loans; while customers such as township enterprises, private companies, individuals, joint-stock companies, joint-stock manufacturing companies, foreign-funded enterprises, and individuals account for a small proportion, accounting for only about 8% of all loans.

Second, the industry distribution of existing credit assets is unreasonable. Loans to traditional industries such as textiles, coal, chemicals, and domestic trade account for more than 80% of all loans, while emerging industries such as technology, real estate, electricity, transportation, construction, medicine, communication services, hospitals, and schools only account for 80% of all loans. About 15%.

Third, the term structure of existing credit assets is unreasonable. Short-term loans account for more than 75% of all loans, and medium- and long-term loans account for about 25% of all loans.

Fourth, the business structure of existing credit assets is unreasonable. In terms of types of credit assets, traditional loans such as working capital and fixed assets account for more than 90% of all loans, while new loan types such as real estate, personal consumption, and other medium and long-term loans only account for about 5% of all loans.