When and where will the state-owned commercial banks in China be listed? Bank of China was listed in Shanghai on July 5, 2006 and in Hong Kong on June 6, 2006.
China Industrial and Commercial Bank 2006- 10-27 Hongkong, listed at the same time.
China Construction Bank was listed in Shanghai on September 25th, 2007 and in Hong Kong on September 27th, 2005.
Which state-owned commercial bank does p2p cooperate with? Now p2p has not cooperated with that bank. Peer-to-peer finance refers to small loan transactions between individuals, and there are two modes: online and offline. Now it is more online mode. Regarding p2p, what I want to say is the problem of investment risk control. The yield of p2p investment is generally higher than that of banks, but now the relevant policies in this regard have just been introduced, and the current policies are still not perfect. As investors, when choosing a p2p platform, we should choose a big platform and learn more. Learn more about the relevant policies issued by the state in this later period and manage your finances reasonably.
Are state-owned commercial banks dominated by local governments? Do not belong to local leaders.
According to China's commercial bank law, its establishment, organization, supervision and management have nothing to do with local governments.
What are the prospects for the treatment of various banks? (Central Bank, four state-owned commercial banks, China Merchants, etc. ) In Shanghai, Bank of Communications is recommended for the best treatment. So can the Agricultural Bank. ICBC is the worst and busiest, and BOC is in the middle. The same is true for promotion. The minimum requirement is undergraduate course.
Unfortunately, the current situation of non-performing assets of state-owned commercial banks. I did this problem some time ago, but now I have lost a lot of data in WIND. If you can use the wind, I suggest you find it there.
Problems of State-owned Commercial Banks (Finance) Present Situation and Causes of Non-performing Assets of City Commercial Banks
According to the statistics of China Banking Regulatory Commission, as of the end of June this year, according to the "five-level classification", the balance of non-performing loans of 1 12 city banks was 10389 billion yuan, and the non-performing loan ratio was 10.43%. After years of efforts, especially through comprehensive disposal and asset replacement, the non-performing loans of city commercial banks have been effectively controlled, and the non-performing loan ratio has been continuously reduced from the highest of 34.2% to 65,438+00.43%.
The above data basically reflect the current situation of non-performing assets of city commercial banks in China, but it should also be noted that there is no lack of water in the above data. In recent years, the decline of non-performing loan ratio has been realized under the condition of a large increase in total loans, which has dilution factors; From the micro level, it is possible for city commercial banks to artificially create data.
The reasons for the formation of non-performing assets of city commercial banks are similar to those of state-owned banks, but they also have their own particularity.
(A) Poor management of small and medium-sized borrowing enterprises is the objective cause of non-performing loans. The market positioning of city commercial banks is different from that of state-owned banks. Limited companies, collective enterprises and other small and medium-sized enterprises account for more than 80% of all loans. Bad loans caused by poor management of small and medium-sized enterprises have always been the main reason for the formation of bad loans in city commercial banks.
(B) The serious defect of bank governance structure is the root cause of non-performing assets of city commercial banks. At present, the ownership structure of city commercial banks in China is unreasonable, which leads to defects in the internal governance structure of the company. This is mainly manifested in the following aspects: because the local * * * is in a controlling position in the city commercial bank, the main management positions of the bank are recommended by * * and elected by the board of directors or shareholders' meeting; In fact, city commercial banks are controlled by a few * * * capital agents, and the board of directors (or councils), the board of supervisors and other power departments exist in name only, which cannot effectively supervise the bank agents; At present, the incentive mechanism design of city commercial banks does not fully reflect the principle of commercialization, and it still has a strong administrative incentive color.
(C) There are many problems in risk management, resulting in high non-performing assets.
1, the risk-taking subject is not clear. China's city commercial banks are all joint-stock companies, and the corporate governance guidelines of joint-stock commercial banks do not specify the risk-taking subjects. The result is a weak sense of financial risk management and a lack of urgency and enthusiasm for risk management.
2. The risk management system is backward. Only a few large city commercial banks have independent risk management departments, and most banks' risk management systems are constantly "copying" various risk management regulations issued by the regulatory authorities in order to cope with the supervision of the regulatory authorities, without forming independent risk management departments and perfect management systems.
3. There is a serious shortage of risk management talents. Because of the comprehensiveness and professionalism of risk management, it is required that the personnel engaged in risk management must have high quality and undergo strict professional training. At present, city commercial banks are quite short of talents in this field.
(4) Loans from affiliated enterprises caused huge losses of non-performing loans.
City commercial banks have become the most serious types of banks in China. Since the beginning of 2004, there have been serious loan-related problems in Chengdu, Zhuhai and Kunming, especially in some large enterprise groups. For example, Delong Company's circuitous infiltration of Kunming Commercial Bank is a typical case.
Countermeasures to solve the problem of non-performing assets of city commercial banks
Combined with the causes of the formation of non-performing assets in city commercial banks, we must solve the problem of non-performing assets in city commercial banks from two aspects: preventing incremental non-performing assets and eliminating existing non-performing assets.
(A) to prevent the generation of non-performing assets increment
(1) Rebuild social credit environment, broaden social credit channels and eliminate the root causes of non-performing loans. Enterprises and * * * have repeatedly evaded debts, which has become an important restrictive factor to reduce non-performing assets, increase effective credit supply and improve the operational efficiency of banks. Therefore, we should rebuild China's social credit system, especially establish and improve the enterprise credit system and improve the enterprise credit evaluation system. At the same time, enterprises that violate credit should be severely punished.
Excessive concentration of social credit in banks is the root cause of a large number of non-performing loans. In order to prevent city commercial banks from generating new non-performing loans and eliminate the social factors of new non-performing loans, we should develop direct credit, cultivate enterprises' self-accumulation ability, encourage enterprises to use foreign capital and broaden their financing channels.
(2) Improve the innovation of property right system and fundamentally solve the problem of non-performing assets increment. The ownership structure of city commercial banks is mainly controlled by local finance, which has a strong administrative color and a low degree of marketization, resulting in high non-performing assets. To solve the problem of non-performing assets of city commercial banks, we must first reform the property right system, and the key is to reduce the equity ratio of local financial offices and attract private capital and foreign capital.
(3) Improve the internal control system and improve the risk prevention and control ability. The internal control system of banks is the first and most important line of defense to prevent and control the risks of commercial banks and prevent new non-performing loans. The basis of strengthening internal control of city commercial banks is to strengthen risk management, which should run through the whole loan cycle, and form corresponding risk prevention concepts and risk monitoring mechanisms in the whole process of pre-loan investigation, in-loan review and post-loan inspection management, which is the institutional guarantee for maintaining sustainable development and preventing new non-performing assets.
(4) Adhere to the market positioning of SMEs and Scientific Outlook on Development. From the bank's point of view, small and medium-sized enterprises are not only the source of absorbing low-cost deposits and issuing profitable loans, but also will become the most active and growing part of China's national economy in the long run. By increasing loans to small and medium-sized enterprises, city commercial banks will undoubtedly gain higher profit space from the growth of small and medium-sized enterprises.
(B) reduce the stock of non-performing assets
Revitalizing and collecting the stock of non-performing assets is the basis and realistic task to reduce non-performing assets. At present, city commercial banks cannot divest non-performing assets like state-owned banks, nor can they win the support of national policies. City commercial banks can only reduce non-performing assets by themselves. At this stage, there are mainly the following ways: taking additional loans, collecting loans, recovering in advance and other credit means to revitalize non-performing assets; Take legal measures to collect loans according to law; Accelerate the disposal of debt-paying assets; Improve operating efficiency and write off some non-performing loans with bad debt reserve.
For city commercial banks, reducing non-performing assets and improving operating efficiency are two aspects of the same thing, and the two are complementary and mutually causal. Improving asset quality, especially avoiding and reducing the occurrence of non-performing loans, raising loan interest rates and stopping enterprises from evading debts, can reduce losses and directly increase operating profits. The improvement of operating efficiency also provides a solid material foundation for banks to implement prudent accounting principles, improve capital adequacy ratio and increase the withdrawal and write-off of bad debt reserves, which is a necessary condition for banks to enhance their ability to digest and reduce non-performing assets. City commercial banks play an important role in resolving the financial risks of city credit cooperatives and supporting local economic development, and are closely related to local governments. Undeniably, the generation of non-performing assets is also related to this, so city commercial banks should actively seek the support of local governments when resolving non-performing assets.
Problems faced by state-owned commercial banks after listing With the listing of shares of Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (4.55%, -0.02% and -0.44%) in Shanghai and Hongkong on October 27th, 2006, three of the four state-owned commercial banks in China have successfully listed. How will the listing of state-owned commercial banks affect the development of Chinese banks (3.40, -0.0 1, -0.29%)? First, can "private banks" and "private finance" be legalized?
Over the years, due to the influence of market segmentation, information asymmetry and relative scarcity of financial resources, many private enterprises, especially small and medium-sized private enterprises, are far from meeting the demand for external financing from banks. A large number of market demands gave birth to "private banks" and expanded the scale of "private finance". Undoubtedly, "private banks" and "private finance" have played an irreplaceable role in effectively alleviating financial repression in China's economic development and promoting the development of private economy. But so far, it has not been able to move from "underground" to "above ground" and obtain its due legal status and identity.
After the state-owned commercial banks are listed at home and abroad, private enterprises and foreign-funded enterprises can become shareholders of listed state-owned commercial banks; With the end of the five-year transition period of China's entry into WTO, foreign banks with independent legal personality established in China will also be able to fully operate RMB business. Under such circumstances, the CBRC should strictly regulate the entry threshold of the banking industry, strictly implement the open and equal standards and conditions, strengthen the supervision of the banking industry, follow the trend, and open the door to the legalization and standardization of "private banks" and "private finance". This is the need for China's private enterprises and private capital to enjoy national treatment and participate in the development of the financial industry, the need to accelerate the formation of China's unified and complete financial market, and the objective requirement for China to deepen financial reform and promote financial deepening.
The second question is, can listed state-owned commercial banks truly realize enterprise and market-oriented operation?
In view of the extreme importance of financial industry to national economic security and the fact that state-owned banks have long been an important carrier of national macro-control, it will take time to test whether China state-owned commercial banks can achieve better enterprise and market-oriented operation like other listed companies.
Take China Industrial and Commercial Bank as an example. Similar to other Chinese banks, ICBC's income is highly dependent on deposit-loan spread income. Although its non-deposit and loan spread income is slightly higher than the average level of 65,438+00% of all Chinese banks, it is far from the average level of about 50% of major international banks. Under the realistic pressure that the bank has excess liquidity and the contribution rate of non-spread income cannot be greatly increased in a short period of time, ICBC after listing must maintain and continue to expand the loan scale and improve the loan-to-deposit ratio in order to fulfill its promise of 65,438+06% return. From June 5438+05, when the bank reserve ratio was raised by 0.5 percentage point again, controlling the bank credit scale, appropriately reducing the bank loan-to-deposit ratio and reducing the excess liquidity are the goals and basic requirements of the current national macro-control. Therefore, as the largest state-owned commercial bank in China, the first goal of ICBC's operation after listing is to increase corporate profits and meet the requirements of all shareholders, or to continue to follow the requirements of national regulation and control, with the implementation of national credit policies as the main orientation? It has become an important issue that people care about. This is not only the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, but also all the state-owned commercial banks in China, such as Bank of China and China Construction Bank, have encountered practical difficulties after listing.
Since the three major state-owned commercial banks are all controlled by the state after listing, the major shareholders will undoubtedly play a leading role in the development direction of the banks and even the decision-making of specific business behaviors. Moreover, after the listing, the presidents of state-owned commercial banks and other senior managers still show a strong color of administrative officials, which often makes the decisions of senior managers of listed banks more inclined to the needs of * * * management and social benefits, and sacrifices the market-oriented operation and internal economic benefits of enterprises to a certain extent.
At present, the positive significance of the listing of state-owned commercial banks in China may be more manifested in improving the bank's capital adequacy ratio. As for how to truly realize the market-oriented operation of listed state-owned commercial banks and maximize the interests of all shareholders as the primary business goal, it is necessary to further deepen financial reform to find a solution.
How many state-owned commercial banks are there in China? 5. Industrial and Commercial Bank, Agricultural Bank, China Bank, China Construction Bank and Bank of Communications.
How do state-owned commercial banks cope with the challenges after China's entry into WTO Abstract: This paper briefly analyzes the competition and challenges brought about by China's entry into WTO, and the preparations that state-owned commercial banks should make in terms of concepts, mechanisms, talents, products, science and technology, etc. In order to improve the overall competitive strength and sustainable development ability of state-owned commercial banks.