In the mid-1980s, the exchange rate of the Japanese yen against the US dollar underwent two major adjustments: first, the Plaza Agreement of June 65438+September 0985, which mainly settled the trade dispute between Japan and the United States, greatly appreciated the Japanese yen against the US dollar; Second, louvre accord1987 February, mainly to solve the adverse impact of the excessive depreciation of the US dollar on the world economy, the Japanese yen experienced a brief sharp depreciation against the US dollar. These two large-scale adjustments of the exchange rate of the Japanese yen against the US dollar were caused by the trade friction between Japan and the United States and the practical needs of their respective domestic political and economic interests. All of them were promoted and implemented under the leadership of the United States, through the pressure of the international community and the exchange rate coordination mechanism of international conferences, which had a great impact on the economic operation of Japan, the United States and other countries and the world. At present, it is of positive practical significance to seriously study and summarize the experience and enlightenment of the two major adjustments of the exchange rate between Japan and the United States for improving the understanding of the importance of maintaining the stability of the RMB exchange rate and further exploring and perfecting the RMB exchange rate formation mechanism.
First, the Plaza Accord and the appreciation of the yen.
In the early 1980s, the American economy was plagued by "stagflation". At that time, the Reagan administration implemented the supply-side tax reduction plan to stimulate the economy, and at the same time, the US central bank depressed the money supply and suppressed inflation through the high interest rate policy. The policy combination of "loose finance and tight currency" has achieved certain results in alleviating "stagflation", but at the same time it has also brought serious potential problems to the American economy, notably the high fiscal deficit and current account deficit in the United States, and the interest rate in the United States is also significantly higher than that in most industrialized countries at that time. The ratio of US government fiscal deficit to GDP was 2.9% in 1980, and it rose to 5.2% in 1985. In the same period, the current account deficit of the United States reached $654.38+$024.5 billion, accounting for 3% of GDP; The domestic market interest rate in the United States is about 4 percentage points higher than that in developed countries.
During this period, the economies of Japan and West Germany were also hit by "stagflation", but because these countries were in the period of economic recovery after World War II, the fundamentals of economic operation were relatively better than those of the United States. The government's fiscal deficit has been greatly reduced, and the current account has a large surplus. The ratio of Japanese government fiscal deficit to GDP was 4.9% in 1980, and decreased to1.4% in 1985; The fiscal deficit of the West German government accounted for 2.8% of GDP in 1980, and decreased to 1. 1% in 1985. The average domestic deposit rates in Japan and West Germany are also significantly lower than those in the United States.
The differences in macroeconomic policies and economic performance between Japan, the United States, Germany and other developed industrialized countries, especially the high interest rate policy of the US dollar, have attracted a large amount of foreign capital into the United States, leading to a sharp appreciation of the US dollar exchange rate. In the first half of 1980s, the exchange rate of the US dollar appreciated by 72% on average. In fact, the high exchange rate of the US dollar hides a huge speculative bubble. The appreciation of the US dollar exchange rate and the high fiscal deficit and trade deficit have increased the employment pressure in the United States, increased national dissatisfaction and increased the tendency of trade protectionism. At that time, the mainstream opinion in the United States was that the main problems were Japan and West Germany, and the US government should urge the international community to strengthen exchange rate coordination so that the US dollar could depreciate moderately against non-US dollar currencies such as the Japanese yen. On the other hand, Japan and West Germany have accumulated considerable economic strength after more than 40 years of development after World War II. Both governments are unwilling to worsen their relations with the United States because of trade frictions. At the same time, they believe that the appreciation of the yen and the mark against the dollar is also conducive to the internationalization of the yen and the mark, and enhance the international status of Japan and West Germany. The appreciation of the Japanese yen against the US dollar conforms to the basic interests of the coordinated survival of the international community and is driven by international political and economic factors. 1In September, 1985, the finance ministers and central bank governors of five developed countries (G5 countries, including the United States, Japan, West Germany, Britain and France) signed an agreement in new york Plaza Building, unanimously agreeing to promote the appreciation of the yen against the US dollar steadily and orderly through international "coordinated intervention". The agreement signed at this meeting is called "Plaza Agreement" in history.
According to the Plaza Accord, G5 countries should strengthen "cooperative intervention" in international exchange rate, and raise the exchange rate of US dollar against Japanese yen from 1 to 120 within two and a half years. At that time, the long-term interest rate difference between countries was also a factor affecting the capital flow in the international foreign exchange market, and the coordination of Plaza Accord policies also involved this field. At the time of Plaza Accord, the interest rate of 30-year long-term US Treasury bonds was 65,438+00.8%. After the United States relaxed its financial policy, it fell to 7.3% in the summer of 1986. During this period, the Federal Reserve Bank of the United States lowered the federal funds rate four times, from 7.5% of the Plaza Accord to 5.5% of 1986 in August. However, Japan's financial adjustment has kept the domestic long-term interest rate basically stable. The interest rate of Japan's long-term government bonds was about 5.8% at the time of the agreement, and it remained at this level at the beginning of 1986. The narrowing of the long-term interest rate difference between Japan and the United States has reduced the pressure of capital flowing to the United States, and G5 countries have strengthened their "cooperative intervention" in the foreign exchange market, which has effectively promoted the depreciation of the US dollar. At the end of 1985, the exchange rate of the US dollar against the Japanese yen fell to 1 200 yen, and then fell to 1 0/50 yen in the summer of 1986.
Second, the stability of the exchange rate between louvre accord and the US dollar
After the Plaza Accord, although the US dollar depreciated sharply against non-US dollar currencies such as the Japanese yen, there was a "J-curve effect" in currency depreciation because the US government failed to take effective measures to improve its financial situation, and the US foreign trade deficit did not shrink for more than two years after the Plaza Accord. 1987 The US trade deficit reached168 billion US dollars, accounting for 3.6% of GDP, of which 3/4 of the deficit came from the current account surpluses of Japan and West Germany. The deterioration of the trade balance in the United States and the sharp increase in foreign debt have affected the inflow of foreign capital into the United States, and the market's confidence in the US dollar has declined. It is obvious that continuing to devalue the dollar will do more harm than good, and the trade friction between the United States, Japan and West Germany will intensify. At the same time, influenced by the appreciation of the yen and the mark, the foreign trade exports of Japan and West Germany declined, and the economic growth rate declined. Japan's economic growth rate dropped from 4.2% in 1985 to 3. 1% in 1986, while the economic growth rate in West Germany hovered around 2% in 1985- 1987. Japan and West Germany are dissatisfied with the failure of the United States to effectively reduce its fiscal deficit according to the Plaza Accord. In addition, the sharp and rapid depreciation of the dollar has also caused great shocks in the international foreign exchange market and the world economy. Major developed industrialized countries obviously feel the need to stop the decline of the US dollar as soon as possible and maintain the basic stability of the US dollar exchange rate, which is conducive to the common development of all countries in the world. At that time, the United States can choose to raise domestic interest rates to attract international capital inflows and slow down the excessive depreciation of the dollar. However, for fear that this will cause domestic economic depression, the United States is unwilling to raise domestic interest rates, and tends to lower interest rates in Japan and West Germany.
Under the leadership of the United States, in order to stabilize the international foreign exchange market, prevent the US dollar exchange rate from falling too fast, and solve the policy problems faced by developed countries through international coordination,1In February 1987, the finance ministers and central bank governors of G7 countries reached an agreement in the Louvre in Paris, agreeing that G7 countries should strengthen "close coordination and cooperation" in domestic macro-policies and foreign exchange market intervention, so as to maintain the basic stability of the US dollar exchange rate at that time. The agreement of this meeting is called "louvre accord" in history.
Louvre accord emphasized the importance of strengthening the "close cooperation" of the Group of Seven in maintaining the stability of the US dollar exchange rate and the coordinated development of the world economy, and emphasized that more balanced global economic growth plays a central role in promoting the balance of international foreign exchange payments. In fact, this means that the accelerated economic growth of American trading partners will help solve the imbalance of American balance of payments. The main agreements in the agreement include: Japan and West Germany implement plans to stimulate domestic demand, and the United States further cuts its fiscal deficit; G7 countries strengthen "intervention and coordination" in the foreign exchange market, secretly maintain the informal floating zone of the exchange rate of the US dollar against the Japanese yen and the mark, and strengthen cooperation and intervention if the exchange rate fluctuation exceeds the expected target of 5%. After the louvre accord, the exchange rates of major international currencies have remained basically stable for more than two years, with little fluctuation.
Third, the impact of the two exchange rate adjustments on the Japanese and American economies.
The Plaza Accord and louvre accord had a great impact on Japanese and American economies. As far as the American economy is concerned, the overall positive effect is greater than the negative effect. The two agreements were essentially signed under the guidance of American policy and economic interests. Especially after louvre accord, American foreign trade exports expanded rapidly, and the trade deficit and financial deficit both fell sharply. 1987- 1990, the growth rate of American foreign trade exports remained above 10%; The current account deficit in the United States dropped from $654.38+06.8 billion to $92 billion, accounting for 654.38+0.6% of GDP. The proportion of the government's fiscal deficit to GDP has dropped from 4.5% to 3.4%. These changes have obviously played a positive role in strengthening American economic hegemony and alleviating domestic "stagflation" and employment pressure. However, after louvre accord, Japan and West Germany lowered their interest rates because the attitude of the United States was too tough, but it was difficult for Japan and West Germany to lower their interest rates because of their domestic economic situation. Due to multiple factors such as market expectation, new york stock market experienced a serious stock price crash in June 1987+ 10/9. New york stock market plunged 22% that day, which was called "Black Monday". At the same time, the sharp depreciation of the dollar after the Plaza Accord also prompted the United States to gradually change from a net creditor country to a net debtor country. By the end of 1986, the total foreign net debt of the United States reached $263.6 billion, making it the largest net debtor in the world at that time.
As far as Japan's economy is concerned, the Plaza Agreement of 1985 has promoted the appreciation of the yen, which in fact has become the fuse of Japan's "bubble economy" in the future. In the second year after the Plaza Agreement was signed, namely 1986, Japan experienced a depression caused by the appreciation of the yen. The growth rate of foreign trade exports dropped from 2.4% in 1985 to -4.8% in 1986, and the actual economic growth rate dropped from 4. 1% in 1985 to 3. 1% in 1986. However, at that time, Japan's economy was generally in the rising period of recovery and growth, and domestic industries were generally optimistic and confident about Japan's economic development prospects. At the same time, the Plaza Agreement made the yen appreciate, which played a positive role in reducing the price of consumer goods and increasing the real income of residents. Japan's domestic private consumption expenditure has increased substantially, and the investment boom led by private consumption has effectively stimulated the rapid expansion of Japan's domestic total demand. On the other hand, before and after the Plaza Accord, in order to alleviate the trade friction between Japan and the United States, Japan did not open the import market while agreeing to the appreciation of the yen against the US dollar, but implemented a loose monetary policy to promote the import of American goods, especially the "ultra-low interest rate" policy. From 1986 to 65438+ 10, in order to reduce the negative impact of the appreciation of the yen on domestic economic growth, the Bank of Japan lowered the official discount rate for five consecutive times from 1986 to 1987 in February, bringing it down to the lowest international level of 2.5% at that time. After louvre accord, the Bank of Japan kept this "ultra-low interest rate" of 2.5% until May 1989, which lasted for 27 months. The official interest rate of the Bank of Japan has been at a low level for a long time, which has effectively promoted a large increase in loans from financial institutions. The ratio of loans to GDP of Japanese financial institutions was about 50% in the early 1980s, and it had risen to 100% by the end of 1980s. During the period of 1987- 1989, the annual growth rate of Japanese money supply (M2+CD) was 10.8%, 10.2% and 12%, respectively, which kept a high level.
Due to the extreme expansion of monetary policy, Japan's economic growth rate was 6.0%, 4.4% and 5.5% in 1988- 1990 respectively, which obviously exceeded the average level of about 3% in the early 1980s and the level of other developed countries in the same period. At the same time, a large amount of surplus funds flowed into the stock and real estate fields, which led to the skyrocketing stock prices and real estate prices. 1987- 1989, the Japanese share price rose by 94% on average, and the urban land price rose by 103% on average. In the same period, the consumer price index in Japan only rose by 3. 1% on average. The Bank of Japan and the Ministry of Economic Planning did not pay enough attention to the asset price bubble 199 1 for a long time before the collapse of Japan's bubble economy, because consumer prices did not rise sharply while asset prices soared. At that time, policy decisions paid more attention to the growth of the real economy, the stability of consumer prices and the balance of international payments. Although people think that there are some "anomalies" in the financial sector and asset prices, the decision-making authorities only warned the "anomalies" in the financial sector because of price stability and sustained economic growth, and did not take substantive measures in time. In this way, the increase of credit produced a bubble, the expansion of the bubble promoted the increase of credit, and the increase of credit further produced a bubble. By the end of 1989, Japan had fully entered the bubble economy.
Louvre accord-bubble economy
The bubble economy is constantly expanding, and the Japanese government is gradually feeling the pressure. 1In May 1989, the Bank of Japan changed the direction of monetary policy and raised the "ultra-low interest rate" of 2.5%, which had been maintained for more than two years, to 3.25%. 1989 At the end of the year, Kono, who strongly advocated the suppression of bubbles, became the governor of the Bank of Japan. At the beginning of his tenure, he was ready to raise the official discount rate from 3.75% to 4.25%, ending the era of "ultra-low interest rates" in Japan. From May 1989 to August 1990, the Bank of Japan raised the official discount rate five times, making it as high as 6%. At the same time, the Bank of Japan explicitly requires financial institutions to limit loan investment in the real estate industry. By 199 1, banks have actually stopped lending to the real estate industry. The growth rate of money supply in Japan dropped to 7.4% at 1990 and to 2.3% at 199 1. Due to the credit crunch, Japan's bubble economy began to collapse at 199 1 and has been in a downturn ever since.
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