On state-owned enterprises and legal countermeasures 1. According to the data first disclosed by China Construction Bank in May 2002, the NPL ratio of the bank was 18. 14% by the end of the first quarter of 2002. By the end of 2004, the proportion had dropped to 3.92% and to 3.84% by the end of 2005. In addition, Bank of China, as one of the pilot banks in the reform together with China Construction Bank, has a NPL of 253.9 billion yuan, which makes the NPL at the end of 2004 decrease by 1 1. 16% compared with the end of 2003. At the end of 20001year, the NPL ratio of China Industrial and Commercial Bank reached 29.8%. After 2004, ICBC significantly accelerated the pace of disposal of non-performing loans. In 2005, the NPL ratio and NPL ratio of the Bank decreased to 2.49% and 4.43% respectively. Second, the economic analysis of bank non-performing loans lies in the bounded rationality, opportunistic behavior tendency and unbalanced information of economic people, which is inevitable. 1. The bounded rational economics of economic man assumes that people's economic behavior is "rational". But in fact. In the limited and rational competitive environment of borrowers, due to many uncertain factors, borrowers will face social risks and operational risks, and may be led by decision-making mistakes. As far as the bounded rationality of the lender is concerned, the loan is bound to lose money because of information asymmetry. 2. The opportunistic behavior tendency of economic man is defined as "the behavior of seeking personal interests with false or empty threats or promises". Because of human's limited rationality, opportunistic behavior tendency is bound to exist. Before the credit transaction, the purpose of the loan is to conceal or provide false information, which makes the bank's credit assets have potential risks. Starting from their own interests in credit transactions, they will engage in activities that are not from the lender's point of view in order to maximize their own interests. Lenders will face the potential risk that it is difficult to recover their loans in time. 3. Information imbalance and its adverse selection effect. In loan decision-making, information generally includes: macro policy, monetary policy, etc. Micro-information, such as production and operation status, management level, market development ability, entrepreneur quality, etc. According to the economic subjects in the market, it can be divided into two categories: balanced information and unbalanced information. Unbalanced information refers to the market information obtained by market participants. In the credit market, banks and enterprises are market participants. One party is the borrower, which is the enterprise. As borrowers and users of funds, the "actual" investment projects of borrowed funds (not necessarily providing all information to banks; On the other hand, the lender is a bank. Banks are only providers of funds, and information about the use of borrowed funds can only be understood indirectly through enterprises or other channels. Therefore, under normal circumstances, it is impossible to have the same level of informatization as enterprises. The existence of such unbalanced information makes it impossible for banks to timely and accurately judge the credit quality of borrowers and the repayment probability of funds. In the credit market with asymmetric information, interest rate has adverse selection effect and moral hazard effect. Stiglitz and Weiss believe that with the increase of interest rate, there will be: (1) Because banks can't fully understand the relevant information of borrowers in advance, they will take the loan interest rate as a detection signal. A higher proportion of borrowers who prefer to take risks (risk preference type) will come out to accept the increase of loan interest rate, while safer borrowers who don't like to take risks (risk avoidance type) will quit the applicant team, which is "adverse selection". (2) Borrowers who are willing to pay higher interest will tend to change their business projects and engage in high-risk and high-yield investment projects in order to obtain higher profits, and the loan risk will also increase. This is "moral hazard". Moral hazard will also strengthen the adverse selection effect, so that the risk of bank loans will increase with the increase of loan interest rate. Three. Countermeasures for state-owned commercial banks to resolve non-performing loans. Strengthen the management and disposal of non-performing loans that have not been stripped. The government should cultivate a perfect non-performing loan circulation market. Through market intermediary, broaden the channels of information exchange on non-performing loans, find potential investors, buyers and partners at home and abroad, encourage private enterprises and foreign investors to participate, and adopt flexible methods such as public auction, secret bidding and equity joint venture to provide sufficient follow-up funds for the disposal of non-performing loans. Actively innovate disposal methods, break through the original scope of loan collection, and formulate practical management measures for cash collection and debt repayment with things for the purpose of preserving credit assets to the maximum extent. Physical assets, bills, intangible assets and intellectual property rights can be used as debt repayment, and non-performing loans can be effectively revitalized through the development, transfer, lease and auction of mortgaged assets. If the enterprise with collateral loses its cash repayment ability, it should recover the debt repayment in time, deal with it as soon as possible, and offset the loan balance to prevent the loan loss from increasing due to the damage or depreciation of collateral. For some enterprises that have stopped production or stopped production, although the bank has not gone through the mortgage formalities, it should also collect the assets that are easy to be realized by enterprises through negotiation or litigation, so as to offset the principal and interest of bank loans and reduce loan losses. For non-performing loans with collateral, it is necessary to recover the collateral in time according to law and collect the non-performing loans by auction. 2. Strictly control the quality of new loans and fundamentally reduce the number of non-performing loans. At present, state-owned commercial banks hope to dilute the stock of non-performing loans through the expansion of total loans, but to completely solve the problem of non-performing loans of state-owned commercial banks, stock revitalization and incremental optimization must be carried out simultaneously. Therefore, while expanding the total amount of loans, we must emphasize incremental optimization. (1) Accelerate the reform of state-owned commercial banks and improve the efficiency of capital operation. ① Deepen the reform of the property right system of state-owned commercial banks and improve the corporate governance structure. Property right system is the basis of commercial bank system, which determines the efficiency of bank operation and resource allocation. Therefore, it is necessary to speed up the reform of the property right system of state-owned commercial banks, change the single ownership structure and introduce non-state-owned investors on the premise of state holding. The separation of decision-making power, management power and supervision power will make state-owned commercial banks truly become modern financial enterprises with independent operation, self-financing, self-restraint and self-development. ② Establish information disclosure system. Improve the accounting system, implement unified accounting and auditing standards, so that domestic and foreign investors have a thorough understanding of the investment target, and reduce adverse selection and moral hazard caused by information asymmetry between the government (central bank), state-owned commercial banks and borrowing enterprises. State-owned commercial banks should make full use of advanced computer network technology to establish and improve customer information systems as soon as possible, which can not only provide information services for pre-lending decision-making, but also provide analytical data for post-lending management. ③ Optimize the loan structure and improve the quality of credit assets. According to the characteristics of the industry and the level of economic development, the loan resources will be allocated to the energy, transportation, telecommunications and leading industries that China urgently needs to develop. Focus on supporting and developing large and medium-sized enterprise groups with broad market prospects and good economic benefits; It is necessary to control the concentration of loans and maintain a reasonable proportion of large loans. Actively innovate loan business, continue to develop consumer credit such as personal housing and car purchase, and increase the proportion of high-quality loans to all loans. ④ Establish risk control and risk early warning system of state-owned commercial banks as soon as possible. To improve the risk management level of state-owned commercial banks, we should not only establish various models and tools for risk identification, risk measurement and risk control, but also develop corresponding risk management databases and risk management information systems to provide technical support for risk management decisions. At the same time, it is necessary to establish corresponding institutional platforms such as risk management organizations and enterprise processes. Strengthen risk management before, during and after lending, and establish a loan decision-making control system with risk management as the core. The loan amount, interest rate and term are determined according to the risk level. Do a good job in pre-lending investigation and improve the decision-making level before lending. Fully grasp the borrower's financial status and credit rating. According to the "5W" principle, that is, who to lend (who), why to lend (why), what to use as guarantee (what), when to repay (when) and how to repay (how to repay), the loan will be issued after careful examination and confirmation, so as to minimize the decision-making risk. Promote mortgage-guaranteed loans and improve the loan mortgage system and guarantee procedures. Secured mortgage loan is a common loan system in developed countries with market economy. When a borrower applies for a loan from a bank, it shall provide a guarantee. Banks should strictly examine the repayment ability of lenders and guarantors, the ownership and value of collateral, and ensure that borrowers and guarantors have good credit standing and repayment ability before issuing loans. This is one of the effective ways to reduce the loan risk. After lending money, banks as creditors should give good feedback, pay attention to collecting information on capital operation, strengthen supervision over major financial activities of enterprises, timely and accurately grasp information on capital flow and quality of capital use, find out problems in the process of capital use in time through supervision and analysis, and take remedial measures to prevent credit funds from deteriorating. Perfecting the early warning mechanism of credit assets, improving the level of information collection, collation, analysis, evaluation and decision-making of risk management, and taking various effective measures to resolve credit risks once loans enter the early warning range are important links to improve the quality of credit funds and strengthen risk control. (2) create a good external environment and improve the corresponding supporting measures. ① Transform government functions, reduce government intervention in bank credit behavior, and enhance the independence of state-owned banks. The government should provide perfect policy support and legal support, create a good credit environment and establish a unified credit evaluation system. Enrich the capital of state-owned commercial banks and enhance their ability to resist risks; According to the requirements of economic development, it is necessary to revise the liquidity management measures of state-owned enterprises in a timely manner, and it is forbidden to issue loans to newly-built enterprises with their own liquidity less than 30%. ② Strengthen external constraints, and strengthen the supervision and management of the CBRC on the issuance of credit funds of state-owned commercial banks. On the one hand, the supervision department should follow the principles of international financial supervision, improve the supervision system and means, and comprehensively use legal, administrative and economic means to strengthen the external supervision of state-owned commercial banks. On the other hand, it is necessary to strengthen financial law enforcement, strengthen the audit and inspection of loans from state-owned commercial banks, and promptly correct all kinds of illegal acts. Through technical support such as information collection system and risk early warning system, an audit inspection system combining qualitative and quantitative aspects of state-owned commercial banks and their credit business will be established. Only by strengthening the supervision of the credit behavior of state-owned banks can we improve the credit quality and effectively control the growth rate of non-performing loans.
Second, how do banks control the amount of non-performing loans?
Bad debts and dormant accounts
Third, solve the non-performing loans of banks.
1. Commercial banks can write off bad debts with loan loss reserve and its accumulated surplus, or dispose of non-performing loans by auction of creditor's rights. The key to solving non-performing loans is to strictly control the growth of non-performing loans, improve the profitability of banks, and gradually digest and reduce non-performing loans. 2. Inject funds into commercial banks from outside to resolve non-performing loans. Stripping non-performing loans from the books of commercial banks and handing them over to professional asset management companies for centralized disposal. 1999, China established four financial asset management companies, namely Xinda, Huarong, Great Wall and Dongfang, and stripped off the non-performing loans of the four major state-owned commercial banks at book value 1.39 trillion yuan. In 2003, China began a new round of rural credit cooperatives reform, injecting 654.38+065 billion yuan of special bills or re-loans into rural credit cooperatives to solve its historical burden.