Research progress of world shadow banking
The concept of "shadow banking" was first put forward by Paul McCully, executive director of Pacific Investment Management Company, in 2007, which refers to "an all-encompassing acronym soup composed of highly leveraged non-bank investment channels, tools and structures". It can be seen that his original definition mainly refers to various financing channels, tools and structures created in the structured financing market, which is what we usually call "special purpose institutions or tools". This kind of structured financing generally repackages and sells mortgage loans, credit cards, auto loans and accounts receivable by means of asset securitization, using tools such as CDOS and ABS, so as to integrate new funds into the market.
In the subsequent exploration, this definition was further expanded. Both the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the Federal Reserve have put forward their own views, and everyone's views are not consistent. There are two main reasons for this: First, different countries or regions have different demand structures in the real economy, different financial structure and supervision methods, and financial markets are at different stages of financial deepening. Therefore, the so-called shadow banking business has various subjects, activity types and manifestations. Second, due to active financial innovation and changes in financial regulatory policies, the shadow banking business itself has developed rapidly, and new financial products and new financial business models are always being created in the financial market. Therefore, the concept of "shadow banking" cannot fully cover these new products and models.
At present, the popular definition in the world is that "any (partial or all) credit intermediary activities outside the formal banking system" mentioned in the article "Shadow Banking: 20 1 1" can belong to the scope of "shadow banking". In addition, FSB put forward a narrower concept of shadow banking in that report: credit intermediary activities and institutions that are easy to cause systemic risks or regulatory arbitrage outside the conventional banking system, especially those involving term or liquidity conversion, which to some extent cause inappropriate credit risk transfer and leverage accumulation. Of course, the Financial Stability Board also pointed out that there may not be internationally recognized standards on which object is regarded as a shadow bank, which depends on the specific conditions of financial systems and regulatory systems in different economies.
Others believe that only those tools, structures, companies or market activities that copy or replace the core functions of commercial banks (such as liquidity provision, maturity mismatch and leverage ratio) should be the focus of our shadow banking business.
Therefore, it is inconsistent whether shadow banking is differentiated according to the type of institutions or according to financial services and tools. Whether it is more from the perspective of whether there is supervision, whether there is liquidity support from the central bank, and whether it replaces and exerts the main functions or functions of commercial banks, the current views are not the same.
Because shadow banking actually involves shadow banking institutions and traditional commercial banks, it is difficult to make a particularly clear distinction. For example, the huge bond repurchase market in Europe and America is generally regarded as the representative of shadow banking, and traditional commercial banks are only one of the biggest participants. To discuss the risk management and supervision of this market, it must involve the risk management and supervision of commercial banks. For example, although the money market in the United States is also supervised by the Securities and Futures Commission, it is generally considered as an important part of shadow banking because of its complicated structure and opacity. For example, the parent companies of many hedge funds are commercial banks, and this part of the shadow banking business will inevitably involve consolidated supervision.
Although there is no consensus on shadow banking and its business scope, it is generally believed that it has four characteristics: First, it lacks supervision (such as hedge funds) or
It is imperfect supervision (for example, the bond repurchase market and the money market share a fund); Second, some shadow banking activities are due to regulatory arbitrage; Third, some activities have economic value; Fourth, if shadow banking is not properly regulated, it will bring new systemic risks to its financial system.
Although there are many discussions and reflections on shadow banking after the crisis, in fact, the scale of global shadow banking business has not decreased, but has increased. It should be pointed out that while the scale of global shadow banking is constantly expanding, there is no authoritative organization to make a clear calculation of its risk increase. For example, at the beginning of 20 13, the scale of hedge funds reached 2.25 trillion US dollars, a record high; The money market * * * mutual funds 20 1 1 reached 4.7 trillion US dollars, which was lower than the peak of 5.8 trillion US dollars in 2007, but still greatly exceeded the scale of about 4 trillion US dollars in 2005; The bond repurchase market in Europe and America, 20 10 as a whole, has surpassed the pre-crisis level. According to the latest data of the Financial Stability Board, the scale of global shadow banking increased rapidly from $26 trillion in 2002 to $62 trillion in 2007. After a brief decline in 2008, 20 1 1 year once again reached 67 trillion US dollars, the highest in history, equivalent to 1. 1 times the global GDP. According to FSB's estimation, the scale of shadow banking in China is about 0.4 trillion US dollars, accounting for about 5% of GDP, less than the global 1%.
At present, more than 80% of the world's shadow banking activities are concentrated in developed economies in Europe and America. Considering the complexity, high leverage ratio and spillover effect of shadow banking services such as hedge funds and structured financing, the impact of cross-border transmission between different institutions and businesses on emerging countries with insufficient flexibility and resilience in their financial markets should be highly concerned, which is also the most important aspect for us to understand the stability of the global financial system.
Shadow Banking in China: Roots and Characteristics
In recent years, the rapid growth of China's shadow banking business has emerged under the background of national macro-control, monitoring the scale of bank loans and strengthening financial supervision. At the same time, the impulse of extensive scale expansion of banks has not diminished, and the growth model driven by investment in the real economy has not fundamentally changed. At the policy level, we will continue to promote the marketization of interest rates and encourage the exploration and development of various direct financing methods and channels. All these factors have promoted the profound changes in China's social financing structure: First, the traditional credit activities of commercial banks have been constantly replaced by multi-channel financing models; Second, the balance sheet structure of commercial banks has shifted from on-balance sheet to off-balance-sheet, from retail to wholesale, and from peers to peers.
There are quite different views on the connotation and scale of shadow banking in China. The largest scale of shadow banking is about 30 trillion yuan, and the smaller scale is about 5 trillion yuan. The main difference lies in whether it includes off-balance-sheet business of banks and business of non-bank financial institutions. The author believes that what is important at present is not the scale of discussion, but to study and deal with the systematic impact of these activities on the financial system, the impact on the formal traditional commercial banking system and the impact on financial consumers.
China's shadow banking is significantly different from American-style shadow banking. First of all, from the institutional point of view, most of the subjects engaged in financing activities outside the credit business of traditional formal commercial banks in China are strictly supervised or supervised to a certain extent.
Secondly, from the business point of view, most of them have supervision system and management system arrangement, but they don't have institutions, tools or structures opposite to the commercial banking system, and they don't have the complex basic characteristics of repeated securitization, wholesale financing and lack of supervision, which are similar to the shadow banking business in Europe and America.
Thirdly, from the perspective of financial instruments, financial derivatives are the foundation of the shadow banking system in the United States. In China, the so-called shadow banking actually provides "credit-like" services through credit creation.
Finally, from the perspective of business model, shadow banking in the United States is a highly market-oriented credit intermediary, relying on the active secondary market and wholesale financing market, with high leverage. However, China's shadow banking business is more similar to the formal banking business, relying on deposited funds, with a low level of leverage.
At present, there are still financial repression phenomena such as inefficient financial services and unreasonable resource allocation in China. The appearance of shadow banking itself is only a part of China's financial deepening and economic development, which has increased diversified financial services and products for enterprises and investors, which is the inevitable process and result of financial disintermediation.
Challenges faced by standardization of shadow banking
In the supervision of shadow banking business, we should pay attention to avoiding "one size fits all" and analyze its business composition. In addition to understanding the independent operation mechanism of these financial activities, it is also necessary to analyze the relationship between them and between them and traditional commercial banks. Supervision should focus on those activities that may cause specific risks to investors' interests, financial environment and macroeconomic stability, and strive to strike a balance between maintaining market stability and promoting innovation and development in order to find the most effective way to reduce the harmfulness of these risks.
Standardizing the shadow banking business in China faces three major challenges. The first challenge is how to improve the regulatory framework to identify and measure the scale and risk characteristics of shadow banking. This monitoring framework should consist of two parts: accurate data and comprehensive information, and high-quality analysis and research that can identify and measure risks. At the same time, it must be pointed out that the monitoring framework should also be flexible and forward-looking, and be sensitive to innovative activities that may lead to regulatory arbitrage and systemic risks.
The second challenge is how China's financial supervision properly responds to the rise of shadow banking credit intermediary activities, that is, it can strengthen risk supervision without generating new regulatory arbitrage activities. The challenge is not the business that financial institutions with strict supervision may be involved in, but various shadow banking activities that exist outside informal regulators. To standardize, guide and even ban some illegal acts of these activities requires information exchange, cooperation and understanding of multiple departments.
The third challenge is how to promote financial reform and support more professional financial institutions to grow and develop. By improving the professional service ability of these new non-bank financial institutions, it will help to standardize and solve the problems of little or no supervision in other shadow banking activities, make the information of various financing channels more symmetrical, reduce market failures, reduce potential systemic risks, and make financial consumers get more professional services and better protection.