Current location - Loan Platform Complete Network - Loan consultation - Want to get some information about the reform of state-owned commercial banks, thank you very much!
Want to get some information about the reform of state-owned commercial banks, thank you very much!
The reform of China's state-owned commercial banks has entered a critical period, and various problems have become more and more profound. The whole financial community can only choose to face up to these problems in order to better grasp the future. As one of the participants in the reform of state-owned commercial banks in China, Mr. Tang Shuangning put forward his own practical summary of the reform of state-owned banks with a pragmatic attitude.

First, the stage of the reform of state-owned commercial banks.

The reform of state-owned commercial banks in China is being carried out in stages. I have analyzed the historical stages of the reform of state-owned commercial banks on different occasions. Over the past twenty years, the reform of state-owned commercial banks has gone through three stages.

(1) 1984- 1994 professional reform stage

Before 1984, China implemented a "unified" banking system. 1984 Under the background of China's reform and opening up, China Industrial and Commercial Bank was restructured from China People's Bank. Together with the Bank of China, which specializes in foreign exchange business, the People's Construction Bank of China, which used to exercise financial functions, and the Agricultural Bank of China, which was restored in 1979, these four banks have become national specialized banks, while the People's Bank of China has exclusively exercised the functions of the central bank. Since then, China has formed a dual banking system.

(B) 1994-2003 stage of reform of wholly state-owned commercial banks

From 65438 to 0994, the state established three policy banks to separate policy finance from commercial finance. 1995, the Law of People's Republic of China (PRC) Commercial Bank was promulgated and implemented, which made it clear that state-owned commercial banks are market subjects with "independent operation, self-bearing risks, self-financing and self-restraint". At this point, the four major professional banks are legally defined as wholly state-owned commercial banks.

During 1997, the Asian financial crisis broke out. In June of the same year, the central government held the first national financial work conference 5438+0 1, and then a series of reform measures for state-owned commercial banks were introduced one after another, including: the central government issued 270 billion yuan of special treasury bonds to supplement the capital of four banks; Stripping assets of 654.38+393.9 million yuan from four newly established asset management companies; Cancel the loan scale and implement asset-liability ratio management; Strengthen enterprise management and performance appraisal.

At this stage, many advanced ideas and methods have been introduced, the internal control mechanism of operating performance and risk has been gradually established, and the external administrative intervention has been obviously weakened. However, on the whole, the reform at this stage is mainly carried out at the levels of combing internal and external relations, introducing advanced management technology and disposing of non-performing assets, and has not touched on deep-seated problems such as system.

The reform stage of state-controlled joint-stock commercial banks began in 2004.

At the end of 2003, the CPC Central Committee and the State Council decided to choose Bank of China and China Construction Bank to carry out the pilot joint-stock reform, and used 45 billion US dollars of foreign exchange reserves to inject capital, hoping to fundamentally reform the system of state-owned commercial banks. This reform is generally divided into three steps. First, financial restructuring, that is, with the support of national policies, to digest historical burdens and improve financial conditions. Financial restructuring is the premise and foundation of the shareholding system reform of state-owned commercial banks. The second is corporate governance reform, that is, according to the requirements of modern banking system and drawing lessons from international advanced experience, the management system and internal operation mechanism of banks are reformed. Corporate governance reform is the core and key to the shareholding system reform of state-owned commercial banks. Third, listing in the capital market means that by listing in domestic and foreign capital markets, the shareholding structure will be further improved and the market will really accept supervision and inspection. Listing on the capital market is the deepening and sublimation of the shareholding system reform of state-owned commercial banks.

Looking back on the three stages of the reform of state-owned commercial banks in the past 20 years, the first two stages focus on treating the symptoms and taking care of the root causes, laying the foundation for the next stage of reform; In the third stage, on the basis of the first two stages, the reform focuses on tackling the root cause and treating both the symptoms and the root causes. The so-called root cause is to carry out a thorough shareholding system reform of state-owned commercial banks by learning from the common practices of international joint-stock banks. Joint-stock commercial bank system is a common system model adopted by all countries in the world, and so far no system model can surpass it. Therefore, the shareholding system reform is an inevitable choice for the development of China's banking industry.

Two, several basic considerations about the reform decision of state-owned commercial banks

State-owned commercial banks are the main body of China's banking industry and play a very important role in the allocation of national economic resources and the operation of payment system. The reform of state-owned commercial banks involves all aspects, which requires overall consideration, careful preparation and careful deployment. Therefore, in the third-stage reform decision of state-owned commercial banks, after repeated argumentation, full comparison, multi-party weighing and careful weighing, the following basic considerations are summarized:

First of all, it's easy before it's difficult. The joint-stock reform of state-owned commercial banks and the whole economic system reform, especially the reform of state-owned enterprises, are intertwined, interrelated and transformed, which intensifies the urgency, complexity and arduousness of the reform. In the demonstration stage of shareholding system reform, it was initially envisaged to push forward horizontally and start at the same time, but the decision-making was very difficult. Later, it was changed from horizontal promotion to vertical promotion, with one line and one policy, and banks with relatively good conditions were selected to take the lead in piloting. This easy-before-difficult strategy has greatly accelerated the reform process.

The second is the consideration of joint operation. According to the original reform plan, the digestion of non-performing assets of the four banks mainly depends on financial resources, either directly written off by finance or guaranteed by finance. Due to "financial problems", the reform has been difficult to start. Later, it was considered to use the national foreign exchange reserves to start the reform, which can not only reduce the financial pressure, but also give full play to the role of foreign exchange reserves and improve the utilization efficiency of foreign exchange reserves. Practice has proved that this joint operation strategy can kill two birds with one stone.

The third is the consideration of treating both the symptoms and the root causes. At the beginning of this reform, the reform idea of treating both the symptoms and the root causes was established. At the same time of financial restructuring, the Guidelines on Corporate Governance Reform and Supervision of Bank of China and China Construction Bank were specially issued, which established ten aspects of corporate governance structure reform and seven assessment indicators in three categories. Strictly evaluate the two pilot banks every quarter to ensure the effectiveness of corporate governance reform.

Fourth, it is in line with China's national conditions. No reform can be divorced from the specific reality of the country. Only according to China's national conditions and drawing lessons from the successful experience of advanced countries can the reform be successful. This basic consideration has been a basic guiding ideology of the whole reform since the beginning of the reform.

Three. About capital injection and stripping

In the process of financial restructuring of state-owned commercial banks, capital injection, write-off and divestiture have become the focus of social attention. Some people don't know much about the relationship between capital injection, write-off and divestiture in financial restructuring. Some people object to why the capital should be replenished again after the issuance of 270 billion yuan of special government bonds; Some people are also worried about the moral hazard caused by re-stripping. These three problems need to be explained by facts and theories.

First of all, capital injection, write-off and divestiture are three different concepts. According to the reform plan, the basic idea of this financial restructuring is to first convert all the original owners' equity, reserves and profits of the two pilot banks in 2003 into risk reserves, which are specially used to write off asset losses, that is, before the year-end accounts in 2003, try to dispose of the confirmed loss loans, some suspicious loans and non-credit losses confirmed by the Ministry of Finance, the People's Bank of China and the China Banking Regulatory Commission, which is called write-off; The unwritten-off part was further handled in the first half of 2004, that is, the suspicious loans of 654.38+0498 billion yuan and 654.38+0289 billion yuan from China Construction Bank and China Construction Bank were sold to asset management companies in a market-oriented way. Because this treatment was carried out once in 1999, it was called "stripping" at that time. Although some market mechanisms have been introduced this time, it is customarily called "divestiture". At the same time, central huijin Investment Company approved by the State Council injected US$ 22.5 billion (equivalent to RMB 654.38+086.2 billion) into Bank of China and China Construction Bank, which were used to improve the capital adequacy ratio. This is called capital injection. The nature of capital injection is the state's equity investment behavior of supplementing the capital of two pilot banks with foreign exchange assets, and correspondingly increasing the state's share capital to improve the capital adequacy ratio. Capital injection, write-off and divestiture are three interrelated links in this financial restructuring, each with a specific meaning.

Secondly, the real situation of capital adequacy ratio of state-owned commercial banks after 1998 issued 270 billion yuan of special treasury bonds. 198 issued 270 billion yuan of special treasury bonds to supplement the capital of state-owned commercial banks. At that time, the average capital adequacy ratio of the four banks should reach 8% in theory, but in fact it only reached 4.6% according to the standards at that time, and fell to 4.28% in 2003. If calculated according to the new method and prudent measures are taken to deduct all loan losses, it is only -2.29%. The main reasons are:

First, there is a big difference between the measured data and the actual implementation results. At that time, the weighted risk assets used to calculate the capital gap were based on the risk assets of four banks at the end of June 1997 and calculated according to the average asset growth rate of four banks in the second half of each year. Non-performing loans and total capital are replaced by the figure at the end of June 1997. However, from the actual implementation, at the end of 1997, the risk assets and non-performing loans of the four banks increased, while the total capital decreased. If the capital adequacy ratio reaches 8% at the end of 1997, the supplementary capital will be 336.5 billion yuan. Conversely, if the supplementary capital is 270 billion yuan, the capital adequacy ratio at the end of 1997 is 6.87%.

Second, capital deduction and weighted risk assets rose sharply in 1998. At the end of 1997, the off-site supervision of commercial banks was further standardized, and commercial banks were required to submit consolidated accounting statements of local and foreign currencies, domestic and overseas and affiliated companies with unified legal personality as of 1998. Because of this, the bad debts of the four banks increased by 32.3 billion yuan at the end of11600 million yuan.

Third, due to the lack of dynamic capital replenishment mechanism and other policy reasons, on the one hand, the scale of assets continues to expand and the risk assets continue to rise; On the other hand, the capital adequacy ratio of state-owned commercial banks has been declining due to the increasing deduction items and the capital allocation of asset management companies. After adopting the new prudential method, capital supervision is closer to international practice and more real, but it has also dropped significantly.

Finally, why it needs to be stripped again. During the period of 1999-2000, four banks have divested1393.9 billion yuan of non-performing assets. Why should this reform be stripped again? This is a common concern in this reform. It should be said that the non-performing loans of state-owned commercial banks are accumulated for many years, and their causes are very complicated, which is a comprehensive reflection of the deep-seated contradictions in the national economy. Generally speaking, the reasons for the formation of non-performing loans of state-owned commercial banks are: the proportion of direct financing in China is too low, the self-owned funds of enterprises are seriously insufficient, and production and operation rely too much on bank loans; In order to support the adjustment of industrial structure, system transition and reorganization of state-owned enterprises, state-owned commercial banks have issued a large number of special loans; The social credit environment is poor, and enterprises evade bank debts seriously; Failure to implement a prudent accounting system has caused a lot of false profits and real losses. It can be seen that the losses accumulated by state-owned commercial banks in history are different from the operating losses of commercial banks in western market economy countries, which is the cost that China must pay to establish a socialist market economy system and maintain rapid national economic development and social stability.

For this reason, under the background of 1999 Asian financial crisis, the state stripped off some non-performing loans of four banks through the establishment of asset management companies, which made the non-performing loan ratio of state-owned commercial banks drop by 9.2 percentage points in 2000. However, it should be noted that the assets of 654.38+03939 billion yuan stripped at that time were not all non-performing loans of four banks, including 654.38+000 billion yuan from development banks, and the interest on the balance sheet was more than 654.38+000 billion yuan, which was more than 654.38+000 billion yuan generated by debt-to-equity swaps. The actual non-performing loans divested by the four banks are about 654.38 billion yuan. Later, after checking the authenticity of loan quality, non-performing loans rose by another piece (about 400 billion); The transfer business of the Agricultural Development Bank has increased by another piece (the Agricultural Development Bank was transferred three times before and after the divestiture, and the non-performing loans were about 654.38 billion yuan); The four-level classification was changed to five-level classification, and another item (about 600 billion yuan) was adjusted. By the end of 2003, the balance of five-level classified non-performing loans of the four banks was still as high as 2000 billion yuan, with an average non-performing loan ratio of 20%, which was 15 percentage points higher than the average non-performing loan ratio of the top 100 banks in the world (this increase is generally not a problem of commercial banks' own operation, but a reflection of the authenticity of loans after the adjustment of policies and accounting systems and the strengthening of supervision, that is, these 20 thousand). Since the transition period of China's entry into WTO is coming to an end, we can only solve this problem by stripping again to clear the obstacles.

It is worth mentioning that compared with the last stripping, this stripping has made some reforms in the operation method, which is not a simple flip of the last stripping. The last divestiture was to divest assets to four asset management companies at a price of one to one. In fact, it is an administrative act to transfer the non-performing assets of four banks from banks to asset management companies. The divestiture was carried out through public bidding for four asset management companies at a price of 50%, and a certain market mechanism was introduced.

Fourth, on the issue of system reform.

The third stage reform of state-owned commercial banks is a fundamental system reform. The commercial banking system includes three levels: system foundation, basic system and other systems. The so-called institutional basis mainly refers to the system of power; The so-called basic system mainly refers to the establishment and effective operation of the "three meetings" system after the ownership reform; The so-called other systems mainly refer to management systems in business processes, financial accounting, information technology, human resources and public relations. Institutional basis, basic system and other systems constitute the institutional framework of commercial banks. Only through the comprehensive reform of these three aspects can the efficiency of banks be optimized.

According to the above viewpoint, the "Reform Guidelines" issued specifically for this reform put forward ten reform requirements for the pilot banks.

On the basis of the system, the "Reform Guidelines" require the two pilot banks to set up joint stock limited companies in accordance with the relevant legal requirements, select domestic and foreign strategic investors fairly and justly, change the single shareholding structure, and realize investor diversification. At present, the joint-stock companies of the two pilot banks have been established. The Bank of China was approved to be established exclusively. In addition to Huijin and CCB, CCB successfully introduced Baosteel Group, Changjiang Power and State Grid as the first batch of candidate sponsors. After the establishment of the two pilot bank joint-stock companies, new domestic and foreign strategic investors will be introduced.

In terms of basic system, the reform guidelines require the two pilot banks to establish a standardized system of shareholders' meeting, board of directors, board of supervisors and senior management. At present, the two pilot banks have basically completed the formulation of the corporate governance reform plan, the articles of association of the joint-stock company (draft), the rules of procedure for "one line, three meetings" and the rules of procedure for the subsidiary committees of the board of directors. The organizational structure of shareholders' meeting, board of directors, board of supervisors and senior management has been established, and the new organizational structure has been put into trial operation.

In addition, the reform guidelines also require the two pilot banks to establish a scientific decision-making system, internal control mechanism and risk management system; Formulate a clear development strategy to maximize the value of banks; According to the principle of intensive management, implement flat organization and integrate business process and management process; Deepen the reform of labor and personnel system according to the requirements of human resource management in modern financial enterprises; Implement prudent accounting system and strict information disclosure system; Strengthen information construction and comprehensively improve the comprehensive management and service functions; Give full play to the professional advantages of intermediaries and increase training. At present, these reforms have started and made progress: an effective internal control system has been established, and most special committees such as risk management Committee and audit Committee have been established; Strategic planning and specific implementation plan have been initially drawn up; We are comprehensively promoting flat organization and vertical business management, and comprehensively transforming internal business processes; Cancel the administrative level of cadres and comprehensively promote the reform of labor and personnel system from the head office; Financial management measures are being revised and a new accounting system is being implemented; The information technology development plan is being improved; Intermediaries enter the market to carry out their work; The training of middle and senior managers has begun.

Last year, I put forward the views of "likeness" and "spirit likeness" on corporate governance reform of state-owned commercial banks. It should be said that the two pilot banks have initially achieved "similarity" in system reform. However, there will be a long process from "likeness" to "likeness", especially the recent case of pilot banks, which further illustrates the importance and arduousness of likeness. It remains to be seen whether the spirit likeness can be realized and whether the process can be shortened as much as possible.

V. Evaluation of the pilot reform.

The law of mutual variation of quality is a basic law of dialectics. Everything is a qualitative leap through a certain amount of change. The success of the reform of state-owned commercial banks depends on quantitative assessment. Referring to the advanced experience of international big banks, this reform has established a reform assessment index that can be generally recognized at home and abroad, that is, after the joint-stock reform, the two pilot banks should reach and maintain the average level of the international top 100 banks in terms of operating performance, asset quality and prudent operation. Specific indicators * * * seven items in three categories.

First of all, it is necessary to strictly assess the operating performance of the pilot banks.

The first is the net rate of return on total assets. The net return on total assets is a comprehensive index to examine the operating performance of commercial banks internationally. The average net return on total assets of the former 100 international banks in recent 10 years is about 1%. The net return on total assets of the two pilot banks should reach 0.6% in 2005; It should reach a good international standard in 2007.

The second is the return on equity. This capital injection cost the country a lot. In order to ensure the effect of capital injection and obtain good returns, it is necessary to evaluate the return on net assets of the two pilot banks. The average return on equity of the former 100 international banks in recent 10 years is between 12- 14%. The two pilot banks should reach 1 1% in 2005 and further increase to 13% in 2007.

The third is the cost-income ratio. Effective cost control is the key to enhance profitability. The average cost-income ratio of the top 100 international banks in the past 10 years was between 35% and 45%. From 2005, the cost-income ratio of the two pilot banks should be controlled within 35 ~ 45%.

Secondly, we should strictly assess the asset quality of the two pilot banks. Low asset quality has always been a chronic disease of state-owned commercial banks. Through this reform, we must fundamentally change this situation. The ratio of non-performing assets is a comprehensive index to measure the asset quality of commercial banks. The average NPL ratio of the top 100 international banks in the past 10 years was between 2% and 3%. At present, the two pilot banks have only implemented five-level classification of credit assets, and it is planned to implement five-level classification of non-credit assets in the near future. In this way, all assets can be evaluated according to the five-level classification. In the future, the two pilot banks should continue to control the non-performing asset ratio at 3-5%.

Finally, the prudent operation level of the two pilot banks should be strictly evaluated. According to the Basel Accord and the prudent practice of international banking, the two pilot banks should focus on the following indicators to meet international standards:

The first is the capital adequacy ratio. In 2004, the regulatory authorities promulgated the new Measures for the Management of Capital Adequacy Ratio of Commercial Banks. This method strictly implements the requirements of 1988 Basel Accord, and incorporates the relevant requirements of supervision and inspection (the second pillar) and information disclosure (the third pillar) into the New Capital Accord. From 2004, the two pilot banks should manage their capital according to this method, and the capital adequacy ratio should be kept above 8%.

The second is the concentration of big risks. Large risk concentration reflects the operational risk of commercial banks due to excessive credit concentration, and the measurement index is mainly the single customer loan concentration. The two pilot banks should take effective measures to strictly control the risk of centralized credit granting to the same borrower, and the ratio of loan balance to capital balance of commercial banks should not exceed 65,438+00% from 2005.

The third is the provision coverage ratio of non-performing loans. The provision coverage ratio of non-performing loans reflects the ability of commercial banks to make up for loan losses and prevent loan risks. The average coverage of non-performing loans of the former 100 international banks in recent 10 years is about 100%. By the end of 2005, the two pilot banks should reach 60% and 80% respectively, and should continue to grow by the end of 2007.

Six, about the listing of the capital market

According to the reform plan, the two pilot banks need to choose a suitable time to go public after completing the shareholding system reform. Listing is a double-edged sword. From a positive point of view, it can improve the ownership structure of banks, enhance their capital strength and establish a good market image. However, we should fully realize that listing is not only to raise funds, but its fundamental purpose is to turn state-owned commercial banks into real market-oriented entities. After the state-owned commercial banks become public companies through listing, their corporate governance and management will be completely exposed to the strict supervision of the capital market and public opinion, which will greatly promote the banks to establish effective incentive and restraint mechanisms, exercise and improve their market adaptability, and be conducive to their long-term development; If it is not handled well, it will be eliminated by the market in fierce competition. It can be seen that the listing of state-owned commercial banks is not the purpose, but the purpose is to completely transform the existing operating mechanism and shareholding structure through listing and under the supervision and inspection of the capital market to maximize performance. At present, although the two pilot banks have initially established the corporate governance framework required by joint-stock companies, they still have a lot of homework to do to truly become standardized listed companies. At present, it is important to consolidate the achievements of financial restructuring and corporate governance reform, prevent the rebound of non-performing assets, prevent the occurrence of major cases, and make solid preparations before listing.

Seven, about the risk prevention in the reform.

Risk prevention is the eternal theme of the banking industry, and it is also the starting point and destination of all banking reforms. The purpose of corporate governance reform of state-owned commercial banks is to fundamentally improve management and establish a long-term mechanism to prevent and resolve risks. Corporate governance reform and risk prevention are interdependent and influential. Only by effectively preventing risks can we prove the success of the reform and make up our mind to further deepen the reform; Only by deepening reform can we fundamentally guard against risks.

At present, the bank risks that need to be focused on mainly include credit risk, market risk and operational risk. Credit risk refers to the risk that the borrower or counterparty cannot fulfill its obligations according to the contract; Market risk refers to the risk of loss of on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet business of banks due to adverse changes in market prices (interest rate, exchange rate, stock price and commodity price); Operational risk refers to the risk of direct or indirect losses due to imperfections or errors in internal procedures, personnel and systems, or external events. At present, credit risk is still the main form of bank risk, market risk is a new risk point for banks, and operational risk is an important source of bank risk. In the whole reform, we should make great efforts to prevent the above risks.

Pay attention to prevent risks in the reform, especially to curb the occurrence of cases. At present, the exposure and investigation of some cases, on the one hand, illustrate the achievements of reform and supervision, on the other hand, put forward new topics for deepening reform and strengthening supervision. Bank cases are frequent and the situation is very complicated. Generally speaking, the first problem is the bank's own system, system construction, internal management and supervision, which is the focus of our future work; Secondly, it is undeniable that there are factors of industry characteristics, which is why even the banking cases in developed countries are higher than those in other industries; Third, the factors of historical development stage. At the stage of per capita GDP 1000-3000 USD, it is not only a period of rapid economic growth, but also a period of prominent contradictions, which is also a reason for the relatively low number of cases in the planned economy era; In addition, there are factors of oriental culture, which has its own "strengths" and "weaknesses" that western culture does not have. This is why feelings outweigh institutions, which is one reason why some Asian countries with relatively perfect legal systems still have bank cases. Fully understand the self-factors, social factors and historical factors of bank cases, make overall plans to prevent them, treat both the symptoms and root causes, comprehensively manage them, pay attention to internal causes, resolutely curb the occurrence of cases, and create conditions for reform.

Eight. Regulatory issues related to reform

Just like there is a brake when there is a throttle, there is a referee when there is an athlete. Bank reform can't be achieved completely through self-improvement. Strengthening supervision is an important guarantee for the success of reform.

The supervision of the shareholding system reform of state-owned commercial banks can be divided into three different levels. First, the major shareholders of the Bank (namely, the financial department and Huijin Company), the internal audit committee, the board of supervisors and the independent directors of the Bank carry out self-supervision, mainly on behalf of the investors, so as to achieve mutual checks and balances and effective operation through the "three meetings" system. Second, the CBRC is responsible for implementing administrative supervision, representing the interests of depositors, and maintaining and promoting the stability and development of the banking industry. Third, the social supervision implemented by intermediaries, industry self-regulatory organizations and news media represents a kind of social credibility, promotes fair competition and builds a harmonious economic order. Self-supervision belongs to internal supervision, while administrative supervision and social supervision belong to external supervision. Self-supervision, administrative supervision and social supervision constitute a relatively complete supervision system, which can ensure the smooth progress of the reform from different aspects.

According to the above ideas, in this reform, the two pilot banks should implement strict accountability and target management, with the chairman (legal representative) assuming the responsibility of the first responsible person, and the major shareholders realizing self-supervision by voting on major issues of the bank and putting forward some suggestions and questions. The audit committee established in the board of directors ensures the realization of the goal of bank shareholding system reform by formulating audit and internal audit systems that meet the requirements of modern corporate governance; The Board of Supervisors supervises and guards against risks in the reform process through independent information channels and direct communication with the internal audit department of the Bank; Independent directors represent the interests of minority shareholders of banks, supervise and restrict major shareholders of banks, and focus on monitoring major risks of banks, especially those caused by related party transactions.

As an external supervision department, CBRC is mainly responsible for supervising the reform of state-owned commercial banks from the aspects of scheme audit, implementation monitoring, process inspection and risk early warning through on-site inspection and off-site supervision. According to the reform guidelines, the CBRC will strictly review the comprehensive reform plan and special reform plan reported by the two pilot banks, and conduct examination and approval according to relevant procedures; Conduct regular and irregular inspections and investigations on the reform, and timely track and evaluate the progress of the reform; Make full use of the stationed supervision team to grasp the situation of bank reform, find and solve problems in the process of reform in time, and give risk warnings to banks. The main supervision work of the CBRC is reflected in the quarterly assessment of the two pilot banks, which comprehensively evaluates the reform progress of the two pilot banks every quarter, and forms a special assessment report and reports it to the State Council.

According to the progress of the reform, the two pilot banks need to be audited by intermediaries in a timely manner, and the relevant audit results should be announced to the public or communicated with regulatory agencies; The two pilot banks and relevant departments should also strengthen the information disclosure of the reform, disclose the progress of the reform to the public in an appropriate way, communicate with the news media in time on relevant issues in the reform, and accept social supervision.

Nine, about the comprehensive reform of industry and agriculture.

While China Construction Bank and China Construction Bank are implementing joint-stock reform, Industrial and Commercial Bank and Agricultural Bank also need to solve the problems of asset quality and operating efficiency, deepen internal reform, strengthen basic management, accelerate innovation and development, and start the reform process as soon as possible according to the requirements of modern enterprise system. Industrial and agricultural reform should mainly grasp the following points:

First, fully understand the importance of reform. Industrial and Commercial Bank of China is the largest state-owned commercial bank in China, and Agricultural Bank of China is the state-owned commercial bank with the largest number of institutional outlets in China. Starting the reform of Industrial and Agricultural Bank of China is of great strategic significance to comprehensively promote the banking reform in China and truly resolve the banking risks in China. Therefore, if the industrial and agricultural banks want to survive and develop, they must reform, and there is no other way. The whole society should fully realize this, and the two banks should be fully prepared.

The second is to fully estimate the arduousness of reform. The total assets and non-performing assets of ICBC are much larger than those of CCB and CCB, and the internal management, historical issues and internal and external relations are much more complicated. Promoting the reform of industrial and agricultural banks involves more interest adjustment, and at the same time it will encounter greater resistance, so we should be fully prepared for this.

The third is to fully consider the particularity of the reform of the two banks. At present, the reform plan of ICBC is being studied and formulated. The main service target of ICBC is industrial and commercial enterprises, and the reform of ICBC is closely linked with the reform of state-owned enterprises. The reform of state-owned enterprises, especially the policy bankruptcy, will bring uncertainty to the reform of ICBC. ICBC should be fully aware of this uncertainty, and financial restructuring must be carried out. After financial reorganization, the standards of various indicators cannot be relaxed. Agricultural Bank of China mainly faces agriculture, countryside and farmers. At present, it is impossible for China to completely solve the problems of agriculture, countryside and farmers by market means, which is the biggest particularity of the reform of Agricultural Bank of China. Therefore, the reform of Agricultural Bank of China should be considered under the framework of the whole rural financial system reform. On this premise, combined with their own reality, put forward a comparable scheme and demonstrate it quickly.

Summarizing the past is to better grasp the future. At present, the reform of state-owned commercial banks is in a critical period. As a participant in the reform and a witness to these historical events, I would like to take this opportunity to talk about some views, which only represent my personal academic views.