On the eve of the founding of New China, although Stalin expressed his willingness to provide economic and military help to the "Brothers Party", he still had to settle his accounts. At the beginning of 1949, when Su * * * visited Xibaipo on behalf of mikoyan, he proposed that the Soviet Union provide a loan of 300 million US dollars, indicating that he would repay the principal and interest in the future. In late June of the same year, Liu Shaoqi arrived in Moscow, and Stalin said in the talks that day that he was willing to provide a loan of 300 million US dollars, with an annual interest rate of 1%, which would be delivered in five years, with a repayment period of five years after payment. 1950 In February, Mao Zedong signed an alliance clause with the Soviet Union during his visit to the Soviet Union, and formally reached this loan agreement, which was mainly used to solve the arms urgently needed by the PLA, half of which was used to purchase naval equipment for the liberation of Taiwan Province Province. The short repayment period of this loan is also a pressure on the finance of New China. At that time, Mao Zedong explained in the Party Communiqué that the small amount of loans to the Soviet Union was due to "borrowing more is better than borrowing less", which to a great extent learned the lesson that modern China was economically constrained by others because of its heavy foreign debt.
Before the signing of the Sino-Soviet loan agreement, due to the military struggle at the beginning of the founding of the People's Republic of China and the urgent need to restore the economy, China used $40 million of the $60 million loan from 1950 to buy aircraft and equipment needed to establish an aviation school, as well as anti-aircraft guns, cars, parachutes, rails and gasoline. At this time, all units of the People's Liberation Army also generally used the "Wan Guo Brand" miscellaneous weapons seized in wartime. Of the 5.5 million people in the whole army, only more than 20,000 cars were seized and purchased (at this time, there were only more than 60,000 imported cars in the country). Military industry can't even build mortars, and at the same time, due to financial difficulties, it can only buy equipment for the newly built air force and air defense force.
1950 In late June, the Korean Civil War broke out, and the United States took this opportunity to intervene in Korea and sent its navy to control Taiwan Province Province. According to Mao Zedong, this is equivalent to "three knives" threatening China in North Korea, Taiwan Province Province and Viet Nam, and China has to prepare for war against the United States. At that time, the United States was the country with the strongest economic and military strength in the world, and its industrial output value accounted for half of that of western capitalist countries. As the second powerful country, the Soviet Union lags far behind. As a backward agricultural country, China lags far behind the United States and the Soviet Union, as can be clearly seen from the following table.
(Attached Table) 1950 Comparison of the economic strength of China, the Soviet Union and the United States; Gross national product; Output of steel; Number of cars; China; 65.438+05.5 billion dollars; 600,000 tons; 60,000 Soviet Union; 90 billion dollars; 27.3 million tons; 965.438+08 billion dollars; 87.84 million tons; 388 billion dollars.
Ten days before 1950 10, American troops crossed the 38th parallel and moved northward. The situation in North Korea was critical, and both Soviet dynasties hoped that China would send troops to participate in the war. Because modern warfare is to a great extent a contest between weapons and financial resources, the Central Committee of China naturally asked the Soviet Union to provide weapons and equipment when preparing for war. After Stalin agreed, he raised the question of China's contribution, which made it very difficult for New China, which was extremely embarrassed at that time, to send troops, and also triggered repeated negotiations between China and the Soviet Union.
The long-term secrecy of arms transactions and payments between China and the Soviet Union during the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea led to some false legends in China society. After the reform and opening up, China published some historical materials and memoirs about the parties concerned (although some memories were inaccurate). 199 1 After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation declassified the archives of the Korean War. At that time, the author interviewed Shi Zhe, who was the director of Russian Translation and Central Research Office in Mao Zedong during the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, and went to Stanford University in the United States on 1992 to consult and study the copies of Russian files he purchased. In addition, after he returned to China, he consulted historical materials and deeply felt that it was very difficult for China to win Soviet aid for weapons. This not only shows the difficulty of asking for help, but also shows that Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and other leaders have taken pains to reduce the war cost paid by our country.
According to China's archives, 1950, 10/0. On 2 October, Mao Zedong drafted a telegram to Stalin, in which China agreed to send troops to North Korea and listed the required weapons and ammunition. Because there was disagreement within the central leadership at that time, the issue of sending troops had to be discussed again. This telegram was not sent to Moscow (so it can't be found in Russian files). On 5th October, 65438/KLOC-0, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China made the first decision to send troops to aid North Korea. On 8th October, 65438/KLOC-0, Mao Zedong drafted an order to send volunteers to North Korea. On the same day, Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao flew to the Soviet Union according to the requirements of the Central Committee, mainly to win the support of the Soviet Air Force as scheduled, and also asked the Soviet Union to provide weapons and equipment.
Shi Zhe, who accompanied Zhou Enlai to the Soviet Union and worked as a translator, told me that they arrived near Sochi on the Black Sea coast on June+1 October 65438+1October/October 65438 and met Stalin. Zhou Enlai showed "two opinions". First of all, he said it was difficult for China to send troops. The two sides talked for a day, but Stalin refused to fulfill his original promise of sending Soviet air force, so Zhou Enlai said it was difficult to send troops and did not submit the list of weapons and ammunition needed. Stalin, who was eager for China to go to war, said that he could provide all kinds of weapons needed for the war, but he did not specify the form of payment. Shi Zhe, then a translator, recalled: "When we negotiated with the Soviet Union, we only talked about the quantity of arms, not the price of arms." At that time, * * * producers in China were used to military production and life for a long time and were not familiar with commodity economy. It is not surprising that this happened.
Zhou Enlai, who has always been famous for his meticulous work, didn't take this into consideration. He privately said to Shi Zhe, "We accept Soviet arms as their contribution to the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea." This is equivalent to China sending troops and the Soviet Union paying for it. Shi Zhe, who has lived in the Soviet Union for a long time, replied: "According to my understanding of the Soviet Union, people who do specific things will not agree with our idea of not paying money." (Shi Zhe: Giant of History, p. 502, Central Literature Publishing House, 1992. Sure enough, the Soviet side then raised the issue of payment, and it was Stalin's own idea.
Zhou Enlai returned to Moscow from the Black Sea and received a telegram from Mao Zedong on June 13 18, saying that "it is beneficial for our army to send troops to North Korea" and "it is beneficial to participate in the war, but it is harmful to not participate in the war". Although Stalin confined the Soviet Air Force to the Yalu River and could not cooperate with the volunteers to enter the DPRK to participate in the war, the Central Committee decided to participate in the war after re-study. Mao Zedong also specifically talked about the Soviet Union's weapons supply, and asked whether to lease or buy with money. According to the telegram, as long as it is leased, it can maintain the budget of $200 million for economic and cultural construction and general military and political expenditure, thus maintaining the unity of most people in China. Mao Zedong also asked Zhou Enlai to stay in Moscow for a few days to renegotiate the above issues with the Soviet side.
Mao Zedong's "lease" proposal should be understood as of great significance. During the Second World War, after the allies of Britain, the Soviet Union and China had basically exhausted the foreign exchange and gold they could buy, the United States provided nearly $50 billion in weapons and materials to these first-line countries under the Lending Act. Most of the weapons used in the war have been damaged or worn, except for the transfer of some maritime islands by Britain. After the war, the original materials should not be returned, but the money should be returned at a low price (for example, the United States asked for $2.6 billion from the Soviet Union's $654.38+009 billion loan materials, and the Soviet Union only paid back $300 million symbolically). Most of the $6,543.806 billion weapons "leased" by the United States to the Kuomintang army were used to fight the civil war, not to resist Japan, but later the United States simply abandoned them (Chiang Kai-shek could not return them even if he fled to Taiwan Province Province). Mao Zedong put forward the concept of "lease", only citing the example of World War II, so that the weapons used by the Soviet Union in the war of aiding Korea did not have to be repaid too much after the war.
Stalin refused to agree to take the form of renting weapons in order to reduce the economic burden of the Soviet Union. The last condition he put forward was that the arms expenses could be counted as the Soviet Union's "credit loan" to China. 10 10 14, when negotiating with Zhou Enlai, Molotov promised to adopt the credit loan method, that is, China does not need collateral and relies entirely on credit. Stalin also considered that China's economy was extremely difficult, and he had to bear part of the war expenses. Therefore, he proposed that the two sides "* * * share the burden" on weapons assistance, that is, the weapons provided by the Soviet Union were recorded as loans at 50% of the cost price, with an annual interest of 1%.
The Soviet Union's loan terms are favorable if they are based on normal trade between countries, but they are not qualified according to the "selfless internationalism" they advocate, and they still put their own interests above others. At that time, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and other leaders saw that this bottom line of the Soviet Union was the final condition to win. Although they were not satisfied, they accepted it. When Mao Zedong met Kim Il Sung on 1970, he also said, "I think we still have to thank the Soviet Union. It always helps us get half-price weapons, ammunition and motorcades. " (Central Literature Office and Central Archives: Literature of the Party, No.5, 2000, p. 14. )
1950, 10 year 10 in late October, the Sixth Army of the Volunteers who entered the DPRK fought with the enemy, using old weapons from many countries captured in the past. Because there is no corresponding ammunition production line in China, the CMC has to ask all localities to "clean up the warehouse foundation", that is, clean up and classify the remaining bullets and shells, and then send them to the front line of North Korea. Only a few months after the war began, the stock was running out. Only by completely replacing Soviet weapons can the troops entering the DPRK ensure the supply of ammunition.
Just after the first campaign to enter the DPRK, 165438, Mao Zedong talked about weapons in his telegram to Stalin: "Because the weapons and equipment of the People's Liberation Army are mainly booty seized from the enemy, infantry weapons has various calibers." To this end, the telegram specifically stated: "I ask you to study the issue of supplying infantry weapons equipment to 36 divisions during 195 1 1 and February." Mao Zedong also specifically proposed to provide the following weapons as soon as possible: 1.4 million Soviet rifles and 58 million rifle bullets; 26,000 Soviet-style automatic guns and 80 million bullets; There are 7,000 Soviet-style light machine guns and 37 million rounds of light machine gun bullets; There are 2000 Soviet-style heavy machine guns and 20 million heavy machine guns; Pilot pistol 1 000, pilot bullet 1 000. TNT explosive1000t.
Seeing this list, we can't help feeling deeply for future generations! At that time, China couldn't even solve the pistol used by the pilot and its bullets by itself. In such a backward situation, it dares to send troops to North Korea and fight the best-equipped American army in the world. How much courage and courage it takes!
Seeing the victory and efforts of the volunteers in North Korea, the Soviet Union immediately indicated that it could meet the requirements as soon as possible. 165438+1October 9, Stalin called back to Mao Zedong and said,195110 can ship all these equipment to China between10 and February. The second batch of troops entering the DPRK, namely 19 Corps and the 3rd Corps of Volunteers, were able to change into Soviet-style equipment and participate in the fifth battle.
These weapons provided by the Soviet Union still have to be accounted for at "50% off the ex-factory price". According to this principle determined by Stalin, 195 1 February, Zhou Enlai and zakharov, the general military adviser of the Soviet Union in China, signed the Agreement on the Soviet Union Providing Military Loans to the Government of China on behalf of the Chinese and Soviet governments respectively. According to the agreement, the Soviet Union provided China with a loan of 65.438+23.5 billion rubles to buy military equipment, ammunition and railway equipment needed by China during the war; China's military orders from the Soviet Union, including military equipment, ammunition and railway equipment, are bounded by 1950 10 10/9 when China sent troops to resist US aggression and aid Korea. Prior to this, orders were paid at full price; 195010 June19 After China sent troops to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea, the military equipment and ammunition orders were paid at half price, and the railway equipment was paid at a 25% discount.
The light weapons of these 36 divisions provided by the Soviet Union are basically weapons developed during World War II or even before the war, belonging to the old equipment that the Soviet Union is retiring and eliminating. Some new weapons of the Soviet army in active service, such as SKS semi-automatic rifle (later made in China to imitate Type 56 semi-automatic) and AK47 assault rifle (later made in China to imitate Type 56 assault rifle), were not provided. The Soviet Union had begun to equip RPG-2 rocket launcher (that is, the 56-type 40 rocket launcher copied by China later), but it was leaked out for fear of being captured by the US military in the Korean battlefield and was not provided to the volunteers. When this kind of weapon was supplied to China on 1955, Peng said with emotion that it would be much easier to fight tanks if North Korea had this kind of weapon. Due to the lack of anti-tank weapons, domestic arsenals had to copy the rocket launchers and 57-mm and 75-mm recoilless gun provided by the United States to Kuomintang troops during World War II for emergency use, because it was much better than hitting tanks with explosive charges and barrels.
Air combat requires particularly high performance of technical equipment, and the fighters provided by the Soviet Union to China are relatively advanced. 1950, the Soviet air force has equipped a large number of MIG-15 fighters, and the troops coming to China also take this type as the main force. At first, they only sold MIG -9 fighters to China Air Force. This kind of aircraft has poor performance, and its operational radius is only about 200 kilometers. If it is far from the airport, it will run out of fuel and can only be used for air defense in cities and key points. China Air Force, after inspection, believes that its performance is far behind that of American F-84 fighters. Instead, the Soviet consultant flew into a rage and said that you dared to doubt the superiority of weapons produced by the socialist Soviet Union. When Stalin learned that this incident caused China unhappiness, he immediately apologized from the overall situation of Sino-Soviet relations and international strategy, and on May 22nd and 26th 195 1 twice called Mao Zedong to point out that since the Soviet Union failed to provide China with more MIG-15 fighters in the past, it is estimated that the MIG -9 fighter can rival the best jet fighter in the United States, so it is now a fighter. As an action to correct this mistake, the Soviet Union provided China with 372 MIG-15 fighters (only for transportation) for refitting six MIG -9 fighter divisions in China. The first batch of 72 fighters arrived in China before June 20th, and the remaining 300 fighters arrived in China in batches at the end of August.
When accepting infantry equipment, many volunteers also complained for a while, because China basically got second-hand goods from World War II, and it was half price. After these situations were reflected to Stalin, the leader who considered the overall situation of international strategy had to worry. After the equipment of infantry divisions 195 1 ordered by China from the Soviet Union arrived, the equipment of three divisions was given to the Korean People's Army free of charge due to the shortage of equipment. Stalin also decided to make a gesture in front of China's high style, and decided to give China 20 infantry divisions free equipment.
During the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, the Soviet Union provided China with weapons of 60 infantry divisions. In addition to the equipment donated by the Chinese side to three divisions of the Korean People's Army for free, the equipment of 1 division was dismantled and used in military training in military academies, and 56 divisions were actually equipped. According to the drawings and production technology provided by the Soviet Union, domestic arsenals copied 50-type submachine guns, 53-type riding rifles, 53-type heavy machine guns and other light weapons, and * * * produced the equipment of 50 light infantry divisions. By the time of the Korean Armistice, the PLA 106 Infantry Division, 16 Artillery Division, 2 Tank Divisions and 23 Aviation Divisions had basically completed the replacement of Soviet-style equipment, and the standardization and serialization of weapons and equipment were realized for the first time in the history of China.
According to the policy of "building while fighting", the domestic military industry was greatly strengthened during the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea. In the first year of the war, the domestic production of ammunition needed by the volunteers can only meet about 10%, and it can produce 40% in the event of armistice. China's defense industry laid the initial foundation in this war.
At the beginning of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, automobiles once became the most urgently needed materials for entering the DPRK. Because there was no motor vehicle manufacturing industry in China, they had to turn to the Soviet Union. In June+10, 5438, when the volunteers were preparing to go out, the Soviet Union promised to provide 3000 vehicles for the volunteers before June1950+February 15, but it was difficult to solve the urgent need. 165438+1On October 5th, when meeting with General zakharov, general counsel of the Soviet Union, Zhou Enlai urged: "At present, there are cars first, and tanks and cannons can be placed behind them." 165438+ 10 17, Zhou Enlai called Stalin again, saying that "the lack of vehicles" caused "the food and winter clothes could not be delivered in time and the troops were starving". When the vehicles promised by the Soviet Union could not be delivered for a while, Zhou Enlai proposed to borrow 500 old cars from the Soviet Lushun base first. Stalin replied on the same day that he would immediately deliver the new car at Manzhouli Station and asked the Soviet transportation department to speed up the delivery. By the end of 1950, 5,000 vehicles had been transported to China. 195 1 year, China purchased another10.2 million vehicles, and increased the purchase volume in the next two years. Volunteers who entered the DPRK * * * got 2 1 728 vehicles, 7,729 vehicles were destroyed in the war, and 8,436 vehicles were sent back to China for repair. Less than half of it was left at the time of the armistice (including those transported back to North Korea after repair).
During the period of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, the number of cars of domestic troops increased greatly due to the import from the Soviet Union, and they were mainly equipped with artillery, navy, air force and other technical arms. By the end of the war, the whole army had 7 1 vehicle, with an average of 60 people having 1 vehicle. In contrast, during World War II, the US and British armed forces basically realized motorization, with an average of 1 car for every four people. Before the end of the war, the Soviet Union mainly imported 460,000 American cars by means of "leasing", plus self-production and seizure, reaching 20 people 1 car, realizing "semi-motorization". By 1955, every five Soviet troops had a car, and the whole army was motorized. China didn't start producing its own cars until the completion of Changchun Automobile Factory in 1956. However, due to the shortage of raw materials, it failed to meet the design standard of 30,000 vehicles per year for a long time. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) did not cancel its foot troops until 1985, and all of them were transported by motor vehicles. The number of cars equipped by the army also shows that China's industrial base is too weak, and there is still a long way to go to realize mechanization by the gradual construction of the country.
Modern warfare is not only a confrontation between spiritual and military forces, but also a competition of economic strength. Although the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea in New China paid a lot of manpower and financial resources, relying on the advantages of the national system under the leadership of the * * * Production Party, the people of the whole country actively devoted themselves to restoring the national economy, worked hard to increase production and save money to support the war, and successfully completed the task of restoring the national economy in wartime. By the end of 1952, China's industrial and agricultural production had exceeded the highest level in history, and the first five-year plan was implemented in 1953. The achievements of domestic economy have also provided a reliable basis for the supply of materials to the front line of North Korea. What is in short supply is only weapons, mainly supplied by the Soviet Union.
It can be seen from the above statistics that although the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea has caused a considerable financial burden to the country, the growth rate of fiscal revenue is still higher than that of military expenditure. Since 1952, the investment in domestic economic construction has exceeded the military expenditure, thus ensuring the smooth completion of the national economic recovery in wartime. At the time of the armistice, the national revenue of 1953 was more than three times that of 1950. This is really a miracle in history!
In the two-year and nine-month War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, the direct war expenses (that is, excluding domestic combat readiness training and mobilization funds) were 6.2 billion yuan, accounting for 13% of the government's fiscal expenditure in the same period, and the impact on the domestic economy was not too great. Most of the weapons and equipment provided by the Soviet Union in wartime were on credit at "50% off the ex-factory price" (about 1/5 was considered as a free gift), and * * * wrote down a debt of RMB 3 billion (equivalent to US$ 6,543.803 billion at that time).
Coupled with the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, China owed the Soviet Union 3 billion yuan in arms debt. When the Soviet army/KLOC-0 withdrew from Lushun in 1955, it handed over equipment at a discount of 980 million yuan. After China launched the Great Leap Forward with the wrong guiding ideology in 1958, due to the shortage of domestic non-staple food supply and difficulties in purchasing, it was unable to deliver the goods to the Soviet Union according to the trade contract, and during the two years of 1959 and 1960, it owed 2.5 billion rubles in trade debts. According to the figures listed by Li Xiannian, then vice premier in charge of finance, in the National Economic Final Accounts Reports of 196 1 962, the total foreign debt and interest payable of China to the Soviet Union since 1950 was 5.743 billion yuan.
What is the proportion of this debt of 5.7 billion yuan owed to the Soviet Union to the national financial expenditure at that time? 1959 the national fiscal expenditure was 52 billion yuan, and 1960 was 65.4 billion yuan. By 1960, China had paid 3.3 billion yuan in debt to the Soviet Union, which means that it has basically paid off the weapons debt owed by the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea. During the period from 1954 to 1959, China repaid the Soviet Union about 500 million yuan in arms arrears to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea every year, accounting for only 1.5% of the country's annual fiscal expenditure, and the burden was not great.
As for China's debt to the Soviet Union 1960, there is still 2.3 billion left (China's financial statistics: 1950 1), p. 135 136, edited by the Comprehensive Planning Department of the Ministry of Finance, Beijing Science Press 1992. ), all paid off before the end of 1965, with an average annual debt repayment of 400 million yuan, accounting for only about 1% of the national fiscal expenditure in the same period, and the export value of a "No.3 pit" in Xinjiang to the Soviet Union accounted for half of the debt repayment. For this debt, the Soviet Union has indicated that it can postpone repayment without interest. 1961April 10, People's Daily expressed its gratitude for this in a special article, saying: "Due to the serious natural disasters in China, the goods supplied by 1960 to the Soviet Union were seriously overdue. Soviet comrades expressed their comradely cooperation and brotherly understanding. " As for the so-called "forced debt" and the domestic famine caused by paying debts to the Soviet Union, a careful examination of the exact data of that year shows that it is exaggerated and untrue. History has eloquently proved that China won both military and economic victories in the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, and did not bring people the life difficulties exaggerated by some people.
Strictly speaking, all China's human and material assistance to North Korea during the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea was free of charge, while the Soviet Union's assistance to China was mostly at half price, which was really low in style. But as Mao Zedong said, "I think we should thank the Soviet Union". At that time, the Soviet Union's greatest aid to China was not the weapons themselves, but the sending of experts and consultants to impart technology, which made the technological level of the PLA and China's defense industry have been upgraded epoch-making.
1in July, 953, the Korean armistice agreement was formally signed, and then some weapons ordered by the Soviet Union in wartime arrived one after another. For example, the backward T-34 was equipped with 3,000 PLA fighters the following year, and the Air Force also had more than 3,000 fighters, mainly MiG-15. Peng viewed China's national defense construction from a long-term perspective, and believed that China should not buy Soviet weapons except for manufacturing air and sea equipment. After 1954, Khrushchev, who just came to power in the Soviet Union, began to provide China with the production technology and drawings of various types of army weapons in active service in order to win China's political support. At the end of 1950s, China's factories aided by the Soviet Union formed the "May 6th" series by imitation, which reached the advanced level in the world at that time in terms of light weapons. More importantly, it was able to produce independently, and gradually embarked on the road of innovation from imitation.
The biggest gain of the Soviet Union's invasion of China to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea was to help China establish its industrial base and initially lay the foundation for the "two bombs" cause. After 1952, the Soviet Union agreed to build 156 construction projects (that is, the "156 project" that spread all over the country in that year), in which Stalin decided 14 1 and Khrushchev added 15 to improve the technical level and finally implemented it. 19571June 15, Khrushchev ruled out military opposition and made a decision. China and the Soviet Union reached the Agreement on New Technologies for National Defense, stipulating that the Soviet Union would provide China with the latest equipment production lines and production technologies such as missiles, nuclear bombs, MIG -2 1. Although this agreement was interrupted by Khrushchev three years later (Russian archives proved that it was his personal decision to break the contract without central discussion), it finally laid the cornerstone. The equipment provided by the Soviet side is not free, but priced at cost. At the same time, it provides all the technologies of a complete set of engineering project design free of charge, and has also sent 1000 experts to China to teach technology first-hand. This kind of free technical assistance is the most precious to China.
Looking back on the historical process of introducing Soviet weapons and equipment during the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, people can observe and analyze it according to the dichotomy advocated by Mao Zedong: on the one hand, it is of great significance to see that the Soviet Union supported China in equipment and technology, which is of great significance to the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea; On the one hand, the Soviet leaders showed the attitude of national egoism, which made China unhappy on some issues. When Sino-Soviet relations are friendly, people often mention the former; When China and the Soviet Union are in opposition, people often only refer to the latter. This one-sided way of looking at problems is not a scientific attitude. When people enter the era of commodity economy, it is naturally easier to understand this problem.
During the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea and several years after the war, China has made brilliant achievements in military construction, from which we can see the extreme importance of building an independent defense industrial system, otherwise we will always want something from others. In addition, China should not fall into excessive idealism when dealing with foreign exchanges. At that time, the "brother party" still put its own interests first, and don't expect them to have "selfless" help. China people should also pay attention to mutual benefit when giving foreign aid. Deng Xiaoping later proposed that national interests should not be determined by ideology, which was also a reflection on Sino-Soviet relations in that year to a great extent.