The goal of financial supervision
The history of modern financial development is also a history of financial crisis. Every crisis has made the government have a deeper understanding of the objectives of financial supervision.
Since the reform and opening up, China's financial supervision has basically been a dual goal: financial stability and financial development. Financial stability is an international practice and common sense, and financial development is a special national condition of China as a post-developing country. Focusing on the dual goals, each financial regulatory agency has its own emphasis in different periods, especially in maintaining financial stability, both in legislation and institutional setup.
However, in recent years, with the accumulation of residents' wealth, banks, securities and insurance institutions have made great efforts to compete for personal wealth management, aiming at basic financial products such as stocks, bonds, funds and private equity. With the help of Internet finance, individuals often become victims of illegal fund-raising, financial fraud and illegal financial management, causing local financial risks. At present, China's per capita GDP is close to 8000 US dollars, and it is expected to exceed 1000 US dollars by 2020. A larger proportion of family and personal wealth will shift from deposits and real estate to complex and diverse financial products, and the financial protection for consumers will become more and more prominent.
Drawing lessons from international experience and focusing on the development trend of the roof financial industry in the world, its financial supervision goal is to maintain fair transactions between individuals and financial institutions and prevent financial fraud, and it should build a ternary goal of stability, development and fair transactions. Only in this way can we make forward-looking institutional arrangements in financial legislation, establishment of financial institutions and maintenance of financial market order.
Financial supervision system
The collapse of A-share market at the turn of spring and summer of 2065438+2005 exposed the pain points of separate supervision in China. The "railway police" manage each stage of supervision, which can neither grasp the whole picture of the financial market nor adapt to the surging expansion of mixed operation reality. Generally speaking, the current separation system with the institutional subject as the regulatory boundary has the following drawbacks:
The first is to supervise the whole package of benefits. Taking the asset management business that has expanded rapidly in recent years as an example, China Banking Regulatory Commission, China Securities Regulatory Commission and China Insurance Regulatory Commission have different standards and constraints on the number of qualified investors, investment threshold, fundraising methods, venture capital, investment scope, etc. for businesses that are essentially the same or consistent, which leads market participants to arbitrage widely across departments, markets and institutions through loosely regulated institutions or designing multi-layered nested products.
The second is the regulatory vacuum. In recent years, Internet finance, financial holding companies, asset securitization and private wealth management are four new things in China's financial industry. The four new financial formats span the banking, securities and insurance industries. Faced with such a mixed situation, the mentality of banks, securities and insurance companies is very complicated, and they want to manage it but are afraid of not managing it well. In the end, the collective choice is to tie up its own border fence, regardless of the overlapping blank areas. Due to the blank of supervision, new finance grows wildly and local risks occur frequently.
The third is the blind spot of supervision. Now, an understanding of the 20 15a stock crash is that OTC funds have broken through the regulatory barriers by using the respective rules of China Banking Regulatory Commission, China Securities Regulatory Commission and China Insurance Regulatory Commission. The regulatory authorities are all information islands, and no regulatory authority can grasp the source and agglomeration dynamics of the funds entering the market in the whole process and chain. This kind of supervision blind spot exists in a large number of business joints between "one line, three meetings" and the foreign exchange bureau.
Fourth, supervision goes against the trend. Since the 1980s, major economies such as Britain, Germany, France and Japan have moved towards mixed operation and mixed supervision. From 65438 to 0999, the Clinton administration of the United States promulgated the Financial Services Modernization Act, which completely ended the restrictions on mixed operation. However, when major economic powers changed from separate operation to mixed operation, China established the CSRC, CIRC and CBRC in 1992, 1998 and 2003. With the deepening of finance, separate operation and supervision are out of date.
The fifth is to divide the market. Building a unified big market has always been an important goal and direction of China's market-oriented reform. The separate supervision system automatically extends the separate supervision to separate market supervision, rule competition and approval competition, but they are not interconnected.
In view of the deficiency of separate supervision, various circles in China have conducted extensive discussions. In this regard, the author suggests that in the design of system reform, the following three principles should be clearly followed: first, the principle of checks and balances of power, and no regulatory agency is allowed to have excessive power; The second is the principle of mixed supervision, which is the general trend, and the supervision system needs to conform to the development trend; Third, the principle of dual protection of financial producers and financial consumers, to protect the stable operation of financial producers and the fair participation of financial consumers in transactions.
According to the above principles, on the basis of fully considering China's national conditions and drawing lessons from the financial supervision system reform in various countries after the subprime mortgage crisis, the optional reform schemes are as follows:
First, enrich the two functions of the central bank, namely, macro-prudential management function and financial information statistics function. To this end, a financial macro-prudential management bureau is established within the central bank, which is responsible for the identification, analysis, monitoring and response plan of systemic financial risks, and formulates macro-prudential supervision tools and indicators such as countercyclical capital and industrial capital; Enrich the statistical function of financial information, make it clear that all financial supervision departments, financial institutions and financial markets have the obligation to submit financial information to the central bank, make it clear that the central bank uniformly formulates statistical standards for the financial industry, and make it clear that the central bank is the centralized statistical department for financial information in the country.
The second is to merge the "three meetings" into the "two meetings", that is, to adjust and merge the China Banking Regulatory Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commission and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission, and to establish the China Financial Industry Supervision and Management Committee and the China Financial Consumer Protection Committee. The supervision scope of the Financial Industry Supervision Committee covers all financial institutions and all local and foreign currency financial markets. Business departments can be set up according to five major sectors, namely, systemically important financial control group supervision sector, banking supervision sector, securities sector, insurance sector and financial market sector. The supervision scope of the Consumer Protection Committee of the financial industry covers all financial businesses with consumers, including deposits and loans, bank cards, payment and wealth management. , and all accept the functional supervision of the Consumer Protection Committee. Integrate the Consumer Protection Bureau and the Banking Regulatory Commission's Bureau for Combating Illegal Fund Raising. Within the scope of the current "one line, three meetings", we should distinguish responsibilities from the aspects of fair trade, property safety, independent choice and informed education, bring credit rating agencies and personal financial planning consulting services into the scope of supervision, and establish financial consumers' associations and financial industry associations.
Financial legal issues
Financial law is the carrier and guarantee of the financial system. Whether the financial system is advanced or not is closely related to financial legislation. The so-called modernization of national financial governance system is the modernization of financial law. At present, there are four main problems in China's financial law:
First of all, the legal boundaries are vague. Even including the State Council's laws and regulations, China's financial laws and regulations are still very limited compared with developed countries such as the United States, Japanese and German. So far, China has not formulated the basic laws on futures, foreign exchange and financial derivatives.
Second, the contents of laws and regulations are not detailed and not practical. Many laws and regulations become the basic laws of the regulatory authorities, and then each department formulates normative documents before the laws and regulations can be implemented.
Third, too much legislation reflects the will of the regulatory authorities. Due to the complexity and professionalism of the financial industry, the legislature is often unable to get rid of the influence of the regulatory authorities in terms of the power boundary and the thickness of legal provisions, and even becomes a tool to legalize power.
Fourth, the law is slow to update. Due to the rapid economic and financial development in China, laws and regulations often lag behind the reality of financial development, and the result is either to inhibit financial innovation and development, or to constantly test or challenge the legal and regulatory bottom line of market participants.
Solving financial legal problems needs to be incorporated into the national governance system and governance capacity, including the professionalization and specialization of legislative talents. At present, in order to standardize mixed operation, it is imperative to give priority to revising and perfecting the Securities Law and the Trust Law.
At present, the securities law is about to be amended. It is necessary to develop multi-level capital market and strengthen investor protection, but it is more urgent to expand the definition of "securities". In recent years, the so-called mixed operation, in addition to cross-industry licensing and cross-industry operation of financial institutions, is more important to cross-market investment and financing. Banks, trust companies, securities companies, Public Offering of Fund subsidiaries, private equity funds and insurance asset management companies. Focus on wealth management business and enter the other market for all-round competition. Similar businesses, but different regulatory rules lead to the prevalence of regulatory arbitrage.
20 17 the revision of China's securities law is accelerating. It is suggested to lay a legal foundation for mixed operation and supervision, and at least include all kinds of asset management collective fund plans in the definition of "securities".
Trust law is another basic law to manage mixed operation, especially in civil law countries. 200 1 1 China Trust Law was formally implemented. At present, trust law faces several major problems in content and practice: first, it is narrowly confined to trust company law; The second is shelved, and there are few court cases. The CSRC and the CIRC are afraid of introducing the trust law and stepping on the "feet" of the CBRC, and choose to turn a blind eye; Third, the content does not adapt to the development and changes of the financial industry.
From the experience of foreign countries, the trust law regulates the wealth management system, not a corporate business, and there is no such financial institution as a trust company. Through the trust law, countries have legally stipulated the rights and responsibilities of the parties entrusted by others to manage their finances, especially the division of trust property and the obligations of the trustee. At present, the financial market in China is chaotic, and the fundamental reason is the weakness and emptiness of the trust law.
Therefore, it is suggested to start the revision of the Trust Law as soon as possible, and bring all kinds of asset management businesses managed by CBRC, CSRC and CIRC under the norms of the Trust Law. Focus on improving the trust registration system, trust tax system, customer loyalty system and public trust system.
State-owned financial problems
At present, in all industries of the national economy, the leading position of the state-owned economy in the financial industry is the first, regardless of its scale or influence. In the financial industry, the state-owned economic component of the banking industry is particularly prominent, accounting for more than 60% of the total assets.
The leading position of the state-owned economy in the financial industry is conducive to macro-control, to maintaining financial stability, to resolving local financial risks, and to coordinating with the major national economic strategic deployment. However, while gaining the above advantages, there are also many problems, which can be attributed to inefficiency. Due to the insurmountable defects in the corporate governance structure of state-owned economic banks, they are biased towards the state-owned economy in capital investment, emphasizing conservatism in business style and lacking long-term incentives in assessment mechanism. Therefore, banks put a lot of low-cost funds into inefficient state-owned enterprises and local government financing platforms.
In recent years, financing is difficult and expensive, which is mainly reflected in private enterprises, chaotic channel business in asset management market, nested business, etc., and its root is that it is difficult for private enterprises to obtain low-cost funds through formal channels.
The past reform practice has proved that the separation of government and enterprise and the separation of government and capital can not solve the problem of low efficiency of state-owned enterprises. In the final analysis, state-owned enterprises are essentially the direct allocation of resources by the government. The secret of the success of state-owned big banks from "technical bankruptcy" more than ten years ago to today's world financial giants is: the government divests non-performing assets+government capital injection+government inclined listing financing+long-term high spread protection, government support plays a major role, and its marketization ability is limited. Therefore, according to the requirements of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee on actively developing mixed ownership economy and promoting state-owned enterprises to improve the modern enterprise system, it is suggested to speed up the reform of state-owned economy in banking.
First, several large state-owned banks will be gradually transformed into mixed-ownership enterprises dominated by state-owned capital. Gradually and orderly replace the capital injection of CIC or Huijin with private capital through market-oriented mechanisms and means, and the proportion of state-owned capital will fall below 50%, and the largest shareholder of the controlling shareholder will be above 50%.
The second is to transform state-owned joint-stock banks other than the six major banks of China, agriculture, industry, construction, communications and postal savings into mixed-ownership enterprises with private capital as the mainstay and state-owned capital as the supplement. State-owned capital is only an important major shareholder, not a controlling position, but more of a strategic financial holder.
The third is to speed up the audit of small and medium-sized banks run by private capital. The market positioning of small and medium-sized banks is to absorb local deposits and issue loans to local banks, similar to community banks in the United States. The government's policy of opening small and medium-sized banks to private capital should be transparent, concise and convenient, and the threshold requirements should be limited to: establishing a relatively standardized joint-stock system with clear property rights; Meet the capital adequacy requirements; Participate in the deposit insurance system; The market positioning is clear. As long as the established enterprises meet the above requirements, they should be approved to engage in banking business as soon as possible.
The fourth is to deepen the reform of the enterprise system of state-owned big banks. Establish a professional manager system and implement a more market-oriented management selection method. The chairman and president shall be elected by the board of directors. Establish benign management incentives to ensure that senior managers take the interests of shareholders as their main goal. Under the premise of market-oriented selection and employment, executive compensation should be completely market-oriented.
(The author is a visiting professor at the Institute of International Economics of Nankai University)