Mainly to cope with the adverse impact of the financial crisis on China's economic growth, the central bank implemented a loose monetary policy, which led to the flooding of financial market liquidity. Generally speaking, the central bank issued too much money to put into the market, which diluted the "gold content" (that is, value) of the money in our hands.

According to the data released by the central bank in June 5,438+101,RMB loans increased by 7.95 trillion yuan in 20 10, which was significantly higher than the target of 7.5 trillion yuan set at the beginning of the year, and also higher than the level that the decision-makers hoped to control within 7.8 trillion yuan since the fourth quarter.

In February of 65438, RMB loans increased by 480.7 billion yuan, an increase of/kloc-0.07 billion yuan year-on-year, which was higher than the predictions of many investment bank economists. At the end of 20 10, the broad money supply (M2) increased by 19.7% year-on-year, with an increase rate of 0.2 percentage points higher than that at the end of last month and 8.0 percentage points lower than that at the end of last year, but higher than the growth target of 17% set at the beginning of the year.

In the fourth quarter, the capital inflow was still relatively fast. By the end of 20 10, the balance of China's foreign exchange reserves was $2,847.3 billion, up by 18.7% year-on-year, and the annual foreign exchange reserves increased by $44,865,438+86 million. In the fourth quarter, foreign exchange reserves increased by $65.438+099.035 billion, reaching a quarterly high of $ 654.38+0997 after the third quarter. Among them, 10 month,1/month and12.596 billion US dollars, 6.9/kloc-0.00 billion US dollars and 79.529 billion US dollars increased respectively.

In June 5438+February, the central bank added 403.3 billion yuan of foreign exchange to hedge capital inflows, which was at a high level.

At present, China's macroeconomic policy is still too loose. This will create the illusion of rapid economic growth in the short term, but in the long run, this loose macro policy will cause greater obstacles to controlling inflation.

20 10 in the fourth quarter, China's GDP increased by 9.8% year-on-year, "obviously exceeding expectations". This means that the annual GDP growth rate (seasonally adjusted) has obviously rebounded from 9.4% in the third quarter to around 12% in the fourth quarter.

At present, the inflationary pressure is already great. If the real economy continues to grow at an annualized rate of 12%, it will further worsen inflation and bring risks to macro stability. He predicted that the annual CPI of China may rise to 5% in 20 1 1 year, higher than the previous forecast of 4.4%. Moreover, in the second quarter of this year, China's CPI may reach 6%.

First of all, inflation expectation itself may lead to the acceleration of money flow, thus increasing inflationary pressure. Considering that the growth of the real economy exceeds expectations, it will further lead to the rise of raw materials and energy prices and increase inflation expectations.

Behind the unexpected growth of the real economy, an important reason is that the monetary environment is too loose. In 20 10, the year-on-year growth rate of broad money and loans nationwide was close to 20%, exceeding the M2 growth target of 17% set at the beginning of the year. 20 1 1, if the M2 growth target is set at 16%, it is "still too fast" for China.

Secondly, rents, raw materials and food prices are all rising. After the house price rises sharply, after the time lag of June-65438+February, the rent will accelerate the price increase, and the price increase of a series of raw materials will inevitably lead to the price increase of consumer goods in the next few months. For example, an 86% increase in the price of 20 10 cotton will inevitably lead to an increase in the price of 201clothing.

It is worth noting that the wholesale price of agricultural products has risen rapidly in recent weeks and will soon be transmitted to the price of processed food.

20 10 agricultural harvest. This shows that the price increase of agricultural products is basically not a supply-side problem, but to a considerable extent should be attributed to the cost push caused by excessive economic growth. At the same time, excess liquidity has also increased the investment demand for agricultural products. "If we do not reduce the economic growth rate and control the money supply, it will be difficult to fundamentally control the rise in food prices."