Indicators used by countries around the world to monitor whether the total foreign debt is moderate mainly include:
Debt ratio, that is, the ratio of outstanding foreign debt balance to gross national product in that year. The formula is: debt ratio =× 100%.
Debt ratio, that is, the ratio of the outstanding foreign debt balance to the total export of goods and services in that year. The formula is: debt ratio =× 100%.
Debt service ratio, that is, the ratio of total debt service to total exports of goods and services in that year. The formula is: debt service rate =× 100%.
According to the internationally accepted standards, the debt ratio of 20%, 100% and the debt service ratio of 25% are the warning lines for debtor countries to control the total foreign debt. In other words, when the relevant foreign debt indicators are below the warning line, the total foreign debt is moderate and safe; On the contrary, when the relevant indicators exceed the warning line, the total foreign debt exceeds the absorption capacity and needs to be adjusted. The core of foreign debt structure management is to optimize the foreign debt structure. External debt structure refers to the arrangement, combination and mutual position of various components of external debt in the total external debt. The optimization of foreign debt structure specifically includes:
1, optimization of external debt category structure;
2. Optimize the term structure of foreign debt;
3. Optimize the foreign debt interest rate structure;
4. Optimize the foreign debt currency structure;
5. Optimize the country structure of foreign debt;
6. Optimize the foreign debt investment structure. China implements the policy of "unified leadership, division of responsibilities, strengthened management and strict control" in foreign debt management, but so far, China's foreign debt management system still lacks a centralized authority. In China, the Planning Commission determines the loan scale, issues the items and types of medium and long-term foreign debts, and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange examines and approves the financial situation of borrowers. The borrower is responsible for the specific use. This highly decentralized macro-management of foreign debt has led to a disjointed situation. To a great extent, the function of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange is only to conduct statistical monitoring of foreign debts afterwards, especially the management of window enterprises is relatively weak.
During the period of 1989, the state set up ten external financing windows (Bank of China, China International Trust and Investment Corporation, China Investment Bank, Bank of Communications, Guangdong International Trust and Investment Corporation, Shanghai International Trust and Investment Corporation, Dalian International Trust and Investment Corporation, Fujian International Trust and Investment Corporation, Tianjin International Trust and Investment Corporation and Hainan International Trust and Investment Corporation) to handle international commercial loans and issue foreign currency bonds. It is an independent enterprise in law, but with the support of the government, window enterprises often become a bridge for local governments to raise funds. Starting from the local economic interests, local governments at all levels often encourage the lending window to increase lending. Although after the 1990s, China has increasingly emphasized the separation of government and enterprise, and local governments are not allowed to use fiscal revenue to guarantee the debts of window companies, there are still many alternatives, such as the government sending letters of condolences. It is impossible for the local foreign exchange administration to intervene in this lending behavior above the local government, so that the behavior of the lending window is not constrained. However, many window companies are backward in their own management concepts and mechanisms and cannot operate according to the code of conduct of an independent market entity. There will be a phenomenon that they blindly introduce without considering the repayment ability and absorption ability of enterprises. Coupled with poor supervision and corruption, many investment decision-making mistakes have been made. The collapse of Guangdong International Trust and Investment Company fully exposed the drawbacks of this system.
According to statistics, Guangdong International Trust and Investment Corporation has total assets of 2 1, 47 1 100 million yuan, liabilities of 36165 million yuan, and is seriously insolvent, including foreign debts of 3.2 billion US dollars. The accumulation of this kind of debt is bound to go through a period of time, but because there is no authoritative foreign debt management agency to restrain its behavior, the situation has deteriorated sharply. The closure of window enterprises has affected the credibility of China's foreign loans. According to Article 3 of the Detailed Rules for the Implementation of Statistical Monitoring of External Debt issued in September, 1997:
"The State Administration of Foreign Exchange and its branches shall perform the statistical monitoring function of foreign debts according to law, and be specifically responsible for the registration and supervision of foreign debts, the examination and approval of special loan accounts and repayment accounts, the examination and approval of debt repayment, the collection and release of debt information, and the follow-up management of the use of foreign debts." In practice, SAFE only pays attention to the statistics of the quantity and structure of foreign debts, and the supervision fails to keep up with it in time.
In principle, SAFE examines and approves the loan conditions of domestic institutions. If it finds some unreasonable conditions, it should not approve them, such as the loan interest rate is much higher than the loan interest rate of borrowers with the same credit rating in the international financial market. But in fact, it is rare to refuse to approve them. The guiding ideology of SAFE is still to encourage the introduction of foreign capital, and enterprises will generally give approval as long as they have the means to sign loan contracts with foreign parties. Moreover, there is no specific regulatory policy for the use of foreign debt funds. By the end of June, 1998, China's foreign debt balance had reached nearly13.8 billion US dollars, with an increase of 5.3% in the first half of the year, which was 16.3% higher than that in the same period. Compared with the economic growth rate of less than 10% in the past two years, it was quite amazing. In particular, it is impossible for China's economy to maintain rapid growth for a long time. The outbreak of the Asian financial crisis will affect China's ability to earn foreign exchange through exports, and excessive accumulation of foreign debts will increase China's debt service burden.
According to the types of debtors, the foreign debts of foreign-invested enterprises in China have the fastest growth, accounting for an increasing proportion of the total foreign debts in the country. As China's foreign loans to foreign-invested enterprises are not included in the national foreign debt scale management, the foreign debts borrowed are registered afterwards, and there is no need to apply for approval in advance like Chinese enterprises. Therefore, the foreign debts of many foreign-invested enterprises are raised by China enterprises through foreign-invested enterprises and guaranteed by China institutions. This part of foreign debt has escaped the supervision of the safe and has become a difficult point in China's foreign debt management. 1, the proportion of basic industries in foreign debt is too high.
Because the central ministries and central banks in China hold most of the foreign debts, their investment is generally consistent with the national macro-policy intention, but the proportion of borrowing foreign debts to invest in basic industries is too large. During the Sixth Five-Year Plan period, the proportion used for basic industries accounted for 67% of the foreign debt balance. Although it declined during the Seventh Five-Year Plan and the Eighth Five-Year Plan period, it still reached more than 52%. Although this kind of foreign debt investment can alleviate the "bottleneck" restriction of China's basic industry tension on economic development and has high social benefits, its economic benefits are not high because of its large investment scale and long construction period, and it is more difficult to repay debts in the future because of its inability to earn foreign exchange.
2. The enterprise management mechanism is not perfect.
The operating mechanism of some enterprises in China is still not perfect, and they still focus on extensive management, emphasizing scale and neglecting efficiency, which has seriously affected the use effect of foreign debt, mainly in the following aspects:
(1) The feasibility study is not sufficient. Some enterprises in our country only consider whether they can borrow foreign debts, but pay little attention to their debt repayment responsibilities, underestimating the risks that may be encountered in using foreign debts. In the feasibility study of a project, the unfavorable factors are often reduced or covered up, and an effective scientific decision-making system is not established. Some projects that borrowed foreign debts were launched blindly without scientific demonstration, leaving hidden dangers of losses;
(2) Lack of corresponding supporting facilities. Due to the blind commissioning of the project, the lack of corresponding supporting funds, equipment and raw materials, and the indigestion of technology, some projects cannot be put into operation after the start of construction, and the expected benefits cannot be produced after the start of construction;
(3) Poor management. Due to the poor quality of some enterprise managers, the scientific management decisions have not been implemented, the enterprise management is chaotic, and the internal mechanism is not perfect, which leads to blind use of foreign debts and serious waste. Implicit foreign debt refers to the actual foreign debt that is outside the supervision and management of national foreign debt and is not reflected in the national foreign debt statistical monitoring system. This is a major problem in China's current foreign debt management. As these foreign debts are not registered with the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, it is difficult for the government to grasp the amount of these foreign debts and control them. Unregistered foreign debts will increase without monitoring, which will greatly threaten the financial security and stability of the whole country.
There are two main forms of China's recessive foreign debt; First, fake joint venture, real financing; Second, domestic institutions provide guarantees for overseas loans without approval.
Because the hidden foreign debt is not included in the national and local long-term planning of national economy and government social development, it is divorced from the effective management and supervision of various government departments, and it also bypasses the registration of foreign debt, which distorts the actual overseas debt figures announced by the state, which may lead to the deviation of the national macro debt management from the expected goal. One of the purposes of national foreign debt management is to reduce the debt burden of lending units and improve their solvency.
The interest rate of implicit foreign debt is generally high, and many foreign debt investment projects are not foreign exchange earning projects, which greatly increases the borrowing cost and risk. Moreover, because a large number of implicit foreign debt repayment contracts are signed privately, the sudden risk of repayment is great. Excessive debt risk and high repayment cost may lead to deviations in the implementation of the country's foreign debt management policy, which may lead to a debt repayment crisis in serious cases.