The net car limit is finally coming, such as sitting on pins and needles of the drop how to deal with themselves, and how to move around in the limited space is a topic of concern to many people.

Policy wrestling space is still there?

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Many people are counting on the fine-tuning of the rules to be "in line with the reality", and this optimism only sees the policy's affirmation of the legitimacy of the network car, but ignores the determination to cut it off completely from the cruising car.

Taxis in China's major cities are largely stereotyped as 1.6-liter A-class cars, with Shanghai transitioning from Santana to Rangyi and Touran, and Beijing dominated by Elantra. In this case, the possibility of online taxis giving up their pre-determined 2,700-millimeter wheelbase and 1.8-liter displacement, and re-exploring the positioning of cruisers is virtually nonexistent, as the policy's original intent was to make cruising taxis an important part of public transportation, but it's not the case that the policy will be a "fine-tuning". cabs to assist public **** transportation to continue to survive.

Considering that Uber started out as a high-end Uber black in the US, and became a "troublemaker" only after it became popular, it seems reasonable to drive online taxis away from the cruiser market. The control of household registration is related to the total amount of control of the network car, which is not like many people criticized as a product of planning thinking behind the times, the policy is only worried about the excessive supply of network car will squeeze the survival of the cruiser, not to mention that it is also implicit in the current production capacity and the overall goal of the de-population of the big cities.

So the core content of the new policy is actually very limited wrestling space.

It took a long time for DDT to realize this, and in the buffer period after the MOTC draft was released, the complacent DDT overestimated the countervailing power of public opinion + GR, underestimated the power of the policy, and focused all their efforts on the Ubuntu China merger.

In fact, the latter has long missed the best time for financing and expansion, only the "born proud" of the young people to "failure" coated with the "will of God to kill me, not the crime of war! The only thing is that the "proud" young people painted the "failure" as "God's will to kill me, not a crime of war". Imagine the core research and development in the United States for Uber, the Chinese young people have done the most amazing thing, but for TK burned a billion dollars, talk about the technical content, Uber young people's opportunity cost is only in the original opportunity to choose a more relaxed work.

The merger and acquisition alleviated the fear of bloodshed competition for TK, to the local Internet to frustrate the U.S. teacher and contributed to a case, of course, also suffered the public opinion after the reversal of the wood show in the forest, the wind must be destroyed by the bitterness of the bitter. The terrible thing about the new policy is that it makes some of the most original concepts in the business model of the drop face reconstruction, such as cab positioning in the end there is no profit margin of the network car?

The number of cabs in China's major cities has been constant for many years is an objective fact, Beijing has long been maintained at 67,000, Shanghai from 50,800 to 48,900, Shijiazhuang 6,700 unchanged for 14 years, many of China's major cities, cabs per million people have a rate of ownership of less than the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development in 1995, the large cities per 1,000 people not less than 2, small cities per 1,000 people not less than 0.5 vehicles, medium-sized cities can take the value of the standard in between.

SO, the question arises, why not increase the supply? The answer is simple, because it's not profitable!

China's cab share of money is generally maintained at the level of 5,000-7,000 yuan per month, Shenzhen's highest 11,743 yuan, Beijing to take the middle of about 6,200 yuan or so, a single-shift car months of children for 5,175 yuan, a double-shift car 8,280 yuan, the city's 277 cab companies monthly share of the money a total of 400 million yuan, after depreciation, insurance, various taxes, management fees, and so on, average! The profit margin is only about 3%, truly not a profitable industry.

What's worse, there is the NDRC pricing, 10 yuan in the 1990s, 10 kilometers of the "noodle", 20 years only from 1.6 yuan/kilometer jumped to 3 kilometers of 10 yuan, and then to 3 kilometers of 13 yuan, which went through countless hearings, and this pricing still can not keep up with the rate of increase of the country's people's incomes. China's per capita monthly salary was around 105 yuan in 1986, 460 yuan in 1995, and the official figure for Beijing in 2016 was 8,717 yuan, a consequence of this scissor gap that has seen cab pricing completely lose its ability to follow the market and respond to demand.

Liberalizing supply under these conditions only worsens the system of supply and demand, a lose-lose situation for cab companies and drivers.Uber and DDT drummed up the entry of social capacity to free up supply, but it did not, and could not, improve the cost structure, as platforms structured on top of private cars don't even have the cost advantages of cab companies yet.

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But then, what is Drip's response?

At least the prescriptions that have been written so far have flunked. For example, the hotly debated driverless. DDT has a huge driverless application scene, which is undoubtedly, but this industry has too many entrants, behind the scenes of the gold masters are numerous, and ultimately by who to dominate, there is a complex wrestling.

Taking a step back, even if the drop of large-scale introduction of unmanned vehicles, its commercial significance is also very limited. In December last year, the birth of the world's first unmanned California regulations clearly stipulate that the driverless car can not really "unmanned", it must be on the road with a driving qualification of a living person sitting in the driver's seat.

This means that the unmanned car not only still have to be equipped with a mother-in-law satisfied, with a local registration, more than three years of driving experience, no criminal record of qualified drivers, but also "driving" a four-wheeled machine much more expensive than a B-class car to serve.

Is there a worse cost model?

So the idea of a driverless car is not only a waste of time, it's also deceptive. In contrast, it is more reliable for DDT's urgent self-medication. As we all know, DDT's losses come mainly from low-priced competing products, but when the new policy is committed to resolving its defeat with cabs and helping it shift to the high-end market, why is DDT ungrateful and still resisting?

This begs the first question.

1, internationalization

Previous mergers and acquisitions have seen Uber pull out of China, and DDT not enter markets outside of Asia, but that didn't stop Liu Qing from talking about internationalization recently, in a speech in San Francisco and in a number of interviews, she said, "We're a sponsor of local service providers everywhere. We are patrons and believers in local service providers everywhere. If there's no local company there yet, we're going to go there ourselves and build our business. Our business will be international."

There is a deep business context to this statement, as the DDT model is difficult to value using the discounted cash flow (DCF) or normal price-to-earnings PE model common in the capital markets, and can only be valued using the P/GMV model, which bets on foresight by spelling out the total number of transactions on the platform in terms of scale (gross merchandise volume), which means that DDT can't possibly stay in a small This means that DDT can not stay in the state of small and beautiful, but can only be obsessed with the big and complete, internationalization is the inevitable choice after the Chinese market faces policy shrinkage.

The unknown lies only in the extent to which Uber, which has become DDT's top shareholder, will support DDT's approach. When the two sides merged at a 4:1 consideration, Uber's 6.7% voting rights and 20% economic interests were ostensibly the same shares with different rights, but in reality, the preferred shares held by TK could still be converted into common shares with voting rights.

2, product structure optimization

Drop is now most concerned about whether the original low-end capacity and the excess resources transferred from Uber China can survive the cold winter of the new policy, as well as how to capture incremental volume and profits from the original neglected high value-added market.

And from the internal release of the news, the feasible strategy is three:

The first is to maintain the temporary stability of the taxi and express, before the positive and negative public opinion wrestling on the drop are good, it warned of some serious consequences of the policy, released in advance of the price increase, pick single and other psychological expectations, as long as the competent authorities are not the city gate of standing timber like a thunderbolt, the short-term DDT's business counter may have a wave of quotations.

Secondly, the drop once envisioned in the fast car and special car between the increase in light luxury segregation products, with "relatively reasonable price" to take over the fast car and other low-end products to release the demand, but also in order to quell the accusations of bad service to the fast car. But this is still under discussion.

The more disruptive shift comes from the car, the drip car marketing department has issued a brand upgrade Brief, emphasizing the need to shift to high-net-worth customers, and the definition of the standard is abnormally high: the age of 25-39 years of age of high-income management and professionals, with an annual income of $ 30-2 million, the family income of three times the local average, and the family's own vehicle value of more than 300,000 yuan. .

Pleasing such a group, the driver must of course be strictly controlled, the screening ratio set by DDT is 1% plus the training and certification of the British Management Association, and in November this year to enter the Launch phase. Specifically, the drop special car from the original talk benefit to RTB Division cognitive platform, emphasizing the value of service, ride experience, this Campaign is not a little familiar?

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3, the operability of the policy

Previously said that the policy wrestling space in the disappearance of the legislative level rather than the implementation of the level of the pen on paper hostage to the wind and thunder, to the implementation of the landing on the ground there is a great deal of discretionary space, the competent authorities are also respected by the sky afraid of people, especially pay attention to the not for the "Impact on the job market", "contrary to the national entrepreneurship" and other floating discussion hurt, so the drop can wait and see what happens, rather than disorganize themselves. This is a special kind of wrestling.

If the authorities enforce the law strictly, and check the drivers and vehicles, will DDT sit on the ground and increase prices, let the driver pick single, let the authorities alone to face the angry public, but this is just a punishment, after all, the risk is too great, after the world turned upside down, DDT is not likely to be left alone.

So the drop really want to promote should be Guiyang model, as early as last November, the then drop fast chief development officer Li Jianhua visited Guiyang has big data as a pillar industry, in May this year, Cheng Wei in Guiyang 2016 International Big Data Industry Expo singing the praises of "Guiyang has occupied the future development of Internet The investment in the development of big data and the tolerance and support in innovation are all very surprising. We also hope that DDT and Guiyang will cooperate in the future in terms of big data, such as creating local government data and enterprise data open **** enjoyment of intelligent transportation pilot, so that the people's travel is more and more convenient."

By October DDT and Guiyang Transportation Bureau in cooperation with the big data interaction **** enjoyment center came into being, Guiyang's network car rules are not on the household registration, wheelbase and displacement limitations, only requires that the "bare car price is not lower than the price of cabs" only.

But to make Guiyang such an "enlightened" second-tier city particularly persuasive of the Internet, the DDT Research Institute has to produce results that are visible and tangible to the general public.

By far the biggest missed trick for DDT is the premature acquisition of Youbu China. The recent troubles, dilemmas, and controversies are all related to the merger of Youbu China, which was almost a breath of fresh air, except that the consequences have been infinitely amplified by the harsh new policies around the world.

Mozu's definition of being a "man of honor" is "a man who does what he wants to do at the expense of himself, who does what is evil for his own sake, and who does what is urgent for the sake of the people," which is what DDT did when it took over from Youbu, which had been turned into a negative asset by the new policy.