On the same day, the central bank released statistical reports on the scale increment of social financing in 20 16 and 1 year. In the first month of this year, Ma Yang's RMB loans to the real economy increased by 2.54 trillion yuan, an increase of 1.07 trillion yuan year-on-year, setting a historical record.
These two important signals mean that less than two months after 20 16, China's monetary policy has undergone major changes with the supply-side reform centered on de-capacity and de-inventory. In this regard, the pattern of 20 16 China's monetary policy has basically taken shape. To sum up, there will be the following four trends, which are the four deep meanings behind the central bank's joint eight ministries.
One; The overall amount of funds will increase greatly;
Second; Industrial credit is polarized, and credit in overcapacity areas is more polarized;
Third; A new wave of bank bad debt write-off appears;
Fourth; Taking the non-performing assets and accounts receivable of industrial enterprises as the pilot, asset securitization, which has been hesitant for many years, began to expand.
Trend 1: 20 16 money supply increased significantly.
According to the data released by the central bank today, the scale of social financing in June 20 16 was 3.42 trillion yuan, an increase of10.610.37 trillion yuan and10.37 trillion yuan respectively compared with the same period of last month and last year. Among them, RMB loans in the real economy increased by 2.54 trillion yuan in the month, an increase of 1.07 trillion yuan year-on-year.
The astonishing loan record of 2.54 trillion yuan is more than 900 billion yuan more than that of 65438+ in 20091October when China launched its 4 trillion investment plan. This is a bold test of bank lending impulse under various subjective and objective conditions after the cancellation of loan-to-deposit ratio policy in June 20 15.
The working meeting of the People's Bank of China (16) held in early October this year proposed that the main tasks of the work in 20 16 years include implementing a prudent monetary policy and preventing and resolving economic and financial risks. Among them, the expression of monetary policy operation is, "implement a prudent monetary policy and create a suitable monetary and financial environment." "Flexible use of various tool combinations to maintain a reasonable and abundant liquidity in the banking system."
Since the month of 65438+ 10, "stability" has not only become "loose" but also "beyond imagination".
The loan amount in the first month of the new year shows that the whole 20 16 will adopt a looser monetary policy to ensure the monetary demand brought about by the dual tasks of industrial restructuring and the smooth operation of the real economy. Although the growth rate of money supply will gradually decrease from February, the scale of the first month determines that the money supply this year will be much more than that in 20 15 years.
From the practical point of view, the monetary policy of 20 16 is by no means stable, but very loose. Of course, looseness is relative. Eight ministries and commissions jointly issued "Several Opinions on Financial Support for Stable Industrial Growth, Adjusting Structure and Increasing Efficiency", which clarified the keynote and specific areas of credit to maintain growth and suppress growth.
Simply from the credit structure of June 5438+ 10, the loans are all aimed at the real economy. While physical loans increased by 2.54 trillion yuan, all kinds of bills accounted for a very small proportion, which was in obvious contrast with the situation that bills accounted for 30% of the money supply in June 2009. It shows that Yang Ma is more "quick, accurate and ruthless" in dealing with the current difficult real economy than in 2009.
Of course, there is also a reason for the surge in money supply in June 5438+ 10.
Traditionally, 65438+ 10 is basically the month with the largest credit supply in the whole year. The biggest difference between 2065438+June 2006 and 2065438+20061October is the seasonality and the surge in demand.
1; Seasonal factors include two points: the growth of broad money (M2) in February was 13.3%, which was 438+0 1.4 percentage points lower than that at the end of October; In that month, RMB loans amounted to 597.9 billion yuan, up 14.3% year-on-year, 0.6 percentage points lower than that of the previous month. Generally lower than market expectations, which may include the central bank guiding active regulation through the window. However, June 5438+February is the window period of intensive decentralization of various stable growth investment projects in the central government.
The reduction of monetary investment and the increase of project investment, and the matching of supply and demand of credit funds generated by the reduction and increase need to be completed in 20 16 1. This is a seasonal factor.
Secondly, in the last two months of 20 15, a large number of steady growth investment projects were released, and the central financial funds were already in place, which urgently needed credit funds to keep up.
At the same time, the profitability of commercial banks is declining, so it is urgent to improve the profitability. There are two ways for China commercial banks to improve their profitability: intermediary business and loans. In the process of lending, we can only increase the scale of lending without meeting the short-term interest rate hike conditions. Lending in 65438+ 10 month means the annual interest period. This is the second seasonal factor.
2; Demand surge: mainly from two aspects, a large number of steady growth investment projects need matching funds to start construction as soon as possible; The fluctuation and pain caused by the supply-side reform with the core of de-capacity and de-inventory need to be ironed out by credit to prepare funds and choose the opportunities of bankruptcy liquidation, merger and reorganization and capacity withdrawal.
Of course, in addition to the above two points, the cancellation of loan-to-deposit ratio, a commercial bank, further released the bank's lending impulse at 20 15+00.
However, although there are various factors that lead to a substantial increase in credit in June 20 16, it does not hinder the overall prediction of monetary policy operation in 20 16: loose, cautious and very loose.
Trend 2: Credit is obviously polarized.
Eight ministries and commissions, including the Central Bank, the National Development and Reform Commission and the China Banking Regulatory Commission, jointly issued "Several Opinions on Financial Support for Stable Industrial Growth, Structural Adjustment and Efficiency Increase", which clarified the differentiated operation of credit from two levels:
The first level is about the whole industrial field:
1; Insurance: Seven Key Areas
These seven fields include: strategic emerging industries, technological transformation and upgrading of traditional industries, high-tech enterprises, major technical equipment, strong industrial infrastructure projects and other supporting fields, "Made in China 2025", new energy vehicles and other consumer industries.
Specific measures include: guiding financial institutions to increase investment in medium and long-term loans, providing all-round services for the financial industry, appropriately reducing the down payment ratio of new energy vehicles and used car loans, and rationally expanding automobile consumption credit;
Encourage insurance asset management institutions to accelerate the innovation of asset management products such as debt investment plan, equity investment plan and combination of stock and debt, and provide financial support for strategic emerging industries and advanced manufacturing industries.
2; Pressure: five areas of overcapacity
The five major fields include: steel, nonferrous metals, building materials, ships and coal.
Specific measures include:
No credit will be granted to new capacity construction projects in industries with serious overcapacity that have not obtained legal procedures;
Resolutely reduce and withdraw relevant loans for "zombie enterprises" with long-term losses, loss of solvency and market competitiveness, or enterprises with substandard environmental protection and safety production, hopeless rectification and backward production capacity;
Strengthen the binding force of directory management, standardized management and other means to improve the credit reference value of "white list" and "blacklist";
The second level, specifically for the five overcapacity industries:
1; Insurance: three types of enterprises;
These three types of enterprises are: competitive, marketable and profitable.
Specific measures include: continuing to provide credit support to help promising enterprises tide over the difficulties;
Formulate an action plan for bank-enterprise docking and actively promote information docking between banks and enterprises;
Vigorously develop green credit business such as energy efficiency credit, pledge loan of future income right of contract energy management, mortgage loan of emission right and mortgage loan of carbon emission right;
Accelerate the development of enterprise asset securitization business such as accounts receivable securitization and revitalize the existing assets of industrial enterprises;
Improve M&A loan business, further expand the scale of M&A loan, and reasonably determine the loan term;
For industrial enterprises with temporary difficulties and reasonable market expectations for future cash flows, their debt burden and leverage ratio can be effectively reduced through debt restructuring.
2; Pressure: three types of enterprises.
Specifically, it includes: new capacity construction projects with illegal procedures; "Zombie enterprises" with long-term losses, loss of solvency and market competitiveness; Enterprises and backward production capacity whose environmental protection and safety production are not up to standard and whose rectification is hopeless.
Specific policies include: stop lending, stop lending, and compulsory bankruptcy liquidation.
Trend 3: A new wave of bank bad debt write-off appears.
The last wave of bad debt write-off in China occurred in the late 1990s, which was the biggest wave of state-owned enterprise reform in history. With great determination, courage and cost, the central government has launched a round of positive reform programs for bankruptcy, restructuring, layoffs and debt write-off of state-owned enterprises. Now let's look at this state-owned enterprise reform plan. Although it cost a lot at that time, it has benefited China's economy since then.
But this is still an incomplete reform of state-owned enterprises, and the "dividend after China's entry into WTO" and the "golden decade" driven by investment at that time ironed out the pain of reform. However, the supply-side reform initiated this time faces a different situation: the problems to be solved are more complicated, but the policy dividend of reform and opening up has not yet reached the window period.
However, to complete this supply-side reform, completely eliminate backward production capacity and clean up zombie enterprises, only in this way can we completely liberate a large number of human and material resources, credit and financial resources, and the transformation and upgrading of industrial structure can see results.
Therefore, the "Several Opinions on Financial Support for Stable Industrial Growth, Structural Adjustment and Efficiency Increase" jointly issued by the Central Bank, China Banking Regulatory Commission and other eight ministries and commissions clearly stated that banks should be prepared to write off and dispose of all kinds of bad debts. But at the same time, we should also pay attention to dealing with risks and resolutely hold the bottom line that regional and systemic financial risks will not occur.
The tone of the central bank is also rare in recent years: make full use of the existing write-off policy, speed up the write-off progress, and achieve "all nuclear should be done."
From 20 14 to 20 15, with the bankruptcy cases of steel, photovoltaic, shipbuilding and other industries, banks actually began to write off debts. However, the debt write-off in 20 16 will be more concentrated and large-scale.
With the slogan of "Several Opinions on Financial Support for Stable Industrial Growth, Restructuring and Increasing Efficiency", the central bank has loosened the commercial banks that have been timid, which means that it is necessary to put down the ideological burden and do it boldly in the write-off and disposal of bad debts.
However, debt cancellation will also be selective, specifically:
1; State-owned enterprises will give priority.
First, because of the national conditions; Second, because the policy operation is better; The third is to prevent some enterprises, especially private enterprises, from "malicious insurance" and "moral hazard" and other negative effects.
2; "Zombie enterprises" will be given priority and determined consideration.
Those "zombie enterprises" or private enterprises will adopt the policy of "more mergers and less bankruptcy" to promote debt restructuring. Or, simply follow the newly revised enterprise bankruptcy law and enter bankruptcy proceedings.
However, according to the "Several Opinions on Financial Support for Stable Industrial Growth and Structural Adjustment to Increase Efficiency" jointly issued by eight ministries and commissions, the difficulty in writing off bad debts lies in how to define zombie enterprises.
The write-off and disposal of bad debts is the key and sensitive point of this round of capacity reduction, especially the key, which is easy to cause social problems. If there is no clear definition and disposal standard, it will greatly affect the policy operation.
Trend 4: the securitization of non-performing assets and accounts receivable assets has been promoted.
Taking the non-performing assets and accounts receivable of industrial enterprises as the pilot, asset securitization, which has been hesitant for many years, began to expand. Previously, there were many calls for asset securitization and some attempts, but most of them were operated around some high-quality assets. Entering the field of non-performing assets and accounts receivable to test water is a bold attempt by financial forces to reform the supply side.
However, the experiment of asset securitization of non-performing assets and accounts receivable will not be pushed far away, and the scope should be very small. After all, because there are many links involved, and many domestic intermediary markets engaged in asset securitization are not perfect, a good credit system needs long-term construction.
The attitude of the central bank is also very cautious: "On the premise of prudence and safety, select a few qualified financial institutions to explore the pilot of non-performing asset securitization. Accelerate the development of enterprise asset securitization business such as accounts receivable securitization and revitalize the stock assets of industrial enterprises. "
In addition, the central bank and other documents of eight ministries and commissions also proposed to speed up the securitization of housing and auto loan assets.
No matter how big the steps can be, the reform has taken another step.